Chazzsongs News Thailand

`Bangkok Post' daily acts as voice of Zionist lobby in Thailand

2007-04-05T12:12:00.000-04:00

`Bangkok Post' daily acts as voice of Zionist lobby in Thailand

Thailand Zionists

The Thai daily Bangkok Post affiliated to Thailand's Zionist lobby has been acting as the voice of Tel Aviv in the major developments of the Middle East and world of Islam.

During the 33-day war launched by the Zionist regime against the defenseless people of Lebanon, in particular the disastrous genocide in Ghana which provoked worldwide protest, in the articles of Bangkok Post, the oppressed Lebanese people were branded as terrorists.

Meanwhile, concerning the issued related to Iran, the Thai daily gives special attention to the interests of the Zionist regime.

The growing trend of Iran-Thailand political, economic and cultural relations, which naturally makes Iran's role in the issues associated with Thai Muslims more decisive, has always been challenged by this daily.

In the editorial of its Monday issue, Bangkok Post raised questions on Iran's stance on British marines' violation of the country's territorial waters by repeating the claims of the media associated with Zionist organizations.

The daily accused Iran's coast guards of taking into custody the British marines in the territorial waters of Iraq.

Upon illegal entry into Iran's territorial waters on March 23, 2007, fifteen British marines were arrested by Iranian coast guards.

Following such a violation, without paying any attention to the data and information registered in the Global Positioning System (GPS) of the arrested marines, British officials attempted to pretend through extensive media and political propaganda that their servicemen have been arrested in Iraqi waters.

The arrested marines confessed to their illegal entry into Iran's waterways and apologized to the Iranian people.

The media experts of Southeast Asia believe that the Bangkok Post editorial is in line with the goals of the media centers associated with Zionists aiming to make Iran give up its inalienable international rights.

Dismantling Thailand's Shin Corp

2007-03-11T16:39:00.000-04:00

Dismantling Thailand's Shin Corp

By Shawn W Crispin

BANGKOK - With this week's takeover of iTV, Thailand's new military rulers have made their first move toward dismantling the telecommunication and media empires that once provided the behind-the-scenes financial firepower for ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra's once powerful, now diminished, political juggernaut.

iTV represented a small part of the Shin Corp's corporate expanse, which currently includes major holdings in telecoms, satellites, aviation, property development, consumer finance and the Internet. Its mobile telecoms subsidiary, Advanced Info Services (AIS), provides the lion's share of the conglomerate's profits and catapulted Thaksin to billionaire status before he divested his shares to family members when he took up the premiership in 2001.

The company's profits soared during Thaksin's political tenure, padded by his government's policies aimed at pumping up domestic consumption through aggressive state-bank lending and assorted cheap-credit schemes. With Shin Corp's share price near a record high, and popular political pressure mounting against Thaksin, in January 2006 his family sold the company to Singapore's state-run Temasek Holdings in a controversial US$1.9 billion transaction.

The company has been under political assault ever since the military seized power from Thaksin in a bloodless putsch last September. A Thai court last year ruled that iTV had breached the terms of its original 1995 build-transfer-operate concession with the Prime Minister's Office and imposed more than $2.2 billion in fines, fees and owed interest payments. The station failed to meet a recent payment deadline and the military junta rescinded its operating concession and is in the process of determining which assets it can legally repossess.

To some market watchers, the highly anticipated move represents a form of forced nationalization of a foreign-held asset. Shin Corp's shares fell 2.6% the day after iTV's closure and so far Temasek has remained mum about the losses it will incur because of the station's demise. In part, that's because iTV was the only perennial loss-maker among the Shin Corp's otherwise profitable stable of companies.

But iTV's nationalization likely represents the first of a series of controversial moves to dismantle and then redistribute to politically preferred players the Shin Corp's various communications assets operated under state concessions. Coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratklin has in recent weeks stated the junta's intention for national-security interests to seize three communications satellites that Temasek now majority-owns through Shin Corp subsidiary Shin Satellite.

The potentially bigger blow will come if and when the junta follows through on its apparent plans to rescind AIS's operating concession. Pridiyathorn Devakula, the interim military government's finance minister and deputy prime minister for economic affairs until last week, in January told a private meeting of foreign analysts gathered to discuss amendments to the Foreign Business Act that it was "only a matter of time" before they rescinded AIS's build-operate-transfer concession, according to an analyst who was in attendance and who spoke to Asia Times Online on condition of anonymity.

The Council of State is now reviewing legal matters surrounding a possible concession rescission, which reportedly could be justified by alleged irregularities in the manner in which AIS received its concession from the state-owned Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) back in 1992. If so, it's unclear whether the council's legal interpretation would allow for the government to make retroactive demands - as it did in the iTV case - that would require AIS to pay the state potentially billions of dollars' worth of penalties on previous profits and revenues.

Money in the bank
Those penalties could potentially be seized from the $1.9 billion the Shinawatra family received in the Temasek transaction and now reportedly holds in interest-bearing accounts at Siam Commercial Bank, which is controlled by the royal family's Crown Property Bureau. Arguably, financial markets have not fully priced this risk into the Shin Corp's share price, which has fallen from 31 baht per share on the day of last year's coup to 24.6 at Thursday's close of trading.

Large foreign hedge funds, including the United States' Farallon Capital, at least into February held AIS's liquid shares in some of their emerging-markets portfolios. Fitch Ratings recently placed AIS on a rating negative watch because of what it referred to as "heightening policy, regulatory, and legal risks that could substantially affect the major telecom operators in Thailand" and that "rising policy uncertainties may lead to a review of concessions".

HSBC has recently warned its clients about the possibility of a nationalization of Shin Satellite's assets, but one of its senior analysts who spoke on condition of anonymity to Asia Times Online said that its telecommunications department had not yet issued a similar downgrade warning on AIS because of a lack of evidence about the government's plans. Shin Corp chief executive officer Boonklee Plangsiri failed to reply to e-mailed questions from Asia Times Online about reports that AIS is poised to lose its operating concession.

Certain hedge-fund managers and investment bankers who have recently visited Thailand and met with Asia Times Online have universally asserted that if the government moves on AIS on perceived flimsy legal grounds it will further undermine broad investor confidence, not only in its economic management but, more crucially, in its ability to protect foreign investments legally.

"It would represent the last straw," said one senior hedge-fund manager, who, like many foreign portfolio investors, ill-received the junta's December 19 surprise move to impose capital controls on certain types of short-term foreign investments as well as its planned nationalistic amendments to the Foreign Business Act, which are scheduled to take effect this month.

Dampened foreign sentiment is arguably already taking an adverse toll on the Thai economy. Some foreign investment banks have recently downgraded their economic-growth forecasts below 4% for this year, because of stagnant new private investment, declining domestic consumption, and signs that the bureaucracy has been slow to disperse fiscal stimulus measures. According to Phatra Securities, a local investment bank, nearly $1 billion worth of capital flowed out of Thailand in January because of the 30% non-interest-bearing reserve requirement on foreign investments included in the capital controls.

That increasingly puts the junta between a rock and a hard economic place in its apparent pursuit of dismantling Thaksin's commercial legacy. Yet there are a number of other legal avenues the junta could pursue against Shin Corp, including possible charges of tax evasion, subversion of the judicial process, and constitutional transgressions, that would present a more genuine veneer of legal impartiality - while allowing the junta to accomplish the same political ends.

Never tried charges
Shin Corp and its subsidiaries were widely recognized throughout their corporate histories as some of Thailand's best-managed companies. Yet there are a handful of controversial episodes that under Thaksin's political tenure were arguably under-investigated, but through new independent probes might cast the company's tightly managed image of good governance into doubt - or worse.

One strongly alleged - but never investigated nor tried in court - tax-evasion case stands out in particular. A lightly circulated October 2003 research report by Pyramid Research, a US-based consulting firm, raises hard questions about possible tax evasion related to AIS's use of the 1800 bandwidth frequency acquired in its purchase of the Digital Phone Company (DPC) in 2000 from Samart PCL and Telekom Malaysia.

The well-reasoned report contends that AIS, then facing a serious capacity crunch, was systematically underreporting the number of post-paid customers it was roaming on to DPC's network, in effect allowing AIS to avoid paying the higher concession fees DPC contractually owed the state. Under the DPC's operating concession, it was required to pay 32% of its revenues to the state-owned operator-cum-regulator TOT; AIS's concession, on the other hand, only required it to pay 24%.

Moreover, the report made compelling thitherto-unexplored allegations that under Thaksin's government the TOT and AIS had entered into a de facto "strategic partnership" that gave AIS an edge over its local competitors. The report noted one particular example of AIS selling its loss-making pager company in 2002 to TOT for 255.78 million baht (about $7.75 million at the current exchange rate), a generous amount considering the state agency already legally owned the assets and previously had not paid anything for other decommissioned pager companies. [1]

There are also the unresolved tax-evasion allegations lodged against Shin Satellite by an opposition politician, who based his charges on information he had received from a former company customs employee who apparently had access to documents related to the import of expensive capital equipment. That case's proceedings were thrown into a tailspin when the witness was shot and killed in 2003 by masked assassins while he was riding on his motorcycle in the northern province of Chiang Rai.

There has arguably never been a proper official investigation into the circumstances surrounding the former Shin Satellite employee's death. When this correspondent inquired about the situation in an interview with Shin Satellite CEO Dumrong Kasemset in January 2006, he immediately broke off the one-on-one interview.

At the very least, there is a compelling case for the military government to open an independent probe into both the mysterious murder and the original tax-evasion charges - neither of which has ever been given proper official treatment. It could also look into the circumstances behind the eight-year tax holiday worth $400 million the Prime Minister's Office-run Board of Investment granted Shin Satellite in 2003, representing the first, and apparently only, time the foreign-investment promotion agency made such an award to a Thai-owned company.

The government could also have pursued a more damning case involving iTV on charges that Thaksin violated constitutional press-freedom guarantees through his government's alleged manipulation of the station's news coverage to his political party's advantage. Unfortunately, the junta is in no position to take the moral high ground on press-freedom issues because of its abolition of the 1997 constitution and its own heavy-handed policies and overt censorship of the broadcast media.

Instead, the junta's handling of Shin Corp seems set to mirror its stumbling ways in prosecuting the other charges it has leveled against Thaksin and his associates to justify last year's coup. The government's enduring failure to nail down with hard corroborating evidence the corruption and political crimes Thaksin allegedly committed risks losing the support of the Bangkok elite and middle class that initially strongly backed the military intervention.
Should the junta similarly be perceived to mishandle its pursuit of charges against the Shin Corp, perhaps even more dangerously, it risks further undermining already waning foreign-investor confidence in its leadership, bringing on a destabilizing economic meltdown.

Note
1. See John Barrett's "AIS: De Facto Dual-Band Network", Pyramid Research, Asia Pacific Perspective, October 3, 2002.

Shawn W Crispin is Asia Times Online's Southeast Asia editor.

Thailand's Royal Wealth

2007-03-05T09:47:00.000-05:00

Thailand's Royal Wealth

AsiaSentinel

How Thailand’s Royals Manage to Own All the Good Stuff

A man, let’s call him Somchai, lives in a prime location in central Bangkok. Now in his sixties, Somchai designed and built his house himself nearly 30 years ago. He doesn’t own the land, but he only pays about 400 baht ($11) in rent to his landlord.

So why does he now wish he lived somewhere else?

“If I could do it all over, I wouldn’t build on this land,” he told Asia Sentinel. “There is no security. I can get kicked off at any time.”

But he won’t go voluntarily. Somchai’s land, you see, is owned by the King.

In fact, most of Bangkok’s best real estate is owned by Thailand’s royal family through the Crown Property Bureau (CBP), which manages the monarchy’s land holdings. Somchai was able to build the house by bribing bureau officials a few decades ago. Now if he sells it, 75 percent of the money will go to the CPB, giving Somchai—who is retired with little savings—no incentive to leave.

“The people around here all worry that they might be forced out, but we are too scared to talk about it,” he said.

That fear of upsetting the monarchy goes a long way to explain why so little has been written about the Crown Property Bureau. King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s golden robe shields the bureau from public criticism, allowing it to oversee a modern form of feudalism with little scrutiny.

More than any institution over the past hundred years, the CPB has shaped Bangkok and in recent years it has only picked up speed. Since recovering from huge debts incurred during the 1997 financial crisis, the CPB has aggressively sought to boost profits from its prime Bangkok land plots, often pushing out poorer shop owners and tenants that have lived on the land for generations.

The ceaseless development of huge malls, hotels and office buildings is rarely debated as the bureau avoids public criticism. When its officials do speak, they simply tout the king’s theory of a sufficiency economy, which preaches moderation, reasonableness and immunity. As the bureau has found, however, the best immunity from an economic downturn is to make sure its birthright properties are yielding large amounts of cash.

Claiming the land

Talk of that sufficiency economy has been replaced with a 13-billion-baht grand vision to turn famed Rajadamnoen Avenue in Bangkok’s historical district into a shopping street known as the “Champ Elysees of Asia” – that brand name ought to bring a smile to former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who royalist coup leaders have blasted for failing to adhere to “sufficiency economy”. The bureau owns much of the area, and said it would not renew 137 contracts after they expired in 2004.

A new part of the CPB’s strategy was to turn much of its prime land into shopping centers and luxury housing. The CPB also signed a 30-year lease with Central Pattana to transform the World Trade Centre near the Chidlom Bangkok Transit System station into Central World Tower, an enormous hotel, office and shopping plaza in the heart of Bangkok. It also joined hands with Singaporean property firm CapitaLand to form a local subsidiary.

In addition to Central World, the CPB owns the land on which a host of the city’s largest malls are located, including MBK Shopping Center, Siam Center, and Siam Paragon. Coincidentally, Kempinski Hotels and Resorts, a Europe-based company majority-owned by the bureau, will manage the new luxury hotel being built next to the Paragon.

In recent years the bureau has also shocked longtime residents of various traditional marketplace districts by giving them eviction notices. Previously they had always felt safe living on “the king’s land.” In Chinatown, Thai-Chinese families that lived on CPB land on Soi Luenrit for three generations were kicked out so a property developer could put up a jarring shopping mall that is out of character with the historic neighborhood.

In Charoen Phon, residents were told to leave their shophouses to make way for a Tesco Lotus superstore. In Klong Thom, another Chinatown market, the bureau sent marching orders so a developer could build a new market that yielded higher rents. At the old fish market on Charoen Krung on the Chao Phraya River, traders fear that thousands of unskilled laborers will soon be out of work. The CPB wants to turn the traditional market into a 7-billion-baht high-rise hotel, condominium and commercial complex. The Silom Club, an 89-year-old sports club that some regard as a historical monument, will also be turned into a high-rise.

The results of the new strategy have paid off grandly. In 2003, the CPB recorded revenue of four billion baht. About 1.7 billion baht of that came from increased rents, shattering the 1 billion baht target Bureau director-general Chirayu Isarangkun na Ayutthaya had set four years earlier. In 2004, the bureau’s earnings reached five billion baht. Chirayu announced that the CPB was now healthier than before the 1997 crisis.

Bangkok’s tallest skyscraper

The Crown owns vast tracts of Bangkok

But as the bureau’s ambitions grow, the more it is entering the public spotlight. While eviction is never easy, two high-profile spots are getting more press. At Bo Bae market, City Hall asked vendors to move off the street, where they had been blocking traffic, and into another building. Although the CPB is not evicting anyone, it owns the land and offered a concession to a developer to build a new market that was supposed to house the evicted Bo Bae vendors. Police were called in at one point when vendors refused to budge, and some have gone elsewhere. The developer, meanwhile, is upset that many in the market have not moved into the new building. The fight looks set to go on, as some vendors are standing firm and have vowed to go to jail if necessary.

A larger fight could potentially take place at the Suan Lum Night Bazaar, where reluctant vendors have been given until April to vacate what has quickly become one of the city’s surprising tourist attractions. Some see the battle over the largest plot of land in Bangkok’s central business district as a prime example of how the CPB is patient in getting what it wants.

In the 1950s, the Navy controlled this valuable plot of land next to Lumphini Park, but the military-run government of Sarit Thanarat transferred it to the Army after he suspected Naval officers of using the site to plot a coup against him. It then became home to the Armed Forces' Preparatory School, which opened in 1958.

In 1993, the CPB told the Supreme Command to move the school when its lease expired in 1999 in order to ease traffic congestion. Since then, plans for the 20.6-hectare site have been mired in controversy. Initially it was to become a 350-meter tall telecommunications tower 49 percent-owned by the bureau. Then it was set to become the headquarters for Siam Commercial Bank, in which the CPB has a controlling stake.

But all along, the military pushed for the land to become a public park in a city starved for green space. So when it emerged in 2000 that the bureau would turn the land into the Suan Lum Night Bazaar, a kitschy night market for tourists, many criticized the move. “The shopping mall is an eyesore and a disgrace,” said leaflets distributed at the site by military school alumni. “This is against a social contract made with pre-cadet students.”

The CPB responded in 2002 by saying the move was intended only to recoup some cash spent relocating the military school. In a statement reported at the time, the bureau said that long-term the land would be used for “educational, cultural and recreational purposes.”

Many suspected, however, that the bureau only wanted to lease the area to the night market in order to change the zoning from educational use to commercial and residential. That happened in 2002, when Thaksin’s government passed a law changing the status of the land plot. Indeed, by 2004 it was clear that the site was actually the pillar of the CPB's expansion plans.

Director-general Chirayu said the sprawling market would be turned into a 100-billion-baht commercial complex filled with offices, retail outlets, condominiums, entertainment venues and a hotel.

Last June, the bureau announced that it had short-listed Central Pattana Plc, Sansiri Plc and TCC Land as developers for the site. The company that operates Suan Lum also submitted a proposal to expand the site while retaining the popular Night Bazaar and its many vendors; that was rejected.

Central Pattana, which runs Central World Tower, has said it wants to redefine the city’s skyline by erecting Bangkok's tallest skyscraper on the site. The bureau is expected to announce the winner next April.

Royal cloak

This popular night market was used as a ploy to change zoning regulations Despite any setbacks, what keeps the bureau strong over the long haul is the lack of critical public input or media coverage. Sure, some attacks do appear on certain web boards, but business editors in Bangkok know better than to write anything about the CPB for fear of upsetting the monarchy, and the bureau is happy to keep it that way.

This immunity was most apparent after Singapore-government run Temasek Holdings bought Shin Corp from Thaksin’s family in January 2006. The sale was the tipping point for Thaksin, who responded to mass protests by calling early elections. Months of deadlock ensued before the military, with the backing of the palace, pushed the twice-elected premier from office. Most criticism of the deal centered on the complicated shareholding structure Temasek used to purchase Shin in such a way that it could bypass foreign ownership restrictions.

Although this seems devious, the practice had been standard operating procedure in Thailand for decades before Thaksin’s political opponents seized on the issue.

It turns out that Kularb Kaew, one of the companies in the Temasek-led consortium, was acting as a nominee for Temasek. Shareholders of Kularb Kaew included Pong Sarasin, the brother of Arsa Sarasin, King Bhumibol’s principle private secretary. Kularb Kaew owns part of Cedar Holdings. The other owners of Cedar are Temasek and Siam Commercial Bank, in which the Crown Property Bureau has a controlling stake. SCB also played a crucial role advising and providing financial support for the deal.

Despite these interlocking interests, public anger was directed solely at Thaksin for “selling off” a valuable Thai national asset to foreigners. SCB and CPB were barely mentioned in the local press, even though they actively helped Temasek allegedly violate the law.

The issue gets even more bizarre. The currently military-appointed government recently proposed changes to the law to stop the longstanding practice of foreigners using nominees to buy Thai companies. The new Commerce Minister Krirkkrai Jirapaet had said the changes were necessary because the Shin purchase through nominees “led directly to the fall of a government”— the implication being that Thaksin himself was responsible for the army driving tanks into Bangkok and tearing up the Constitution.

The Crown Property Bureau also has longstanding ties to Singapore. Temasek owned a stake in SCB long before the Shin deal transpired, and Chirayu has said the state-owned investment vehicle has been a “good partner for years.”

Chumpol NaLamlieng, who served as president of Siam Cement for 12 years, is now chairman of SingTel, which is owned by Temasek and holds a 21 percent stake in Advanced Info Service, the market-leading telecommunications company founded by Thaksin and Shin Corp.

Since everyone knows everybody in this elite circle of friends, it came as a shock to many that Tongnoi Tongyai, the private secretary to Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, seemed set to join the Shin board and then was quickly disowned by the palace. The episode was certainly awkward. While the sequence of events remains opaque, some claim the prince gave the go-ahead for Tongnoi to join the board, which led to a public announcement, but King Bhumibol nixed the deal. Vajiralongkorn then issued a bizarre and shocking public statement lashing out against Tongnoi.

“HRH the Crown Prince's Personal Office considers MR Tongnoi Tongyai a perverse abuser of power for his own benefit,” the statement said. “His acts have misled the public and harmed HRH the Crown Prince's Personal Affairs Office, which thus finds itself obliged to publicize the facts of the matter.”

Of course, since he had offended the throne, Tongnoi was not able to defend himself.

The incident didn’t go away easily, however. Post Today, the Thai-language sister paper of the Bangkok Post, had to pull thousands of copies off the printer one recent night because a story quoting a leftist academic said the press should investigate why Tongnoi was dismissed in such a strange manner. Vajiralongkorn eventually called a group of reporters to the palace, where he reportedly asked them: “Do you have a problem with me?” Nobody spoke up.

Moral money-making

The Crown Property Bureau’s operations are important to scrutinize in light of the September 19 coup. It was argued that the coup was justified because Thaksin abused his powerful position to boost the financial gains of his many companies, intimidated the media into favorable reporting, and flaunted foreign ownership laws and tax loopholes in his family’s sale of Shin Corp.

These arguments certainly have merits, but they are dubious justifications for the palace-supported coup. The CPB is also guilty of what Thaksin is accused of. The bureau has used its powerful position for decades to acquire its massive landholdings, winning favorable business deals and paying no taxes. It intimidates the media by linking itself to the god-like Bhumibol, leaving newspapers afraid to touch it for fear of violating lese-majeste laws.

Some may argue that this doesn’t matter, as the Crown Property Bureau’s assets are technically national property. Yet if that’s the case, then it should shed its opaque “semi-private, semi-public” legal status and open its books for all to see where the money is going. As of now, all anyone has to go on is the words of executives and the general belief that they must be morally outstanding because of their closeness to the royal family.

This moral image is crucial to the success of the monarchy and its financial arm. Thaksin was certainly well loved in many parts of Thailand, but was reviled in Bangkok by royalist elites who eventually saw him as a rival to the all-powerful Bhumibol. This opened the door for attacks that questioned Thaksin’s moral ability to lead after his family sold Shin to Temasek.

Thaksin didn’t help his cause when he openly boasted that his critics were “jealous” of him. Enraged opponents called him greedy and said he didn’t have the kingly attributes to run the country.

Bhumibol, on the other hand, has adeptly crafted an image of a loving father who always has the country’s best interests at heart. He preaches sufficiency economy in an effort to distance the palace from the consumerism that it helps create through opening lavish malls on some of Bangkok’s best properties. You don’t see CPB using much of that land for green space to contemplate the serenity of nature.

If this image was not so carefully cultivated—if Bhumibol were a mere man with rather than a Buddhist dhamma king—then ordinary Thais might ask how it came to be that one family managed to grab so much land. They might even start to demand that they receive “fair value” and an opportunity to have a slice of the pie.

As long as the elderly Bhumibol is around, this is unlikely to happen. But the monarchy must ensure a smooth succession, otherwise the public may demand that some light finally shine on the bureau’s murky finances.

The Crown Property Bureau and How it Got That Way:

Centuries of Thai history have solidified into massive property ownership by the Thai monarchy

The history of the land owned by the Thai monarchy, and thus the Crown Property Bureau, can be traced as far back as the Buddhist kingdom of Sukothai in the 13^th century, as traditionally in Thailand the king owns all the land.

In the 1800s, the monarchy set up the Privy Purse to use the profits from royal trading to pay the royal household, and it was later used to finance overseas education for royals. At least five percent of government revenues were transferred into the Privy Purse each year. In 1890, it became the Privy Purse Bureau (PPB), acting as the monarchy’s investment arm, according to “A History of Thailand” by Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit.

The government funds flowing into the PPB increased to about 15 percent of state revenues and the money was used to invest in rice mills, property developments, shops and provincial markets.

“As roads were built the price of land increased, and this attracted the elite and the PPB to invest in land and land related business such as market places and row houses,” wrote Porphant Ouyyanont, an economist at Thammasat University, in an academic paper. “A survey of land prices in Bangkok in the first decade of the 20th century shows that the price of land was highest in the areas where roads were cut.”

During this time many Chinese families who prospered through royal patronage formed banks and shipping companies to export rice. But a series of poor harvests from 1904 to 1908 led to a financial crisis.

The monarchy, meanwhile, had set up Siam Commercial Bank with capital from government revenues, allowing it to survive that economic downturn. SCB extended loans to the Chinese merchants, who survived for a little while longer before the monarchy’s bank seized their assets when they defaulted on loans.

By 1910, the PPB was the country’s largest property owner, with about one-third of all land in central Bangkok. It held investments in railways, tramways, electricity, banking, cement, coal mining and steam navigation. In addition to reclaiming land through bad debts, it was able to occupy public land, and could directly buy land from whomever it wanted.

The bureau “always had the advantage in terms of obtaining information on road cutting, the price of land, the advantage of land location and so on,” wrote Porphant. “In this way the PPB acquired many plots of land established at good locations and commercial centres.”

Often the PPB would buy a plot of land to build houses, and then demand that the government build a road nearby to increase the prices of land and properties.

“The linking of Bangkok's administrative structure with royal interests produced both a physical and economic stamp on Bangkok which has had an enduring effect on the city's development,” Porphant wrote.

Absolute Monarchy Ends

Some people are just born luckyAlthough in 1932 a coup ended the absolute monarchy, the putsch leaders wanted to keep the monarch in a symbolic position to help control the masses. In bargaining over his diminished role, King Prajadhipok, or Rama VII, at one point threatened to sell many royal possessions, including palaces, shrines and even the Emerald Buddha, which sits in the Grand Palace to this day.

The new government passed laws transferring control of the Privy Purse Bureau to the government, and subjecting the king to an inheritance tax. Unsurprisingly, King Prajadhipok failed to sign the legislation.

After the king abdicated in 1935, the Privy Purse was divided into Prajadhipok’s personal property and the Crown Property Bureau, which fell under the Ministry of Finance. That year, a New York Times story said the king’s property yielded 500,000 pounds sterling annually, or about 6.5 million baht at the time. An unskilled laborer in Bangkok at the time would make about one baht for a day’s work, meaning he would have to work for 17,808 years to amass as much as the palace made in 12 months.

In 1936, the Royal Assets Structuring Act declared that all Crown Property Bureau income was tax exempt, although the king must still pay taxes on his personal fortune. “National assets are exempted from tax, so therefore the king’s assets are exempted, because they are the same as national assets,” section eight of the law says.

Thawiwong Thawalyasak, educated in Cambridge and a page to Rama VI, persuaded the government to recognize the palace’s ownership of property that fell into private hands after Prajadhipok was gone, according to Paul Handley’s book, “The King Never Smiles.” Thawalyasak made tens of thousands of residents on this land start paying rent to the Crown Property Bureau, and began evicting those who wouldn’t pay. He even tried to evict the parliament, but the lawmakers refused.

The consolidation of property under the CPB allowed the monarchy to slowly rebuild its fortune. By the 1960s, Siam Cement, the majority palace-owned industrial conglomerate, as well as Siam Commercial Bank (SCB), were growing with the strong economy.

The palace became the ideal joint venture partner. Its land was used to build major hotels like the Siam Intercontinental, the Erawan and the Dusit Thani. It held investments in insurance, agribusiness, tires, and textiles. By the late 1960s, Handley writes, the CPB had 500 staff members to oversee its investments and property holdings.

In 1970, Thawiwong died, and the ensuing decade saw failed investments like Air Siam, an airline meant to rival Thai Airways, and other challenges to the CPB empire.

In one case noted by Handley, the bureau ordered slum dwellers at Mu Ban Thaepprathan to vacate the premises so it could be commercially developed. “The very public fight against eviction generated comparisons between the CPB and officials who evicted poor farmers from degraded state forests,” he wrote. “When student activists got involved and likened the palace to a landowning feudalist, the embarrassed palace halted the project.”

In the late 1970s, the Communist Party of Thailand had launched an offensive against the monarchy, criticizing its extravagance. At one point, the communists broadcast comments saying: “The more powerful the monarch becomes, the poorer the people become, and the more the monarch’s income from land rental, his shares in commercial companies and his bank savings increase.”

Prem brings stability

By the early 1980s, the communists had suffered a series of setbacks, and many took up an amnesty offered by former army chief Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda, who now heads Bhumibol’s 19-member privy council. Under Prem’s watchful eye, royal projects funded by CPB revenues greatly expanded, along with the enforcement of lese-majeste laws, ensuring that criticism of the palace came to a halt.

In 1988, the CPB held stakes in about 40 companies, and the stock exchange was booming. Its holdings in Siam Cement and SCB alone were worth more than $600 million, not to mention the value of its 40,000 acres of land, including 13,300 in Bangkok.

The bureau’s burgeoning wealth put it on the radar screen of the foreign press, and the Far Eastern Economic Review wrote a cover story on the CPB in June 1988 called “The King’s Conglomerate.” In it, Chirayu Isarangkun Na Ayuthaya, the longstanding CPB director who had only been on the job a few months, said the bureau is neither public nor private.

“We are a little of both,” he told the magazine. “Our charter appears to highlight the image of a public entity. But we also enjoy flexibility similar to [but not totally on a par with] a private enterprise.”

The article added that the CPB’s operations are “supervised” by a five-man committee headed by the finance minister. The king is supposed to be consulted on important matters, the article says, “but actual royal involvement is rare.”

The story made no mention of the hybrid company’s unfair advantages, and didn’t question the legal gray area the CPB operates in. For instance, if the CPB gets so many state privileges and operates under the Ministry of Finance, why is its annual report only for the eyes of the king?

A former Finance Ministry official familiar with budgets says that although the government technically runs the CPB, in reality the decisions are made by the monarchy.

“Actually the king is supposed to play a symbolic role,” he told Asia Sentinel. “But this is Thailand.”

The king’s personal fortune sits with the Privy Purse. Although the palace gets a stipend from CPB revenues, the rest of the money goes to support the institution of the monarchy, including the many royal projects and propaganda activities. But the details of who gets what are not for public consumption.

Handley argues that the royal projects, along with low rents and media campaigns, were an orchestrated effort by the palace to win political support for the throne. This could be seen from the many villagers who petitioned the king directly to help them.

“Details about these petition cases remain a closely held secret of the palace, with the secrecy enhancing the very mystery of the king’s wisdom and ability to improve the lives of his subjects,” he writes. “The cases divulged a greater truth, though: the more the king’s works were advertised by Prem at the expense of the government’s, the more the people looked beyond the government to their king for escape from misery.” Without funds from the CPB, this would be impossible.

Rapid expansion

Things only got better for the palace business conglomerate in the early 1990s. Chirayu aggressively sought deals with developers that would give the CPB a return of share rentals and equity. It put more money into small restaurants, luxury condominiums, shopping complexes, hotels and office space. The new leases substantially increased CPB income and the king’s personal wealth. In 1990, Handley writes, dividends to the Mahidol family (Bhumibol was the son of Prince Mahidol of Songkhla and the grandson of King Chulalongkorn) reached US$30 to $40 million per year tax-free, and the holdings of the royal family were worth more than $1 billion. Estimates now put Bhumibol’s personal wealth at between $2 billion and $8 billion.

The crown also had big plans. Its media arm sought to buy Thai-language dailies and a television station, as well as build a film production studio and tourist attraction to rival Universal Studios. The CPB had subsidiaries involved in advertising, cable television, financial services, construction, cinemas, insurance, hospitals, and petrochemicals, among many others.

During this time, a few questionable deals surfaced. In 1996, the government investigated when Siam TV & Commercial, a joint venture between the CPB and SCB, won a concession to run a commercial television station, iTV. The company won the 30-year contract with an offer of 120 billion baht in royalties, even though a rival company offered royalties of 625 billion baht. The results of the investigation were never reported.

Also in 1996, the CPB sought to acquire a 15 percent stake in rehabilitated First Bangkok City Bank from the central bank for 8.50 baht a share, even though the market valued them at 22.50 baht per share. The deal was arranged by Finance Minister Surakiart Sathirathai, who is married to Suthawan Sathirathai, a niece of Queen Sirikit. The successor for Surakiart, who also served in Thaksin’s administration, canceled the order, saying “the fund stands to lose too much.”

Crash

When the government floated the baht on July 2, 1997, the Crown Property Bureau was devastated. Its media arm, already struggling before the crash, quickly went bankrupt. Siam Cement and SCB were also shaken, and Chirayu took over as board chairman of both companies. Siam Cement had not hedged US$4.2 billion in foreign debts, resulting in a $1.2 billion foreign exchange loss in 1997. Siam Commercial Bank was worse off, as loan collateral didn’t even cover half of the loans given out. The bureau’s total liabilities hit six billion baht.

By 1998, Chirayu said it was time to “bite the bullet.” The CPB announced that it was cutting 143 billion baht worth of new projects and adopting the king’s “sufficiency economy” approach. It would now focus on its core investments in Siam Cement and SCB, as well as try to extract more money from its leases.

“We're told not to be greedy,” Chirayu told reporters. “Our problem in the past when the economy was in good shape was that we received many investment invitations and we agreed. From now on, we need to be careful and our investment policy will hinge on the macroeconomic prospects. We must not invest in risky projects.”

Getting a “fair return”

The bureau received a large amount of help post-crisis, although its earnings reportedly dropped 80 percent in 1998. Honda Motor raised capital in its struggling local unit partially owned by the CPB and offered to sell the stake back to the bureau at book value in 10 years. At the same time, Chirayu insisted that the government help bail out SCB, even though it was strictly a commercial enterprise.

The government proceeded to inject $1 billion to bail out SCB and agreed to sell back its stake to the bureau in the coming years. The CPB did so in 2004 when it traded a piece of land near Victory Monument to the Finance Ministry, which technically oversees the bureau, for a 13 percent stake in SCB.

After the financial crisis, Thaksin also helped the palace out when he paid $60 million for SCB’s stake in iTV, which for a brief period was the only independent television station in Thailand. “With little likelihood of ever recovering the investment, Thaksin was effectively bailing out the bank and the palace,” Handley wrote.

The CPB also set a goal in 2000 to increase revenue from rents from 300 million baht per year to one billion baht by 2005. It would raise rents across the board, including for the cash-strapped government agencies that supposedly controlled the bureau.

“We will focus on both areas and try to maximize benefits from our assets,” Chirayu said. “We also have no plan to invest in any new projects.”

Having learned its lesson, the CPB restructured in 2001. Chirayu announced that the CPB would shed its “antiquated” way of doing business to get a “fair return” on its holdings. The bureau created CPB Equity to look after its equity investments and joint ventures, and CPB Property to look after its land holdings.

Things suddenly got much better the following year, and the halt on investments was lifted. Helped by a team that prominently featured American business consultant Michael David Selby, the Crown Property Bureau announced that it repaid its debts from the financial crisis and was “now financially strong,” according to executive Yos Euarchukiati.

In fact, its plans, as the ensuing years have shown, were bigger than ever.

Thailand's new economic logic

2007-02-16T05:41:00.001-05:00

Thailand's new economic logic

by Shawn W Crispin

BANGKOK - Thai Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont says his interim government has launched a "year of great reforms", with changes aimed at putting the economy on a more sustainable long-term track. Many foreign investors, on the other hand, are howling that recent government policies are woefully out of step with market mechanisms and, if not reversed, could eventually cause Thailand's economic demise.

So who's right? In an effort to erase ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra's legacy, Thailand's new military-appointed government is indeed leading the country in a fundamentally different economic direction. Foreign investors and the market-fundamentalist Western media have roundly blasted Bangkok's recent decisions to impose capital controls, limit foreign ownership for certain service-sector investments, and broadly implement King Bhumibol Adulyadej's untested "sufficiency economy" concept.

Many investors voted with their feet when the capital controls were first imposed in mid-December, driving down the Thai bourse 18% in a single day. But after equity investors were exempted from the controls, the stock market has recovered most of those losses, and now big foreign hedge funds have flocked to Bangkok to seek out potential opportunities amid the policy confusion.

Meanwhile, the Thai currency, the baht, has continued to appreciate against the US dollar, trading at a recent high of about 33 to the greenback in offshore markets despite the capital controls on currency transactions. After introducing widely perceived nationalistic amendments to the Foreign Business Act in early January, major export-oriented multinationals, including China's Huawei, Japan's Panasonic and the United States' Ford, have since made major new commitments to their Thailand-based operations.

If Thailand is headed for economic doom, it's not yet apparent. Rather, a grudging consensus is emerging among more seasoned Thai observers that there is a technocratic logic to the government's thinking. Although not admitted publicly, the capital controls policy was likely designed as preemptive action against an anticipated major global economic shift: the steep and long-term decline of the US dollar and economy.

The Bank of Thailand is not the region's only central bank grappling with the financial wisdom of accumulating ever more US-dollar-denominated assets. For China, which has accumulated more than US$1 trillion in foreign denominated reserves, or nearly 42% of its gross domestic product (GDP), through years of runaway trade surpluses is actively pursuing new ways to hedge its massive stock of depreciating dollars.

Albeit on a smaller scale, it's an equally important issue for the region's other export-geared, dollar-earning economies, including Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, where respectively exports account for 108%, 197% and 70% of GDP. That Thailand is now partially turning away from the openness that previously fueled its economic boom, bust, and recent strong recovery is particularly significant. And it could yet herald a broad regional move away from reliance on Western capital and export markets and toward more inward-looking and even protectionist economic strategies.

Historical vanguard
If so, it wouldn't mark the first time that Thailand was on the vanguard of a sweeping regional economic trend. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Thailand was at the front edge of Asia's export-driven economic emergence. Then, Japanese multinational corporations rapidly transformed Thailand's backwater economy into an export-fueled global powerhouse. Thailand also famously led the region into financial crisis in 1997, when foreign investors perceived cracks in the debt-driven facade and underscored the economic risks to developing economies of unregulated short-term capital flows.

Thailand's new direction is partially a nationalistic reaction to that bitter experience, driven a decade later by traditional elites now represented in government. The prevailing confusion surrounding the sudden implementation of capital controls and anti-foreign amendments to the Foreign Business Act, followed by earnest assurances by senior officials that Thailand will continue to engage with the global economy, has purposefully obfuscated the government's inward-looking intentions.

The Bank of Thailand has somewhat disingenuously maintained that the motivation for imposing capital controls was to protect Thai exporters from an appreciating baht. Yet Thai exports surged 17% last year, higher than consensus projections and in spite of a 15% appreciation of the baht against the dollar. The more complicated explanation for the central bank's move is precisely the opposite: that Thailand is now exporting too much, not too little.

Respected Thai economist Supavud Saicheua - on all accounts a dedicated free marketeer - makes that contrarian argument in an exceptional new research report, in which he argues that Thailand can no longer find efficient ways to allocate all of the US dollars it is earning through record levels of exports. He argues that with exports now accounting for 70% of GDP - more than double China's 34% ratio, and well over the world 24% average - Thailand is long overdue for a structural economic adjustment.

To be sure, buoyant exports sparked economic growth and helped to restore the national accounts after the 1997 financial crisis, allowing Thailand to pay back the International Monetary Fund two years ahead of schedule, and shave external debt down from a crisis high ratio of 90% of GDP to its current level of about 34%.

With those external bills now paid, and the previous government's various import-intensive infrastructure spending plans put on ice, exports are now arguably generating more dollars than the Thai economy can efficiently absorb - similar to the inrush of foreign capital that inflated Thailand's 1997 bubble, yet different in that the foreign-denominated flows are being earned rather than borrowed.

Equitable economics
Enter King Bhumibol's "sufficiency economy" concept into Thailand's new policy mix. The government's precise ideas for implementing the revered monarch's widely misunderstood philosophy are now starting to come into sharper focus. And they appear to jibe with the wider academic literature dedicated to sustainable economic development, which contrary to Western capitalism's drive for short-term maximum profits, strive for the long-term optimal use of resources.

It's literature that's just now beginning to get a serious second reading, with the emerging global consensus surrounding the risks of greenhouse-gas-driven global warming, and related realizations that multinational manufacturers' operations often recklessly degrade the natural environment of less litigious and lightly regulated developing countries. [1]

"The sufficiency-economy philosophy is a Thai model for sustainability, the importance of which is only now becoming recognized around the world," Surayud said last week to a meeting of the Joint Foreign Chambers of Commerce. "As an early adopter of a sustainable approach to development, Thailand should, I believe, be praised, for it is on a path down which every country or company will have to travel sooner rather than later."

This week, Surayud called on Thai industrialists to begin implementing the monarch's concept, namely through risk-management tools that allow for greater flexibility and minimize debts, greater investment in human resources and research and development, and setting business targets focused more on long-term rather than short-term returns. The royalist premier also suggested that - contrary to the global capitalist order - Thai factory owners should refrain from taking advantage of consumers, labor, or material suppliers.

Significantly, Surayud's government is re-exerting sovereignty over Thailand's future economic direction from a position of economic and financial strength - providing crucial insulation to a market backlash against its contrarian philosophy. While imposing capital controls on certain types of foreign inflows, the Bank of Thailand in January more quietly eased longtime restrictions on Thai nationals investing abroad, allowing mutual funds and securities companies to invest as much as $50 million offshore without central-bank permission. Depending on the eventual implementation, Thailand could soon emerge as a net exporter, rather than net importer, of capital.

At the same time, the combination of capital controls, amendments to the Foreign Business Act, and the rescinding of government concessions to Thaksin's publicly listed companies will all inevitably spook certain investors and lead to less short-term capital inflow. It's clearly a risk a more discerning Thailand is willing to take in the pursuit of more sustainable growth and protection against foreigners exporting future economic volatility from Western to Thai shores.

For better or worse, Thailand's emerging economic model is one many regional governments will likely give a long, hard look in the months and years to come.

Note 1. Thailand's predominantly foreign-invested electronics sector contributes a substantial 35% to total national exports, but independent studies have found that few properly dispose of their toxic waste. As of 2001, less than 10% of the hazardous industrial waste produced in Thailand was properly stabilized, processed and disposed of.

Thaksin's loss, US's gain

2007-02-16T05:39:00.000-05:00

Thaksin's loss, US's gain

by Shawn W Crispin

BANGKOK - Thailand's unfolding political drama pitting exiled former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra against the military-run Council for National Security (CNS) that ousted him has cast the United States in an awkward but familiar position, where realpolitik imperatives now, as historically, have trumped Washington's stated public position of non-support to governments that seize power through anti-democratic means.

When coup makers ousted Thaksin last September 19, Washington was legally bound to suspend about US$14 million in military-to-military aid earmarked for Thailand. The US State Department on cue publicly admonished the CNS for seizing power through undemocratic means and urged a quick return to democracy, which the junta has promised for this year.

That's still the State Department's public line, but President George W Bush and senior US envoys in Bangkok have signaled clearly to the junta that Washington has scant intention of downgrading bilateral relations because of the coup.

In many ways, Thailand's coup has served US regional interests well. Thailand is historically Washington's most trusted strategic ally in Southeast Asia, and US officials are leveraging their senior military contacts now in government in a bid to counterbalance China's expanding regional influence. While the US maintained strong ties with Thaksin's authoritarian administration, particularly through cooperation on counter-terrorism issues, there were concurrent concerns in Washington that the ethnically Chinese Thaksin [1] was gradually moving Thailand closer to Beijing at the United States' strategic expense.

Those concerns would help to explain why Bush received coolly last April Thaksin's pleading personal letter, where the then-embattled premier claimed "anti-democratic" forces were attempting to knock him from power through "extra-constitutional" means. Of course those anti-democratic forces - the royalist military officials who spearheaded the coup - were and remain some of the United States' best in-country contacts. And since Thaksin's ouster, to the deposed premier's apparent chagrin, the US has kept close working tabs with the junta and its interim civilian administration.

Importantly, the suspension of military aid has so far been more symbolic then substantive. As required by law, the US has suspended its International Education and Training Program for Thai military officials, but the US Defense Department has conspicuously tarried on decisions whether to scrap a joint memorandum on military-to-military logistics, an arms-procurement program that provides cheap loans to the Thai military when purchasing US hardware, the United States' continued use of U-Tapao Air Force Base, and the annual Cobra Gold joint military exercises.

"The official US policy is mandatory, but we sense the [US] Defense Department is trying to work its way around the measures," said an adviser to the Thai prime minister. "Washington understands fully well that the military is in the driver's seat and China is waiting in the wings." To underscore that point, he said, coup leader and army commander General Sonthi Boonyaratklin made a recent trip to Beijing for undisclosed reasons.

Moreover, the sanctions notably did not require the US to sever funding for the secretive Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Center (CTIC), established jointly in 2001 between the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and select Thai intelligence officials. As of 2002, the US was providing annually between $10 million and $15 million as well as advanced surveillance equipment to the CTIC, which is tasked with tracking and hunting down regional Muslim terror suspects.

According to the Washington Post, Thailand also hosted one of the CIA's now-notorious secret prisons, where Muslim terror suspects were held without trial and at times administered interrogation techniques that rights groups say are tantamount to torture. Thaksin had publicly denied the existence of any CIA prison on Thai soil, but because the US ally is not a signatory to either the United Nations Convention Against Torture or the International Criminal Court, which hypothetically could attempt to try US soldiers and CIA agents for war crimes, European diplomats contend that Thailand would be a legally logical and secure location for such a facility. (US officials in Bangkok have consistently declined comment on the secret-prison allegations.)

That said, senior Thai police counter-terrorism officials have openly carped that US Federal Bureau of Investigation terror-related sting operations have frequently impinged on Thai sovereignty. Despite these official complaints, and Thaksin's push for a highly unpopular free-trade agreement with the US, the anti-government demonstrations that paved the way for his military ouster notably never took on an anti-US bent - as did, for instance, the popular uprising of 1973 that led to the downfall of the corrupt and heavy-handed regime of then-US-backed Field Marshals Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphat Charusathien.

Xenophobic energies
The anti-Thaksin movement concentrated its xenophobic energies instead on Singapore, which through its state-run investment vehicle Temasek purchased Thaksin's family-held Shin Corporation in a controversial $1.9 billion transaction only months before his ouster. The CNS has since inflamed still-simmering popular resentments against Singapore, accusing the island state of using the satellite it purchased from Thaksin to tap the mobile-telephone conversations of senior military officials.

That the CNS has played its foreign-bogey card against Singapore rather than the US underscores the strong personal connections top coup makers have with senior US political and military officials. While Thaksin pays US lobbyists to plead his case on Capitol Hill, in Bangkok US officials are leveraging their military contacts to score diplomatic points over China, which has pursued its diplomacy toward Thailand more through political and economic rather than military channels.

The US military jump-started Thailand's move toward capitalism, pumping more than $2.5 billion between 1951 and 1975 in military-related aid into the country to develop a regional bulwark against the spread of communism. During those decades of authoritarian military rule, the US often assisted in suppressing government opponents, including pro-democracy activists, and the CIA frequently meddled in Thailand's domestic politics. [2]

Fast-forward to the present, and it's no surprise when a Bangkok-based US diplomat confirms that US-Thai military-to-military relations have remained firmly "on track" despite the suspension in aid. Noted one longtime Thai observer: "The US is saying to itself: they may be generals, but they're our generals."

Indeed, current premier and former army commander General Surayud Chulanont received military-college training in the US and his presence in senior military leadership positions was, according to one US diplomat, a factor in Washington's 2003 decision to elevate Thailand to the status of a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally, a distinction that paved the way for the country to purchase state-of-the-art US military equipment, including, presumably, the helicopters now circling Bangkok on national-security patrols.

Former intelligence chief, new constitution-drafting chairman and pivotal behind-the-scenes coup maker Prasong Soonsiri was trained and some say retained for a stint in the 1980s by the CIA, and is now known to have close personal relations with US Ambassador to Thailand Ralph "Skip" Boyce. The two developed their friendship during the Thai-speaking Boyce's previous two postings to Thailand.

Most significant, perhaps, former prime minister and current Chief Privy Councilor Prem Tinsulanonda, seen by many as the mastermind behind last year's coup, has strong Cold War ties to several senior US Republican Party operators. During a private dinner in 2000 sponsored by the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, in a speech Prem voiced his "heartfelt" appreciation to Paul Wolfowitz, then the school's dean, for his role in assisting Thailand after Vietnamese communist troops invaded neighboring Cambodia in 1979 and threatened to continue their march into Thailand.

While publicly condemning the Khmer Rouge for their atrocities, the US simultaneously and clandestinely commenced funneling so-called "non-lethal" supplies, including radio equipment, to the murderous Maoist group to help it hold the line against Vietnam on Thailand's eastern border. It was a controversial decision that re-cemented bilateral ties after a rocky period when the US abruptly pulled out of Thailand after the Vietnam War - lasting ties that have influenced Washington's decision concerning which side to take during Thailand's current political standoff.

Repeating history
To some, the US has today made a similarly controversial policy position in supporting the coup makers who ousted a twice democratically elected leader. While publicly lamenting Thailand's retreat from democracy, and more recently criticizing protectionist economic policies that threaten certain US business interests, in private US officials have persistently reaffirmed to Thailand's ruling generals Washington's long-term commitment to keeping bilateral ties on track.

During last November's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Hanoi, Bush met with Surayud on the sidelines and conveyed that Washington "understood" Thailand's political situation. The following month, his father, former president George H W Bush, paid a personal private visit to His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej - widely viewed in Thailand as a symbolic endorsement of the royalist coup.

For Washington, last year's military takeover has presented a unique opportunity to steal a march from China, which through soft economic power has seen Beijing consolidate strong alliances in neighboring Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. It is therefore no coincidence that Thaksin, spurned by what he perceived to be his former US ally, has chosen to launch his anti-junta propaganda campaign, in attempted divide-and-rule fashion, from China and Singapore.

In recent interviews with the mainstream Western media, Thaksin has endeavored - doubtless at the advice of his Washington-based private lobbyists and public relations consultants who arranged the appointments - to portray himself poignantly as a popularly elected leader who has been ousted through illegal means.

International publications, including those previously sharply critical of Thaksin's style of governance, have dutifully played up those themes - though at the time of the coup Thaksin was no longer legally Thailand's elected leader after annulled democratic elections in April, and in spite of his illiberal record of promoting extrajudicial killings of drug suspects and disappearances of Muslim militant suspects, and his systematic and punitive suppression of press freedom.

More seasoned observers draw parallels between Thaksin's current propaganda pitch with former Thai fascist leader Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram, who from exile in the 1940s criticized the monarchy and portrayed himself as a man of the people, and who on retaking power years later presided over a hard-knuckled, illiberal and corrupt military-led regime that at times ran counter to Washington's wishes. [3] Washington, it appears, has come to a similar conclusion about Thaksin's usefulness to the United States' future interests.

One well-placed source close to Ambassador Boyce says that the US no longer views Thaksin as a "political factor" and that to date Washington believes the junta is doing a "satisfactory" job of administering the country. Should Boyce be proved wrong and one day Thaksin return to political prominence - perhaps hypothetically after the passing of King Bhumibol - the US can probably count on a piqued Thaksin avenging the perceived snub by moving Thailand closer into China's regional orbit.

It's a calculated risk Washington is clearly willing to take and, at least for now, Thaksin's loss is the United States' gain.

Notes
1. Although Thaksin pledged allegiance to his US roots during a visit to his alma mater Sam Houston State University, where he joked that Texas was his second home, many perceived his pilgrimage to the grave markers of his ancestors in China's Fujian province as the more meaningful personal connection.

2. See Daniel Fineman's excellent A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958, University of Hawaii Press, 1997.

3. When Phibun was subsequently ousted in an internal 1957 putsch led by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who more than Phibun favored the United State's foreign-investment-led development model, the US State Department issued a statement three days later affirming the military coup would not alter bilateral relations.

Lighten up on govt

2007-01-09T08:50:00.000-05:00

Lighten up on govt

email:postbag@bangkokpost.co.th

The last two public opinion polls and several of your editorials would seem to indicate that people are increasingly unhappy with the interim government because it is too slow in producing results.

After many years of listening to Mr Thaksin, I really distrust grandiose promises of instant results and I am content to watch this government work at a more calm, steady, thoughtful, legalistic and moderate pace as it methodically and systematically investigates and gathers evidence to present and prosecute corruption cases (among other things). Just the fact that this government is seriously engaged in building numerous corruption cases is a huge improvement over the lip-service Mr Thaksin used to give this subject.

I think we owe it to the members of this government to show a little more patience, understanding and yes, gratitude, for taking on what appears to be a dangerous and pretty much thankless task, instead of constantly criticising them for moving too slowly and trying to pressure them into taking some precipitous action that we may all come to regret. Solid accomplishments and meaningful change take time and I think we at least owe them that.

Junta faces charges they are too gentlemanly for their own good

2007-01-09T08:42:00.000-05:00

Analysis: Junta faces charges they are too gentlemanly for their own good

Are the CNS and the government tough enough to ensure stability in their administration?

by Nattaya Chetchotiros

The Surayud government and Council for National Security (CNS) are caught between a rock and a hard place. The New Year's Eve bombings have highlighted this fact. The dilemma for the coup-makers and the interim government is how tough they should be with the so-called "old power" network. If they are ruthless and uproot elements associated with former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, they risk being labelled as power-hungry and unfair.

Should they do this in a more compromising, gentlemanly fashion - which apparently is the path both the Surayud government and CNS have been pursuing - then there is the greater risk that their stability will be rocked, which is the case at present.

It has been almost four months since the Sept 19 military coup. So far, the interim government and CNS have not effectively touched the "old power" network which they allege was corrupt. The "clique" connotes not only Mr Thaksin and his family but a whole network of militarymen, policemen, bureaucrats, business and grassroots people who benefited from the Thaksin administration's populist policies.

Somjai Phagaphasvivat, from Thammasat University's Faculty of Political Science, says that unless the CNS and the government get tough with these remnants of old power, they are unlikely to get their job done.

He says there are people who gained some form of benefit from the past administration who have managed to stay on in the current one, as well as in the CNS. Their presence makes it difficult for the coup-makers or the government to come up with evidence against the Thaksin government or any effective clean-up measures, as they are afraid they would be dragged into the net too.

Besides, both the government and CNS are under pressure to be fair to the old power. They have chosen to stick to the law and follow a lawful and transparent - albeit slow - process of investigating corruption allegations instead of seizing the assets first, which was what every coup-maker did in the past. The lenient approach, however, has given room for the old power to do some manipulative work to destabilise the government, Mr Somjai said.

To cope with the problem at hand, he suggests that the CNS and government toughen themselves. They must be goal-oriented. They must be decisive. If that means they must change their personnel, so be it.

"Although [CNS chairman] Gen Sonthi insists that all the eight leading members of the CNS are united, I believe this will remain so for no more than two months. They will face increasing pressure from the international community. They will face a crisis of confidence. They will be forced to make some kind of change," Mr Somjai said.

As for the government, the political scientist suggests that it rethink and, if possible, immediately overhaul its communications strategy, especially its use of the mass media. Unlike the media-savvy Thaksin government, the Surayud team has no edge in this area. Even the government's spokesman is not well-versed in politics or capable of explaining anything of meaning to the public.

Mr Somjai added that the government does not seem to have any long-term plan or strategy when it comes to politics, either. At present, it seems to be dealing with each problem as it arrives. The cabinet may be able to boast of their overall qualities as good, decent people, but it suffers terribly from being collectively dull as well.

In short, when it comes to political and communications strategy, the Surayud government is outclassed by its predecessor, he says. "It may be the case that the situation at present is too vile for a good person like Gen Surayud. By their nature, the government and CNS may not be suitable for the situation and that is why they have not succeeded in managing the administrative power they have seized," Mr Somjai said.

Chaiyan Chaiyaporn, a political science lecturer at Chulalongkorn University, however, does not believe the government or CNS can get tough and rough things out the way coup-makers of the past might have done. Considering the coup's lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, and the fact that the CNS and government would not want to turn 16 million people who voted for Mr Thaksin in the past into their enemy, the reconciliatory approach they have taken was their only option.

He agreed with Mr Somjai that this choice has its setbacks in the bureaucratic foot-dragging, thus causing delays in exposing alleged irregularities of the past government. The slowness may upset the public, which is keenly waiting for results of the investigations.

Mr Chaiyan believes that the New Year's Eve bombs in Bangkok has diverted the public's attention from the important matter at hand, which is the ongoing corruption investigation. To regain their footing, the lecturer suggests that the government and CNS take everyone who has any connections with Mr Thaksin off the Bangkok bomb investigation team - be they deputy national police chief Pol Gen Achiravit Supanpesat, assistant national police chief Pol Lt-Gen Jongrak Chuthanont or Pol Lt-Gen Panupong Singhara na Ayudhya who has been assigned to head the investigation.

"These officers are known to be close to Thaksin but the government has kept them in their jobs. The result is we haven't seen any solid evidence or much progress in the case, which further discredits the government," said Mr Chaiyan.

Gen Winai Phattiyakul, defence permanent secretary and secretary-general of the CNS, said that Prime Minister Surayud's interviews suggest that he has given a deadline for the national police chief Kowit Wattana to come up with answers regarding the eight blasts in Bangkok. If the deadline lapses and nothing comes up, the CNS will miss one member, but that wouldn't be a problem.

"Our friendship remains the same. The question of professional efficiency is not related to that," Gen Winai said. He admitted that both the government and CNS are not yet on top of the country's political developments. He also conceded that they will need to adjust their planning and communications.

A source close to PM Surayud revealed that the government is perceived as being weak because it can't put its own people in key offices, especially in the national police force, which is seen as a seat of power of the ousted prime minister who was a former policeman.

According to the source, calls were made to PM Surayud to fire the police chief. But then again, the government has its hands tied in its attempt to do things properly and not give the impression that it was unfairly bent on firing Mr Thaksin's people.

The problem is the "old power" clique has at their disposal an almost limitless amount of money. From now until June, when the case against the Thai Rak Thai party will be heard, the money and old power network can cause a lot of chaos. The government and CNS will need to make a quick decision - whether they want to get tough, or continue to act the gentleman.

Barbaric attacks on public condemned

2007-01-09T08:31:00.000-05:00

'Barbaric' attacks on public condemned

January 2, 2007

'Barbaric' attacks on public condemned

Democrat Party chief adviser Chuan Leekpai said yesterday the "old power'' was playing an "undercurrent" game - suggesting the New Year's Eve bombs in Bangkok were the work of the previous administration.

Chuan commented after Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont indicated people who had lost influence from the political change had masterminded the blasts on Sunday night.

Chuan, a former prime minister, said the "old power" still existed like an underground group. "Do not forget that Thaksin Shinawatra was in power for five years. He built an empire with a process that used both money and power as a bargaining chip,'' he said.

Asked if the old power still used their money politically, Chuan said he believed so.

"Thaksin's money keeps rising. Do not underestimate the rich. The richest man in Thailand is not normal. Thaksin had said that dying is better than losing."

Chuan said the previous regime still had significant influence. "The old power has a strong base so they can continuously burn down schools. Some officials belong to the old power so they are not trying to reveal the truth. Money can buy people. People who receive money on a regular basis would naturally have a strong bond to them,'' he said.

Even some members of the media and some Cabinet members had links with the former heavyweights. "Look at this government, how many members of the old power exist," he said.

Former prime minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, meanwhile, condemned those responsible for the attacks and for causing public fear.

Thai Rak Thai Party caretaker leader Chaturon Chaisang also condemned the blasts as an evil act that lacked a sense of responsibility to the public and country.

Campaign for Popular Demo-cracy secretary-general Suriyasai Katasila described the bombs as the barbaric killing of innocent people. "This operation was politically motivated for sure, because they selected the time and the places that would create a strong impact not only locally but internationally," he said.

Suriyasai criticized Police spokesman Lt-General Achirawit Supanpesat for making a personal comment about the bomb attacks by suggesting on Sunday the previous regime was to blame.

"His comment was rather misleading than presenting the truth. Police have the duty to find evidence and arrest the culprits," he said.

If key members of the previous administration were responsible, police should be able to arrest the culprits soon, Suriyasai said. "If that is the case, the government must monitor them more closely."

He predicted the "old power" might adjust its strategies by using the masses to pressure the interim government. "They will not allow themselves to be cornered easily."

String of blasts rock Bangkok on New Years eve

2007-01-09T08:24:00.000-05:00

String of blasts rock Bangkok, killing 3

New Year's Eve parties canceled / Rumors point to 'undercurrents' / Police, military out in force around country

Police and military personnel were scrambling to find out who was behind what seems to have been a coordinated bomb attack in the capital last night that left three people dead and more than 40 people injured.

Bangkok was rocked by six explosions early in the evening at widely separate parts of the city, completely disrupting New Year's Eve celebrations. Tens of thousands of alarmed people swarmed out of the city center hours before midnight after the capital's major parties were canceled.

One person was killed and at least 17 injured when a powerful bomb went off at the Victory Monument at about 6.30pm. The blast ripped through bus stops, shattering windows at a restaurant and sent debris flying in all directions. The dead man was identified as Songkran Kanjana. His age was not known.

"Bodies were scattered all over the place. I didn't know who to help first," an eyewitness told TV reporters. The second fatality was Suwitchai Nakiem, 61, who was killed by a blast near the Na Ranong intersection in the Klong Toei area. The bomb, which was hidden in a trash can near a Chinese spirit shrine, injured three pedestrians and caused a number of cooking-gas cylinders kept nearby to also explode.

Two people were injured in a blast at the Saphan Kwai intersection. Witnesses said they saw a man drop a grenade from a pedestrian bridge onto a police booth below. Residue of C4 and TNT explosives were found at the scene, an television reporter said, quoting an unnamed military source.

A bomb was found in a dustbin outside a gold shop on the first floor of Seacon Square shopping mall on Srinakharin Road. It was removed to the parking lot and went off harmlessly when no one was standing near. The blast created panic among the roughly 10,000 shoppers in the mall at the time, who were ordered to evacuate. All outlets in the mall were ordered to close their shutters.

There were blasts at two police booths, one at the Khae Rai intersection in Nonthaburi province just north of Bangkok, where police said the closed circuit TV monitors went out of action about 3 hours before. The other was at the entrance of Sukhumvit Road Soi 62. No injuries were reported.

The explosions brought a swift reaction from police around the country. Military personnel were called out in a number of centres to assist police with security.

Speaking at a press conference called two hours after the first bomb went off, police spokesman Pol General Ajiravid Subarnbhesaj said the coordinated blasts were intended to "create chaos".

Few sources were prepared to comment openly on the source of the explosions. Speculation was rife that it was an insurgent attack from the South, given the timing of the bombings. But most intelligence sources were emphatic that it was connected to the "undercurrents" of post-coup political tension.

Soldiers were posted at some of the blast sites, while major shopping complexes, including the Central Chidlom and Siam Paragon, closed their doors early.

Deputy Bangkok Governor Wallop Suwandee announced that the New Year's eve countdown celebrations planned at Sanam Luang had been cancelled. The Central World Shopping Centre, where another major count-down venue was designated, also canceled the event. But revelers at the Central World plaza were reluctant to call it quits and dragged the party on for another two hours after its cancellation.

Government Spokesman Yongyuth Malyalarp urged the public to remain calm and said the police had been instructed to stay on high alert, especially in areas where large gatherings of people were expected take part in the New Year countdown.

"Police reinforcements have been sent to various areas of the city. We urge the public to remain calm, continue with the celebrations, but at the same time keep a lookout for any irregularities," Yongyuth said.

Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont is keeping a close watch on the situation as it develops, he said. Surayud late last night visited some of the wounded at Rajvithi Hospital.

The New Year's eve bombings capped a year of unrest in the nation, with political turmoil that was capped by a coup d'etat three months ago and an ongoing insurgency in the Malay-speaking deep South.

More than 20 public schools, mostly in the North and Northeast, have been torched in the past three months. Authorities suspect fires may have been politically motivated arson attacks.

A New Era for Thailand

2006-09-22T02:33:00.000-04:00

The Coup as it unfolds

First Statement from the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy

There has been social division like never before. Each side has been trying to conquer another with all possible means and the situation tends to intensify with growing doubts on the administration amid widespread reported corruption.
State units and independent organisations have been politically meddled, not able to deliver their services as specified in the Constitution.

The administration is also usually bordering on "lest majest" actions against the revered King. Despite attempts from social units for compromises, there is no way to end the conflicts.

The revolution body thus needs to seize power. We have no intention to rule but to return the power to the people as soon as possible, to preserve peace and honour the King who is the most revered to all Thais. - The Nation, Bangkok

Administrative Reform Council leader Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin told foreign diplomats that a civilian government would be appointed to run the country within two weeks and a general election could be carried out by October next year. - The Nation, Bangkok

Photo: 2bangkok.com

Sonthi outsmarted Thaksin at the eleventh hour

Had Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM) leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin not moved as fast as he did to stage a coup on Tuesday, Thaksin Shinawatra would have launched his own coup a day later. Don't be fooled by Thaksin's claim that he stands for democracy.

As the political crisis developed to the point of no return concerning whether Thaksin should stay or be booted out, General Sonthi had no choice but to swallow his words about the days of military coups being over. He had been very reluctant to resort to a coup, as he was known not to have any political ambitions. Moreover, he was not known to be an enemy of Thaksin. Although General Sonthi has a good relationship with both Privy Council President General Prem Tinsulanonda and Privy Council member General Surayuth Chulanont, he came to power partly due to a political compromise struck with Thaksin.

However, an intelligence report reached General Sonthi's camp stating that there would be bloodshed on Wednesday. The People's Alliance for Democracy had planned to hold a political rally that day at the Royal Plaza in order to force Thaksin out of politics. Had that rally taken place, there would have been clashes between the People's Alliance for Democracy and Thaksin's supporters and blood would have been spilt on Rajdamnoen Avenue. If only Thaksin had promised that he would take a break from politics and allow a period of political reforms to take place, the PAD and other branches of the anti-Thaksin movement would have declared victory. All political confrontations would have subsided. Thaksin could have run for office once the Constitution was amended, and he would have been returned to the premier's post, probably in the latter part of next year.

However, Thaksin never considered taking a break from power. Again, don't be fooled by his "taking a break" story - the idea never crossed his mind.

The General Sonthi camp learned that during the PAD rally, Yongyuth Tiyapairat and Newin Chidchob were planning to rally their supporters to create an ugly scene at the Royal Plaza. During the ensuing commotion, there would be human casualties. Thaksin would then have stepped in and declared a state of emergency, placing the country under martial law.

Now you can understand why he had time to prepare his state of emergency statement and read it at 9.20pm on Channel 9 from his New York hotel room. You can also understand why Yongyuth and Newin are now at the top of this country's most-wanted list and have surrendered themselves to the CDRM for interrogation.

Once the situation was under his complete control, Thaksin had planned to fly back yesterday in order to declare victory over anti-democratic elements in society. He had a military reshuffle list in hand that would have further consolidated his control over the military. With that accomplished, everything would have been easy. Virtually all institutions in the country would have been under his directive.

From his New York hotel, Thaksin was preparing to deliver an address at the UN Assembly. The room instead turned out to be the headquarters from which he attempted to launch a counter-coup and negotiate a political settlement. In New York, he planned to recruit top-notch American political consultants to advise him on his political campaign for the next election, which would have been pushed back from October 15 to some time in November.

Thaksin's talk of taking a break from politics was simply lip service. He told the Thai public he would decide whether to take a break from politics only after his Thai Rak Thai went to the Election Commission to register as candidates. This means Thaksin would have liked His Majesty the King to endorse a new election date before he made his decision.

Members of the Thai elite and the PAD, however, would not allow this to happen. If Thaksin were to run in the next election, he would have won. With 12 million votes or so, he would have claimed a democratic majority and he also would have stayed on as prime minister. After that he could rewrite Thai history by turning Thailand into his own regime.

General Sonthi had to act fast to head off Thaksin's coup. He staged a military coup on Tuesday, a day before the bloodshed was set to take place. He and Thaksin did have a telephone conversation on Tuesday evening, with Thaksin trying to buy time and negotiate a settlement.

He told General Sonthi that if he kept his cool, Thaksin would take a break from politics. He asked Sonthi to wait until he returned from New York so that the two could talk things out and said that he would reschedule his return flight to Bangkok to Wednesday, instead of yesterday as he had planned.

General Sonthi was polite, but told him that he had no choice, that he had to stage the coup.

In the meantime, Thaksin was checking on his military allies, who had control of Bangkok, for the most part. He remained certain that in a military power play, he could still emerge the victor. Maj-General Prin Suwannathat, commander of the First Infantry Brigade, is a close ally of Thaksin and he holds the most powerful military post in Bangkok. The commanders of the Air Force and the Navy are also good friends of Thaksin.

General Sonthi had the support of Lt-General Saphrang Kalayanamit of the Third Army, who had been outspoken in his anti-Thaksin remarks. The Third Army is in charge of all military operations in the North. Another key ally of Gen Sonthi is Lt-General Anupong Phaochinda of the First Infantry Division in Bangkok. Maj-General Sanit Prommas, the commander of the Second Cavalry Brigade, also came to play an important role in the power play to seize the capital.

Troops from Prachin Buri and Lop Buri were also mobilised to the capital to assist in the coup, the decisive outcome of which was ironically the victory of thaharn ban nok (upcountry military).

As it turned out, all of Thaksin's military allies, most notably Maj-General Prin, had been marked out - they could not move. General Ruengroj Mahasaranont, the supreme commander and a Thaksin ally, was to look after Bangkok once Thaksin had declared martial law. He too was subdued. Chidchai Vanasatidya and Prommin Lertsuridej were unable to launch any sort of counter effort.

Thaksin's wife Khunying Pojaman Shinawatra was supposed to take a 12am flight to Singapore on Tuesday night. She quickly changed her flight to 9pm. Well, Gen Sonthi had to let her off the hook.

Twenty-five minutes later, knowing that his wife was safely on an aircraft bound for Singapore, Thaksin read out his state of emergency address from his New York hotel room, effectively sacking General Sonthi .

But an hour later, General Sonthi declared a counter-coup to overthrow the Thaksin regime and tear up the Constitution.

The rest is history.

Thanong Khanthong

The Nation

Thailand's "smooth as silk" coup hits no turbulence

2006-09-21T04:01:00.000-04:00

By Peter Janssen, dpa

Bangkok (dpa) - Thailand has arguably taken coup-making to new heights of non-violence, judging by the peaceful response to Tuesday's bloodless blitzkrieg that toppled prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra from power and put a junta in command of the kingdom.

Thai Army Commander-in-Chief Sonthi Boonyaratklin brought troops and tanks into Bangkok Tuesday night and took over the country without firing a shot, putting a junta in power that has promised to hand over the reins of government to a cabinet of appointed civilians within two weeks and hold a general election within a year.

"I have seen 15 coups myself in the past 30 years and this was the easiest one yet," said Luzi Matzig, a long time resident in Thailand who runs Asia Travels, a tour agency. "A smooth-as-silk kind of coup," quipped Matzig, playing on Thailand's national airline's advertising slogan "THAI - Smooth as Silk."

By Thursday most of the tanks had been removed from the capital and the remaining soldiers posted at shopping malls and intersections had to contend with mobs of tourists trying to have their photos taken with the helmeted heroes, rather than irate Thaksin supporters.

According to an opinion survey conducted by Suan Dusit Rajabhat University, some 82 per cent of the people polled in Bangkok were in favour of the coup and, even more surprising, 86 per cent supported it in the provinces.

Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party has won the past three elections with handsome majorities, so one wonders where all those supporters have gone in the aftermath of the coup.

Some, obviously, have gone abroad.

Thaksin's most steadfast supporter, his wife Pojaman, took a flight to Singapore on Tuesday night accompanied by their son Panthongtae and youngest daughter Paethongtarn. The family has reportedly been reunited in London, where Thaksin arrived Wednesday from New York and where his eldest daughter Pimthongta is studying.

They are all staying in an apartment building that Thaksin, a billionaire, recently bought in London.

Several of Thaksin's political allies, such as former agriculture minister Sudarat Keyuraphan and former finance minister Somkid Jatusripitak are also abroad, currently in France.

Other close allies are under army detention in Bangkok, such as former deputy premier Chidchai Vanasatidya and close ally Prommin Lertsuidej. Newin Chidchob and Yongyudh Tiyapairat, two former Thaksin advisors, turned themselves in to the Administrative Reform Council, as the junta has styled itself, on Thursday.

But what about the 19 million Thais who voted for the Thai Rak Thai in the general election of February, last year?

Thaksin and his TRT were most popular in Thailand's northern and northeastern provinces, where the majority of the country's rural poor reside.

There are several practical reasons why these provincial supporters may be keeping mum. For starters, the Administrative Reform Council has yet to lift martial law, which prohibits public gatherings of more than five people.

Secondly, any organized protest would require money to transport demonstrators from the countryside to the capital, and with Thaksin out of the country and his TRT in disarray, they are no longer in the rent-a-crowd business.

Poor farmers are both too poor and too busy to spend money on demonstrations themselves.

The lack of pro-Thaksin uprisings in the countryside may also shed light on the nature of the ousted premier's past popularity.

"If you have money in Thailand you are popular, and Thaksin gave away a lot of money," said Kraisak Choonhavan, a former senator and son of former prime minister who was similarly popular in the impoverished north-east.

"My father's popularity stemmed from the fact that when he had rallies he paid people to come," acknowledged Kraisak. "Thaksin was no different."

The mood of Thailand's rural voters may also been affected by the months of anti-Thaksin protests this year that have exposed many of Thaksin's dubious business deals and controversial governance style.

"Most northeasterners still support Thai Rak Thai but they think Thaksin should have quit. He has failed to clear up many of the accusations against him," said Paiboon Paengsoi, a TRT supporter from Khon Kaen province.

Thaksin not only won the animosity of Bangkok's middle class this year, he also came under heavy criticism from the country's elite, including former premier Prem Tinsulanonda, who now heads the Privy Council of Thailand's much-revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej.

Prem in several public speeches this year questioned Thaksin's moral qualifications to rule and in one speech reminded the military that their leader was the king, not an elected prime minister.

General Sonthi, in justifying his Tuesday coup, included Thaksin's efforts to undermine the monarchy. The junta was quick to get a royal endorsement of their temporary government Wednesday night, although as head of state, King Bhumibol is duty-bound to endorse all new governments.

When asked to explain the overwhelming support for Tuesday's coup, despite Thaksin's one-time popularity, senior TRT member and former government spokesman Jakrapob Penkair, noted, "Thailand is a king-centric country."

Coup as it unfolds

2006-09-19T04:37:00.000-04:00

CHRONOLOGY

The Nation monitors the events that led to the coup as well as events after it as follows:

September 19

8.00 am Thaksin Shinawatra calls an urgent teleconference with all armed forces' commanders at Government House, but none attends.

Gen Sonthi Boonyaratkarin, the army chief, later says the meeting is hastily called. Rumor then spread around the capital and the stock market that a coup de tat is under way.

12.00 am After finishing the webcamera teleconference with Thaksin, who is New York, several Cabinet members check with reporters if there would really be a coup.

6.30 pm The Army's special forces from Lopburi move into Bangkok. Gen Prem Tinnasulalonda, president of Privy Council, has an audience with HM the King, reportedly on a meritmaking ceremony for ML Bau Kittiyakala.

6.55 pm Thai News Agency reports that Thaksin will return to Bangkok on Thursday, instead of Friday.

8.00 pm 191 police receive M16 rifles to prepare for an antiriot assignment.

9.00 pm The Army'[s special forces from Lopburi arrive at the Army's Bangkok headquarters.

Web surfers post messages on Pantip.com asking if there is a coup de tat.

9.10 pm The armyowned TV Channel 5's mobile TV broadcast unit arrives at the Army's Bangkok headquarters.

9.30 pm TV channel 5 cancels regular programming and puts on air royallyauthored songs.

Reporters at Government House say situation is normal, but rumour was rife that deputy premier Pol Gen Chidchai Vanasatit and defence minister Gen Thammarak Isarangkun have been under custody.

Panthongthae, Thaksin's son, reportedly has left Thailand for the UK.

9.40 pm Police commandos arrive Baan Chansongra, Thaksin's residence.

10.00 pm Army tanks take position at Bangkok Makkawan Rangsan Bridge and Rajdamnern Avenue.

10.10 pm CNN reports Bangkok situation

10.20pm Thaksin declares a state of emergency via the phone from New York. He also issues two orders, transferring en Sondhi from the post of army chief to the PM's Office, and naming Gen Rungroj Mahasaranond as the officer in charge of the crisis.

11pm "The Administrative Reform Council" (ARC) issues a first statement on TV network, saying the armed forces and national police have peacefully seized control of Bangkok and surrounding areas. Soldier seize the Shinawatra Building, iTV television stationand Thaksin's residence.

11.15pm Soldiers put steel barricades at Sri Ayudha and Rajdamnoen Roads

11.50pm ARC issues the second statement explaining the reasons for the coup d'etat, citing national disunity and rampant corruption. ARC says it plans to return power quickly to the people

12.39am ARC issues third statement, nullifying the constitution, the caretaker Cabinet and the Constitutional Court.

September 20

1: 24 am The ARC issues its fourth announcement saying that while there is no prime minister, the power of the PM will belong to the ARC chief. The statement says where there are no ministers, the permanent secretaries will take charge of their respective ministries.

8:00 am ARC spokesman announces Gen Sonthi will make announcement on TVs at 9 am. The spokesman also announces that TV stations can resume their normal programmes but most continue to relay signals from Channel 5 except iTV, which briefly airs its morning news programme.

8:50 am: Permanent officials and rectors of universities start arriving at the Army headquarters to report themselves to the ARC. Khunying Jaruvan Mainthaka, the auditor-general, flashes a thumb-up to reporters.

9:16 am Sonthi holds a press conference. The first part of his statement is similar to the first statement of the ARC. He says the ARC has to seize power to solve the country's problems caused by the Thaksin admnistration.

Sonthi appears on TV along with the police chief and commanders of other armed forces in the four-minute announcement.

After Sonthi finishes reading the statement, a spokeswoman announces that the TV pool is disbanded and TV stations resume normal programmes.

9:50 am A source in New York tells a radio programme that Thaksin is considering whether to go to England or not.

10:00 am Sondhi Limthongkul, a decision maker of the People's Alliance for Democracy, announces that the planned rally in the evening is cancelled. Sondhi also praises the army chief for staging the coup.

10:15 am Chamlong Srimuang, a decision maker of the PAD, passes the front of the army head office in a taxi. People give him an applaud as the taxi passes by.

10:40 am A spokesman of the ARC announces its fifth statement on TV pool that AMC invites students to take part in political reform. The spokesman says Gen Sonthi invites students to send suggestions on political reform to the ARC.

10:42 am A spokesman reads the sixth announcement of the ARC that the ARC realises the problem of farmers and is considering how to help them so they should not demonstrate now.

10:45 am An ARC spokeswoman reads the seventh announcement of the ARC that the political gathering of more than five people is banned.

The ARC spokeswoman also read the ninth announcement of the ARC that the ARC will take drastic action against any trader who hoards goods.

The spokesman announces the ninth statement of the ARC that the ARC will adhere to treaties with the United Nations and other international organisations as well as will promote and maintain good relations with other countries.

10:46 am An ARC reads the tenth announcement of the ARC that the ARC seeks cooperation from the mass media to present accurate news and information to the public.

10:52 am An ARC spokesman reads an order of ARC leader Gen Sonthi for the Information and Communication Technology Ministry to check and censor any type of information dissemination that could affect the works of the ARC.

10:58 am The ARC issues its 11th announcement to appoint members of the council as following:

1 Supreme Commander Gen Ruangroj Mahasaranon becomes chief adviser of the ARC.

2 Army Commander-in-Chief Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin becomes president of the ARC.

3 Navy Commander-in-Chief Adm Sathiraphan Keyanon becomes first vice president of ARC.

4 Air Force Commander-in-Chief ACM Chalit Pookpasuk becomes second vice president of ARC.

5 Police Commissioner-General Pol Lt Gen Kowit Wattana becomes third vice president of the ARC

6 National Security Council secretary-general Gen Winai Phatthiyakul becomes secretary-general of the ARC.

1:00 pm Chalard Worachat and several other people are arrested for gathering in a group of more than five people.

1:15 pm Former Thai Rak Thai MP Surapol Kiartchaiyakorn is seen taking away from the Chiang Mai Airport by soldiers on a military vehicle.

1:30 pm Deputy Police Commissioner-General Pol Col Priewphan Damapong, a brother-in-law of Thaksin Shinawatra, reports himself to the national police chief in line with the coup maker's order.

2:00 pm ARC leader Gen Sonthi told foreign diplomats an hour ago that a civilian government would be appointed to run the country within two weeks.

2:30 pm Thawee Kraikupti, former Thai Rak Thai MP, protest against the coup at the Democracy Monument. He is later taken away by soldiers.

3:00 pm A military source say 15 trucks of fully-armed soldiers from the Pawai Camp head to Bangkok.

Sonthi answers reporters' questions at a press conference. He tells reporters that an interim constitution will be drafted in two weeks. After which a Cabinet will be formed to spend another year to draft a new constitution.

Sonthi says the new Election Commission has been dissolved along with the abolition of the Constitution.

4:55 pm ARC issues an announcement that government agencies, state enterprises, schools, banks and the Stock Exchange of Thailand would be open on Thursday.

6:00 pm About 100 soldiers from the 26th Cavalry Battalion in Phechabun arrive at Pathum Thani in ten trucks and ten military trucks. They travel on Rangsit-Nakhon Nayok Road and reach a road check point in Pathum Thani manned by seven tanks. after briefly talking to offices at the checkpoints, the 10 tanks and 10 trucks move on to Bangkok.

7:00 pm A spokesman announces that His Majesty the King has issued a royal command to appoint Sonthi as the ARC president.

7: 04 pm The ARC issues its seventh order to divide itself into four divisions as part of responsibility sharing. The four divisions are the ARC, the secretariat, the advisory division and special affairs division.

7:10 pm The ARC issues an order to maintain the status of Khunying Jaruvan Maintaka as the auditor-general.

The order removes the State Audit Commission but maintains Jaruvan's status as well as maintaining the provision of the SAC Act.

7:29 pm A spokesman of the ARC announces that the ARC has not imposed curfew and the people can live their life as usal.

9:45 pm The ARC announces an order for former Natural Resource and Environment Minister Yongyuth Tiyapairat and former PM's Office Minister Newin Chidchop to report themselves at the army head office at noon on Thursday.

10 pm The ARC issues its 13th statement to maintain the status of the new Election Commission. The ARC statement says the EC ACT would continue to be effective so that the new EC could organize election of local administrations and councils.

September 21

9:11 am AFP reports from Singapore that the Thai baht opens stronger in Asian trade, recovering much of the ground lost Wednesday. The baht was is at 37.5150 to the dollar, up sharply from 37.68 on Wednesday.

10:35 am Soldiers arrive at the house of former natural resources and environment minister Yongyuth Tiyapairaj in Chiang Rai's Mae Chan district to try to locate him. But the house is closed and he is not found there.

11:00 am The People's Alliance for Democracy announces it ceases to exist after its goal to see the Thaksin regime toppled has been accomplished.

11:45 am Former PM's Office Minister Newin Chichob reports himself to the Administrative Reform Council. He arrives at the Army headquarters in a car and lowers his car's window to greet reporters but he is greeted back with boos by people there.

People shouts "Dictator" and "Corruptor".

1:00 pm former natural resources and environment minister Yongyuth Tiyapairat to reports himself to ARC.

1:40 pm Newn's car speeds out of the Army head office but it is not known whether Newin is inside the car or not.

2:00 pm Newin confirms with a Nation reporter on mobile phone that he has been detained by the ARC.

2:25 pm Ousted deputy prime minister Somkid Jatusripitak returns from France. He tells reporters that he has not yet decided about his political future.

3:40pm Former deputy prime minister Wissanu Krea-ngam arrives at the head office of the coup makers, which now call itself official in English as the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM).

3:45 pm Cabinet secretary-general Borwornsak Uwanno comes to the CDRM head office at the Army headquarters.

4:00 pm Ousted deputy prime minister Surakiart Sathirathai returns from the United States. He thanks CDRM for still supporting him for the post of UN secretary-general.

4:20 pm The CDRM issues its 14th announcement to maintain status of the Parliament ombudsmen by reviving the Parliament Ombudsmen Act.

The CDRM also issues its 15th announcement to maintain the status of the Political Parties Act. The announcement adds that new political parties could be registered until further announcement by the council.

The announcement states that current political parties will not be dissolved but they cannot hold any political activity until further announcement by the CDRM.

7:50 pm CDRM issues its 16th announcement to give itself parliament role. It says it will function as parliament while there are no House of Representatives and Senate.

9:45 pm CDRM issues its 11th order to transfer four senior officers to inactive posts at PM's Ministry Office.

They are Pol General Jumphol Manmai, chief of National Intelligence Agency, Pol Maj General Peeraphan Premputi, permanent secretary of the PM's Office, Pol General Phreophan Damapongse, a deputy national police chief and a brother-in-law of Thaksin, and Pol Lt General Chalor Choowong, an asssitant national police chief.

10:00pm CDRM issues its 12th order to appoint Lt Gen Waipoj Srinual, commander of the Internal Security Operations Command, as director of the National Intelligence Agency.

10:33 pm AFP reports that The United States is reviewing its aid to Thailand due to the coup.

September 22

9:30 pm Sonthi enters a ceremony to receive a royal command to be officially endorsed as the president of the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy. The ceremony is broadcast on TV pool at noon.

1:30 pm CDRM issues order No 18 to amend the National Police Act to rid of politicians of the police professional regulating body.

The order appoints the police commissioner-general as chairman of the Police Civil Services Commission, instead of the prime minister.

Continue to The Nation, Bangkok for more Updates

Open and shut media policy

2006-05-29T04:33:00.000-04:00

Open Radio flourished in the little extra space which was created by the surge of political sentiment after the attempted Matichon buy-out, Sondhi's crusade, the Temasek deal and the People's Alliance for Democracy demonstrations.

Last week Grammy announced it was shutting down Open Radio, a 24-hour news-oriented station that has been broadcasting since early this year. The station operated on a frequency that the Army had rented to Grammy. Of course, there were good commercial reasons. The station was operating at a loss. Grammy is an entertainment company and wants to use the frequency to broadcast more entertainment.

We could take this commercial justification at face value if the closure did not fit into a dreary pattern. Since this government came to power in 2001, radio stations have been closed down, specific radio programmes taken off the air, television presenters and editors sacked, community radio stations harassed and outlawed, cable television channels disrupted and websites blocked with a relentless regularity. As in this case, there is often an intermediary to act as the hatchet man and a rationale which has nothing to do with politics, but the pattern tells us we should have no doubt who is behind all of this and what it represents.

This closure also signals a dismal return to business as usual. Open Radio flourished in the little extra space which was created by the surge of political sentiment after the attempted Matichon buy-out, Sondhi's crusade, the Temasek deal and the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) demonstrations. Even mainstream television participated a bit in this miniature Bangkok spring. In March viewers were shocked at the sight of intelligent people discussing the issues of the day on their television screens No such sight had been seen for five years. Even critical views were aired. Opposition figures were allowed to talk at some length. Some programmes even allowed debate. Newscasters began self-consciously allowing the opposition a balanced share of air time, and some of them even restrained their instinct to portray every action critical of government as something close to high treason.

The closure of Open Radio is a signal that spring is over and government is intent on shutting down the little space that was briefly allowed. In the television channels, a couple of editors and presenters who were over-enthusiastic about this mini-liberalisation have been quietly reassigned. The news programmes are almost imperceptibly backtracking towards their old rigidly pro-government format.

What is truly telling about the closure of Open Radio is the fact that the station's content was relatively mild. The station was not following Sondhi's model of raking up dirt and challenging the government to react. The station did not thump a tub and demand Thaksin disappear from the political scene. Open Radio simply had regular news broadcasts which covered a lot of what has been going on through the tumultuous events of the last few months. It strove to be neutral and balanced by airing all sides. Its team of well-informed and highly experienced analysts quietly helped listeners to unravel some of the intricate legal and constitutional technicalities framing recent events. For anyone wanting to relieve the acute stress of trying to understand what the hell was going on, this station was a source of both knowledge and comfort.

Despite this relative mildness, a prominent pit-bull terrier of the Thaksin regime was muttering that Open Radio ought to be closed down. This demand was anything but mild. Such wild dogs like to snarl and snap at anything which verges on reasoned, intelligent commentary and debate.

This outburst was not isolated or unusual. This regime has got so used to acting without fear of scrutiny or criticism that it lashes out against any sign of independence. Recently a minister complained that it was "unfair" when people were able to use the media to criticise him. Once you control 100 per cent of the air space, even dropping down to 99 per cent seems "unfair". Another of the regime's wild dogs was so incensed by criticism delivered in the form of a poem that he let loose his goons on the critic in the television studio.

The siege of the Nation building, the disruption of Democrat Party public meetings in Chiang Mai and PAD meetings in the Northeast, the bomb at the Democrat headquarters, the assault on demonstrators outside the Election Commission (EC), the calls for a state of emergency to clear the PAD off the streets, the attempt to sneak a ban on all public demonstrations into the Highway Bill and the avalanche of defamation suits are all part of the same pattern. Deny by law if possible, by executive power as a good second best and by vigilante violence if all else fails.

The focus of this policy is the electronic media, television and radio. These are the channels through which the vast majority of the people get their news and opinions. From the beginning, this government has allowed a lot more flexibility to the English-language press. This is a brilliant touch which ensures foreign observers have no idea how bad things really are. Thaksin has even occasionally presented himself to the foreign press as a misunderstood martyr lacerated daily by a hail of journalistic barbs.

Since the Matichon affair last year the government has lost much of its control over the Thai-language press, but the recent moves show that it has no intention of releasing its grip on the air waves. An election is looming. The political landscape is possibly more complex than at any point in the last 30 years. There is a real chance that the Thai Rak Thai's ambition to create a virtual one-party state is about to fragment. It is no surprise that in such circumstances the little public space created during the Bangkok spring is now being closed down. Information is powerful stuff. In the affair of the EC, the ruling party has shown its intention of fighting serious allegations by smothering them.

Closing down rabid critics is an obvious move, but closing down media which are trying to be open, neutral, reasonable and balanced is much more subtle, much more insidious and much more revealing.

Chang noi

Thai Values Under Siege

2006-05-28T04:40:00.000-04:00

by Richard Watson Todd

Several qualities that make the Thai lifestyle so attractive are being undermined by the government's obsession with economics.

The Thaksin government is almost exclusively focused on improving economic growth, international competitiveness and income from exports. While no-one would argue that these economic issues do not warrant attention, there is a danger that the single-mindedness of government policies could have an adverse effect on other issues central to a good quality of life.

A reasonable level of wealth is a prerequisite for a good quality of life, and so the government's attempts to strengthen the economy could be seen as generally improving people's lives. If, however, these economic initiatives can only succeed at the expense of societal and environmental assets, quality of life may actually diminish.

The recent series of articles in the Bangkok Post on the unrestrained development of Koh Chang has shown how an emphasis on creating wealth can have wide-ranging adverse consequences on the environment. Less clear is the impact of the drive for economic growth on society.

In many ways, Thai society provides a model for other countries. Indeed, in an ideal world Thailand would be exporting certain facets of its society to the benefit of other nations. Three inter-related social facets in particular are of great value _

tolerance,
personal freedom,
and the concept of sanuk (fun)

_ but these are being undermined by the policies of the Thaksin government.

Historically, Thailand has been a very accepting and accommodating society with high levels of tolerance for others. One clear example is the acculturation of Chinese immigrants. The Chinese community in Thailand see themselves as Thai first and Chinese second. This is not the case in other Southeast Asian countries, where the immigrant communities view themselves as primarily Chinese and racial tensions can run high. The integration of Chinese immigrants into Thai society largely comes down to the tolerance and acceptance of the Thai people.

Another example is the gay community in Thailand, which in general is far less persecuted than in comparable countries. Again, a basic tolerance for others leads to a more harmonious society.

Unfortunately, the continuing problems in the far South of Thailand, which have become so tragically serious under the two Thaksin governments, are providing a challenge to harmony and tolerance. There is a growing danger of general intolerance of Muslims, irrespective of their political beliefs.

A second, more subtle type of intolerance which has been gaining ground since Thaksin came to power concerns the second of the valuable social assets of Thailand, namely, personal freedom.

Thai society has a well-earned reputation for being non-judgmental concerning personal behaviour. As long as no-one is being harmed, traditionally people have had the personal freedom to do as they liked. Within the last five years, however, a host of small but voluble pressure groups has sprouted up with the aim of controlling how others behave. Always trying to take the moral high ground, these groups spread an atmosphere of intolerance as they attempt to restrict personal freedoms.

Concomitantly, Thailand is following other countries in moving towards being a "nanny state", where personal behaviour is controlled by a plethora of annoying petty laws. Those hardest hit by the laws are those without a voice to defend themselves. Youth are an easy target, with the 10 p.m. curfew on under-sixteens and the ban on spaghetti straps typically oppressive puritanical dictates.

The government appears to believe that children should spend all of their time studying, and any distractions, such as enjoying themselves, should be banned. Policies and statements by various politicians also imply that adolescents have a general attraction towards sin that must be pre-emptively repressed.

All of this smacks of hypocrisy. It seems very unlikely that all of the politicians were angels in their adolescent days, especially if their adult behaviour is anything to go by. Along with a bevy of minor wives attached to Parliament, within the last few years a senator has been imprisoned for having sex with an underage girl, several politicians have been accused of rape but argued that they paid for the sex, and then there are the infamous "flower arrangers" who gave private lessons in bedrooms at a political function a few years ago.

The need for morality appears only to apply to the unwashed masses whose personal freedom the politicians are always ready and willing to curb.

What's wrong with a little fun?

All of this brings us to the third social asset that is under threat _ the concept of sanuk, or fun. Ten years ago, Thais would proudly inform visitors of the importance of sanuk in Thailand, but the idea is disappearing fast. I cannot remember the last time I read a newspaper interview that included the idea of sanuk or heard someone speaking of the concept with pride.

The government clearly, if not explicitly, disapproves of sanuk. Instead of citizens having fun and enjoying themselves, the government wants everyone to be sober hard-working automatons dedicated to the greater glory of the Thai economy (and, incidentally, putting more money in the pockets of the economic moguls running the country at present).

Some of the petty regulations ostensibly introduced to solve other problems appear to really aim at reducing opportunities for sanuk. An example is the enforced closure of petrol stations at night, supposedly to save energy. This rule, however, has many problems.

Firstly, given that petrol station mini-marts are still open 24 hours and brightly lit, it seems unlikely that the regulation is saving much energy. Secondly, there are many other more effective ways to save energy, such as setting a minimum temperature of, say, 25 degrees for all government offices (including the offices of ministers and permanent secretaries which are cooled to well below 20 degrees so that everyone can look suave by wearing a jacket). Thirdly, petrol stations offer much more than petrol _ where do you go at night if you're driving and get a puncture?

The regulation to close petrol stations at night, then, does not seem to be a rational one. If, however, we view the regulation as a surreptitious way of controlling people's freedom to have sanuk, things become clearer.

I am not arguing that everyone should be out-and-out hedonists, but enjoying life is important. After all, "All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy" and the Thai concept of sanuk is a valuable way of increasing happiness and harmony.

If the government continues to restrict sanuk, Thailand runs the risk of becoming drab and dull like the Singapore of a few years ago. Realising the importance of sanuk for society, the Singapore government has recently started promoting enjoyment and is actually spending large sums to make the island nation a more sanuk place. At present, Thailand still has the edge, but the Thai government seems to be doing its best to recreate the purely work-focused and dull social environment of old Singapore that the latter now acknowledges as a mistake.

The three social facets of tolerance, personal freedom and sanuk are vital for a happy, healthy and harmonious society. Even focusing purely on economic growth, the Thaksin government's monomania, the three facets are important.

Tourism is a key sector for the economy, and just as a degraded environment hinders tourism, a degraded society, one where intolerance, government control and dullness rule, will repel potential tourists.

There is more to good governance than promoting the economy, and the role of governments is not to control the lives of citizens. Rather, governments need to focus on improving quality of life and a healthy, harmonious society is crucial to achieving this.

More important than another half-point percentage increase in GDP are tolerance, personal freedom and, yes, even sanuk _ those social facets where Thailand has traditionally been a model for the world.

Critics contrast King's success, with govt failure

2006-05-26T13:34:00.000-04:00

While the United Nations honoured His Majesty the King on Friday for his achievements in human development (see separate story: Kofi Annan honours 'Development King'), Thai human rights activists drew attention to the current government's contrasting failures.

"It is unfortunate that despite the extraordinary contribution to human development of His Majesty the King, the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has by contrast failed to commit to the promotion and protection of human rights," said a petition signed by some 121 Thai human rights groups and well-known activists, academics and businessmen.

The petition was presented to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan who was in Thailand Friday to give an award to His Majesty for lifetime achievement in human development.

The three-page document listed a host of human rights violations committed by Thaksin's government, including ongoing violence in the majority-Muslim deep South in which more than 1,200 people have died, the government's "war on drugs" campaign in which 2,598 were killed and the unsolved murders of some 20 human rights activists.

Specifically, it drew attention to the case of the disappearance and presumed murder of Muslim human rights lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit.

Although five Thai policemen were arrested for Somchai's disappearance and murder, only one of them was found guilty of the lesser charge of kidnapping.

"At least 19 other human rights defenders have been murdered since Prime Minister Thaksin came to power in 2001," said the petition.

It added, "Thailand's once thriving human rights community now operates in an increasingly tense climate of fear and impumnity."

A UN official received the petition for Annan, shortly after the UN chief met with Mr Thaksin in Bangkok Friday, and before the UN chief flew to Hua Hin for an audience with the king.

Annan's trip to Thailand is the last leg in a two-week visit to Asia that has taken him to South Korea, Japan, China and Vietnam. He is scheduled to depart Bangkok on Saturday.

Letters To Thaksin

2006-05-23T15:33:00.000-04:00

Hi again, from a couple of Thaksin's old friends

Dear Thaksin Shinawatra, Sorry for not addressing you with a title. Why should I anyway? Caretaker prime minister who has returned from holiday to his caretaking job? Or holiday-taker doubling as a freelance caretaking prime minister?

Or "unemployed man" working as a holiday-taker and caretaker prime minister who still got paid by the state all this time nonetheless?

It doesn't matter much to me, though. You're back, and that's the important thing. I knew you would be. For all the tears, the packing, the "for the sake of national harmony" pledge, I knew deep down you'd return. We have unfinished business, you and I. Your "War on Corruption" was halted by the Temasek fiasco (what an irony!), and you may want to renew it, and I have to prove to you that trying to catch me is like chasing your own shadow.

And speaking of Temasek, too bad you didn't heed my warning. In my last letter, written after you declared war on me for the hundredth time, I specifically advised you that whatever you planned to do with your Shin Corp, don't make it look like you've become your own worst enemy. Your life was hard enough already, and mine easy enough, even without that Bt73.3-billion deal.

But you surely have copied some of my old tricks, and I'm proud of you, my friend. (Hey, anyone can learn a thing or two from his enemy.) I've lived this long because people have such short memories, and a little spin works just fine. The rekindled drug threat was a nice touch, although I found it a touch too elaborate to have villagers visit Government House on the same day you returned to work and tell your well-equipped intelligence officials that amphetamines were wreaking havoc again.

Welcome back and all the best. It won't be so easy, but I hope you make it through. I'm hard to defeat, and I need an enemy like you to prove it. How can I live without you?

Last but not least, kudos for keeping so many folk confused. They really think you are "Democracy", don't they?

Your old friend,

Corruption

LLL

Dear Thaksin Shinawatra,

I'm sure some may want to call your return from holiday a "boost to Thai democracy". Well, they can all think what they like. People think they know me.

A "boost" or a "blow", the bottom line is your country now has two Senates, no House of Representatives, a caretaker government that the courts may rule illegitimate in a couple of days, an Election Commission that faces accusations of malfeasance and bribe-taking and a ruling party alleged to have faked its own competition in a general election that has been annulled, with no date agreed for a new one.

Blame it on your opponents if you will, but they aren't responsible for the fact that the art of using "nominees" will soon be taught in business schools rather than to students of economic crime. Everything happening in your motherland at this moment stems from the penchant of the powers that be for twisting rules and resorting to double standards. So, you may go ahead and do whatever you like, but please just don't portray yourself as a victim.

Of course, I'm frustrated. You are not I, so don't make others think that your troubles are mine. I'm fine as long as tens of thousands of people gather every day, and there's not a single drop of blood spilled, and the soldiers stay in their barracks. I'm not fine if leaders don't respect human rights, or press freedom, or try to control checks and balances. And as I told you in my previous letter, if those leaders are made to suffer undemocratically, I won't shed a tear for them.

You should have understood my essence better. It doesn't matter how many people support you; it's about you not corrupting their faith and you promoting the right values. From time to time, you may be required to make all kinds of sacrifices - but the right principles are indispensable, because without them, everything comes toppling down like a house of cards.

You have decided to end your "holiday", and that's your call. I'll just sit back and watch. Only want to ask you one last time: I know who you are, so stop pretending to be me.

Your estranged friend,

Democracy

Tulsathit Taptim

Even with Thaksin in the saddle, horse is going nowhere

2006-05-22T15:01:00.000-04:00

HARD TALK

by Thepchai Yong, The Nation, Bangkok

Caretaker Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has decided to end his month-long game of political hide-and-seek. While his political comeback is seen as a morale booster for his Thai Rak Thai Party, it will also certainly heighten political tensions.

The Thai Rak Thai PR machine was quick to paint Thaksin as an indispensable political leader who is needed back in the saddle to deal with the country's economic and social woes. But his detractors believe the whole exercise is nothing more than a political expedient to resurrect the disgraced leader.

If Thaksin's reason for taking leave in the first place was ambiguous, his excuse for coming back to Government House is even more dubious.

Thaksin took his leave after vowing to take a political break following his party's landslide but legally questionable victory in the April 2 election. Bidding farewell to Government House staff, Thaksin packed his personal stuff and handed over his duties to his first deputy, Police General Chidchai Vanasatidya, whose only claim to fame is his unwavering loyalty to his boss.

Thaksin obviously didn't care whether his former classmate was up to the country's most important political job at this most critical time. He left the nation practically rudderless while he enjoyed handshakes with a number of world leaders who were arm-twisted into receiving him during a series of overseas trips.

While the violence in the South escalated and the oil price-driven economic woes took their toll on the people, Thaksin basked in his new status as an "unemployed prime minister", whiling away his time in upscale shopping malls and on golf courses.

Most of his Cabinet members seemed to be taking a cue from him - though not officially as he did. Very few of them were known to be taking their caretaker jobs seriously. They were obviously more concerned about their political future, as the mess resulting from the nullified general election was snowballing into a major political crisis.

Even Chidchai, who also holds the post of justice minister, never gave the impression that he was the man in charge. Tackling the violence in the South, which was once his top priority, was suddenly treated as a routine task to be delegated to bureaucrats and Army personnel.

The political vacuum also left the economy faltering amid a slowdown and rising fuel prices. And none of Thaksin's men in Government House could provide any assurance that someone was doing something about it.

All this was happening against the backdrop of a political impasse that had paralysed the whole nation. The Constitutional Court ruled that the April 2 election was null and void, and a new election, according to the Election Commission, won't be held until late October.

But that's not the end of the problems. The Election Commission is so discredited that its legitimacy to conduct another election is a big question mark. Even the country's top judges have joined the chorus calling on the remaining three election commissioners to quit.

The next few weeks are likely to see a new round of potentially explosive confrontations. The Thaksin government and the Thai Rak Thai Party have made known their readiness to defend the Election Commission at all costs. Tens of thousands of supporters of the ruling party are being mobilised to march back to Bangkok for a showdown with Thaksin's detractors, who are stepping up their campaign against the commission.

So the question is whether Thaksin will improve things or make them worse with his comeback.

For Thai Rak Thai, its leader's sudden political re-entry was definitely a boon to its rank and file, who have been badly demoralised by the changing political tide. The party is facing the possibility of dissolution after a sub-committee of the Election Commission found some of its top officials to be involved in bribing small parties to contest the April 2 election. Thaksin himself is facing a lawsuit in the Administrative Court that threatens to strip him of the premiership for alleged dereliction of duty.

But it's the pending election that was probably a major factor in prompting Thaksin to end his break. Without their leader actively at the helm, Thai Rak Thai was obviously as disoriented as the government itself. The prolonged political stalemate that was already causing rumblings within the party threatened to intensify factional conflicts that might result in mass defections.

So it's fairly easy to see the reasons for Thaksin's latest political flip-flop. Salvaging Thai Rak Thai's sagging image and saving it from a possible disintegration was at the top of his agenda. The party also badly needs him to lead the charge into the next election.

But for the public at large, Thaksin's return signals a protracted deadlock. Lest he forget, the political anarchy in the country now is entirely Thaksin's doing. His six-week political hiatus only compounded it.

Thaksin's resumption of the premiership will not in any way dispel the charges of conflict of interest, abuse of power and interference with independent bodies that have been levelled against him and which were the reasons for him being rejected by large sections of society. His party's continuing support for the embattled election commissioners also lends weight to the accusation that they are working hand-in-glove.

If the election date as proposed by the Election Commission holds, it means that the current caretaker government with Thaksin at the helm will continue to hold power for another five months. And that means another five months of political uncertainty.

Thaksin's political juggling only proves that his style of CEO leadership has been a big failure and his Thai Rak Thai is anything but a political institution. Even top level Cabinet members, including his second in command, often cited as his possible political heirs, were helpless without their commander-in-chief around.

If the drug problem and violence in the South have worsened - the reasons cited for his return - it wasn't because Thaksin was on leave. It was because the caretaker prime minister had chosen a bad team.

Do we really have to put up with another five months of political mess under a grossly incompetent government headed by a scandal-tainted prime minister?

Mobsters have a free hand as police look on

2006-05-22T14:59:00.000-04:00

Police finally intervene in a clash between protesters and supporters of the Election Commission at the agency’s office. A number of journalists were assaulted during the confrontation.

Bangkok Post, May 19, 2006

... This was the second time in less than two weeks that rowdy mobsters carried out a violent attack on PAD protesters, who have occupied the area in front of the EC office in a peaceful rally against the election panel under Pol Gen Wasana Permlarp...

Secret Plan To Takeover Thailand Finally Revealed

2006-05-22T08:46:00.000-04:00

TRT goes on offensive over 'Finland Plan'

The Bangkok Post

The Thai Rak Thai party has threatened to sue people who make false accusations involving the so-called Finland Plan.

Thai Rak Thai executive member Surapong Suebwonglee said yesterday he had never heard of any such plan in the whole time he had been in the party.

Outgoing senator Sophon Supapong mentioned the "Finland Plan", which he said was hatched by a small group aiming to take control of Thailand, at the Thailand Weekly forum held at Lumpini park on Saturday.

He claimed that a group of businessmen had persuaded former activists from the October 1973 student uprising to set up a political party and draw up a strategy to take control of Thailand through populist policies.

Media tycoon Sondhi Limthongkul, also a leader of the anti-Thaksin People's Alliance for Democracy, backed Mr Sophon's remarks, saying the government's abuse of the state media was part of the Finland Plan. He was also speaking at the Thailand Weekly forum, which he hosted.

Mr Surapong said the party would sue anyone who made false accusations about any so-called Finland Plan.

Prommin Lertsuridej, the caretaker prime minister's secretary-general and Thai Rak Thai deputy secretary-general, denied the party had mapped out such a plan. He asked the media to seek evidence from people making the claims.

"Thai Rak Thai was set up after the economic crisis," he said.

"The media has closely followed the party's activities ever since.

"Our party had to introduce policies which were different from other parties.

"Our policies focussed on solving people's debts and helping them generate income.

"We asked scholars across the country for their views, which we gathered before coming up with the policies," he said.

Democrat deputy secretary-general Thavorn Saenniem said the Finland Plan, if it really existed, would cause great damage to the country.

He urged the public to keep a close watch on Thai Rak Thai's policies as they looked similar to those mentioned in the Finland Plan.

ONE-PARTY PLAN

TRT: No such thing as 'Finland declaration'

The Nation, Bangkok

Ruling party says rumours of secret party meeting in 1999 'groundless'

The ruling party yesterday threatened to take legal action against people spreading what it described as "groundless allegations" about the so-called Finland Declaration.

"The Thai Rak Thai Party will definitely sue people who have spread rumours about the matter. The allegations are groundless and untrue," government spokesman Surapong Suebwonglee said, in his capacity as a Thai Rak Thai executive member.

Surapong said he had never heard about the so-called Finland Declaration and did not think it existed.

Some newspaper columnists wrote last week that a political party held a gathering in 1999 of senior figures in Finland, where they agreed on strategies to turn Thailand into a country dominated by one party, with a political system modelled on Western republics and democracies, with minimal involvement by royalty.

Some speakers at Saturday's broadcast from Lumpini Park of the Muang Thai Rai Sapda programme also mentioned what they called "evil plans" behind the so-called Finland Declaration.

Prommin Lertsuridej, deputy secretary-general of the Thai Rak Thai, insisted yesterday there was no such thing as the Finland Declaration as far as the ruling party was concerned.

He called on those who made the allegations to produce evidence "otherwise our society would be turned into one obsessed with ignorance and groundless accusations".

Prommin said the secret behind Thai Rak Thai's success was its platforms were distinctively different from those of other political parties.

More on the Finland Plan in Thai Language

Maew Mink Uan Phansak -> actors in Finland Declaration
http://www.thaiinsider.com/ShowNews....5-21/11-32.htm

Ai Mink Denounce Filnd Declaration
http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/2006/0...news_id=105619
http://www.manager.co.th/Politics/Vi...=9490000066495
http://www.thaiinsider.com/ShowNews....5-21/16-19.htm

Ill-gonnetn wealth of the Great going to Lichenstein and the connection with Russian mafia and Durg Kingpin who RUNs Landmark Hotel
http://thaiinsider.com/ShowNews.php?...5-20/16-00.htm

October 1973 Generation Askgn Ai Mink and Ai Liab to get out of TRT or they would CUT the tie with time ...
http://www.thaiinsider.com/ShowNews....5-21/17-35.htm

Democrat Believing in the Existence Finland Declaration
http://www.manager.co.th/Politics/Vi...=9490000066516
More on Finland Declration
http://www.thaiinsider.com/ShowNews....5-19/19-29.htm

Drug war, freebies seen as Thaksin plot

2006-05-20T09:01:00.000-04:00

Hallucinating about drugs

Thaksin's claimed surge in drug in drug use is not borne out by statistics from the top anti-narcotics agency

When caretaker Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra announced last week that he would resume active duty following a 45-day vacation, he suggested the country needed him at the helm to deal effectively with a plethora of problems that had cropped up in his absence. One of the key problems cited to justify his return to the political centre stage was the supposed higher incidence of drug addiction among young people.

With more than a hint of drama, Thaksin made his announcement in front of a group of supporters who claimed to be grieving parents whose children had supposedly fallen prey to amphetamine addiction. It was not clear if the meeting between Thaksin and drug addicts' parents was a coincidence or whether it was stage-managed, but television viewers couldn't have missed the allusion to a knight in shining armour coming to the rescue of a damsel in distress.

If only Thaksin could back up his claim with reliable and accurate statistics to show that the scourge of drugs has come back with a vengeance and that the society as a whole is in jeopardy as a result.

A group of journalists went to Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB), the government's leading agency in the fight against illicit drugs, to look for evidence of the "worsening drug situation" spoken of by the caretaker prime minister, and found none to support his claim.

According to the ONCB, there has been no indication whatsoever that the drug situation is getting worse. Indeed, the anti-drug agency's statistics point to the opposite: the number of arrests in connection with drug trafficking has dropped dramatically in the past three years.

In 2002, the number of drugs-related arrests hit an all-time high of 215,209. The number of arrests dropped to 102,417 in 2003, 55,505 in 2004, 58,853 in 2005, and 13,712 in the first quarter of this year.

Methamphetamines have been the most popular drug among addicts and casual users in Thailand. The synthetic drug can be cheaply produced using widely available chemicals, which also have legitimate uses, in makeshift laboratories along the porous border between Thailand and Burma.

Several drug kingpins backed by personal armies, based in Burma and thus beyond the reach of Thai law enforcement, are capable of moving their amphetamine-producing labs to avoid detection and adjusting their production at short notice in response to the rise and fall in demand. Unlike producers of drugs like opium, heroin and marijuana, they don't have to wait for drug-yielding plants to grow.

According to the latest available estimates, there are about three million people in this country who have dabbled with drugs at one time or another. Of those, about 10 per cent, or 300,000, are regular drug users.

There is no denying that the sharp reduction in the number of drugs-related arrests can be attributed to the Thaksin administration's bloody war against traffickers in 2003. More than 2,000 suspected drug traffickers were killed during the six-month campaign that started in February 2003. During this period, the government appeared to have given tacit permission for police to implement targeted killings of suspected drug traffickers. The killings tarnished Thailand's human-rights record and attracted worldwide condemnation, but there was scant criticism at home thanks to Thaksin's mastery of propaganda.

Thaksin declared victory in the 2003 drug war but subsequently declared several more wars against drugs after he found that doing so enabled him to score easy political points.

Let's hope the ONCB does not get into trouble for the professionalism with which it compiles its statistics and for sharing such information with members of the press so the public can make their own assessment of the drug situation and distinguish between reality and Thaksin's political spin.

Lest people believe they need a superhero like Thaksin to keep the drug situation under control, society should keep sight of the fundamental fact that the war on drugs cannot be won unless Thailand succeeds in reducing the demand for drugs, in addition to law enforcement. As such, the war on drugs will necessarily take time and people should be sceptical about any quack doctor offering quick fix.

Populist policies 'will let him take back PM's job'

The Bangkok Post

The caretaker government's new declaration of a war on drugs and offers of scholarships and handouts to the poor have sparked debate that a plan is afoot for caretaker Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to return to the political leadership. The plans instantly drew flak from Mr Thaksin's opponents who said he had tricked people by pretending to go into a political hiatus in recent weeks.

Chaturon Chaisaeng, chairman of the committee overseeing the scholarship scheme for underprivileged students, said the panel would hand over an extra 400,000 scholarships this year.

The one-year grants, expected to be distributed in August, would help cushion economic hardship in the wake of rising costs of living and skyrocketing oil prices, he said.

Mr Chaturon said the scholarship scheme, an ''urgent'' policy, will be funded by sales of the two- and three-digit lottery.

''We have made a profit of 24 billion baht from lottery sales. Why wouldn't we use it to help people who are suffering increased household expenses?

''It has nothing to do with politics, the election campaign or stimulating the economy,'' said Mr Chaturon.

As the caretaker education minister and authorities gather to sort out who should be eligible candidates, Wan Muhamad Nor Matha, director of the Centre to Fight Narcotics, is gearing up for a renewed war on drugs.

The drugs war, the fifth of its kind, follows Mr Thaksin's meeting yesterday with Pol Lt-Gen Krissana Pol-anant, secretary-general of the Narcotics Control Board and Mr Wan Nor to discuss emerging drug problems.

Mr Wan Nor said drugs abuse and trafficking had increased in 20 provinces including Bangkok and major tourist provinces.

''I'll call a meeting in those provinces next week. Mr Thaksin will visit if he has time,'' he said.

Meanwhile, caretaker Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister Somkid Jatusripitak has ordered CEO-style governors to speed up disbursement of 30-billion-baht funds to prop up the local economy.

A source at Government House said the disbursement was part of a four-point plan to sustain the economy during the caretaker administration when a limit on the implementation of economic projects was expected to affect growth.

Mr Somkid laid down guidelines to ensure the money went to people at the grassroots level.

He told provincial governors to organise low-price consumer goods sales every month to help low-income earners, under the so-called Blue Flag scheme.

Such policies, however, are seen by government critics as mere election campaign gimmicks. They believe Mr Thaksin will renew his bid for national leadership in the upcoming general election, likely to take place in 4-5 months.

Narong Boonsuayfan, of Walailak University in Nakhon Si Thammarat, said the three schemes drive home the point that the ruling party is up to its usual tricks to woo voters with social policy.

''These policies have struck a chord with voters, more than 60% of whom are grassroots people.''

Mr Narong said that the government's failure to tackle the southern unrest, the economic crunch and civic group movement were not deciding factors. Other parties were unlikely to come up with anything challenging, he said.

It did not matter whether Mr Thaksin would accept the prime minister's job again if Thai Rak Thai won. ''He still has negotiating power which will protect him in future,'' said Mr Narong.

Suriyasai Katasila, coordinator of the People's Alliance for Democracy, said the populist policies were just a means for Mr Thaksin to regain power. ''He can't prove himself to middle-class people. So he tries to keep grassroots voters happy,'' Mr Suriyasai said. However, populist policies have lost their magic in several areas because people have grown wiser, he added.

List of activists killed during the Thaksin era

The Bangkok Post

Fifteen community leaders, community rights activists or environmentalists have been killed since Jan 30, 2001:

Jan 30, 2001 _ Jurin Ratchapo of tambon Pa Khlok in Phuket's Thalang district was gunned down. Jurin had resisted businessmen destroying local mangrove forests. The trial of two suspected gunmen is proceeding.
March 28, 2001 _ Suwat Wongpiyasathit was killed after heading opposition against the Rachathewa garbage dump site in Samut Prakan's Bang Phli district.
May 1, 2001 _ Narin Phodaeng, former chairman of a conservationist group in Khao Cha-ang Klangthung in Rayong's Khao Chamao sub-district was shot dead. He was a staunch opponent of a rock quarry owned by a local politician. Nobody has been arrested in the case.
May 17, 2001 _ Pithak Tonwut, who led villagers against a rock quarry owned by a national-level politician in a forest reserve in Phitsanulok's Noen Ma Prang district was shot dead. Two men were arrested but acquitted by the provincial court.
May 21, 2001 _ Chaweewan Pueksungnoen, a member of the Na Klang tambon administration organisation, was shot dead. She had resisted a construction project suspected of involving local influential figures and corrupt officials. Nobody was arrested.
July 2001 _ Somporn Chanapol was shot dead after he resisted the building of a dam in Surat Thani's Kanchanadit district.
June 20, 2002 _ Kaew Binpanma of Chiang Mai's Doi Lo sub-district was shot dead, believed to the result of a land dispute.
Sept 2, 2002 _ Boonsom Nimnoi, who headed a protest against a condensate separation project in Phetchaburi's Ban Laem district, was killed by unknown assailants.
Sept 27, 2002 _ Preecha Thongpaen was shot dead after opposing a waste treatment project in Thung Song district of Nakhon Si Thammarat.
Dec 15, 2002 _ Boonrit Channanrong was shot dead after protesting against the illegal trade in logs taken from Kaeng Krung National Park in Tha Chana district of Surat Thani by state officials
Dec 20, 2002 _ Boonyong Intawong, leader of a protest against a rock quarry in Wiang Chai district in Chiang Rai, was killed.
Feb 1, 2003 _ Khampan Suksai, a village chief from Chiang Mai's Chiang Dao district, was shot dead after opposing encroachment on a community forest.
Feb 4, 2003 _ Chuan Chamnankit, a community leader who fought the spread of drugs, was shot dead in Chawang district, Nakhon Si Thammarat.
May 25, 2003 _ Samnao Srisongkhram, chairman of a conservation group protecting the Nam Phong river basin in Khon Kaen, was killed.
June 21, 2004 _ Charoen Wat-aksorn, leader of a conservation group from Bo Nok in Prachuap Khiri Khan province, was shot dead returning from Bangkok, where he testified before a House committee about a land dispute.

Introduction: Extrajudicial killings of alleged drug dealers in Thailand

The following REPORT is available as a PDF file Download It Here

Editorial Board, article 2

The extrajudicial killing of some 2000 people accused of involvement in the drug trade in Thailand between February and April of the year 2001 is the subject of the special report in this edition of article 2. For the most part, these persons were shot dead by "unidentified gunmen" after reporting to police stations undertaking a campaign to eradicate drug dealers in Thailand within a three-month period. The campaign was begun via a raft of orders issued by the Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, and was buoyed on by comments made throughout this period by the Prime Minster and his subordinates to the effect that the lives of alleged drug dealers are worthless.

Sections 33 and 75 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand contain provisions corresponding to article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to the effect that all persons are equal before the law and are presumed innocent till proven guilty. However, in implementing this campaign the Thai Prime Minister created a special category of persons, alleged drug dealers, for whom these provisions needed no longer apply, for whom any pretence of ordinary criminal procedure could be abandoned. In so doing, the killings may amount to a crime against humanity under article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This begs the question as to whether Thailand has in fact declined to join the Court on the grounds that the King would be subject to its jurisdiction, as was argued publicly, or rather because its Prime Minister was afraid that he might one day find himself in the dock.

This report opens with translations of the Prime Minister's orders that precipitated the three months of murder. A chronology of events by Meryam Dabhoiwala follows, then some case studies of killings that occurred during the campaign. Nick Cheesman writes about aspects of the campaign in more detail, and a comment on its implications for human rights and the rule of law in Thailand by Basil Fernando follows. The report concludes with a statement by the Asian Human Rights Commission from early in the campaign, and finally, some reflections on how to address the consequences of this crisis. The editorial board also wishes to acknowledge Kishori Kedlaya for undertaking most of the field research that formed the basis for these articles.

The report is dedicated to the 2000-plus victims of the 'war on drugs', whoever they were and without regard to whatever accusations may have been leveled against them. It reaffirms their right to have received due process in accordance with their country's Constitution and its obligations under international law.

Prime Minister's Orders Nos 29/2546

Note: These are unofficial partial translations of the three orders by the Prime Minister of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra, on 28 January 2003, launching the "Concerted Effort of the Nation to Overcome Drugs" campaign on 1 February 2003, popularized as the ‘war on drugs’. No official English translations of these documents exist. Other parts of the orders give organisational charts and further subsidiary details of administration.

Prime Minister's Order
No. 29/2546
Re: The Fight to Overcome Narcotic Drugs

...

2. Purpose
To quickly, consistently and permanently eradicate the spread of narcotic drugs and to overcome narcotic problems, which threaten the nation.
...

6. Administration
6. 1. In order to overcome narcotic drugs, there shall be the National Command Centre for Combating Drugs (NCCD), to be a command organ at the national level. There shall also be Operation Centres for Combating Drugs at different levels, to be the prevention and suppression centres for drugs in the regions. The appointed Deputy Prime Minister shall be the Director of the NCCD, who shall have the powers and duties to establish, amend or increase the number of centres or operating organs in the central and regional areas, including along the borders by land and by sea; so that they shall be responsible for the fight to overcome narcotic drugs.
6. 2. To develop structure, assemble strength, administer, direct, supply logistics, communicate, report, follow-up and evaluate the operations of the National Command Centre for Combating Drugs and the operation centres or organs for combating drugs at all levels, in accordance with the assignments made by the Director of the NCCD.
6. 3. All government agencies, local administration organs and public enterprises shall give the National Command Centre for Combating Drugs and the operation centres or organs to overcome narcotic drugs at all levels support as the highest priority. There shall be a unified and result-oriented management system to respond to the "Concerted Effort of the Nation to Overcome Drugs" policy and the action plans to overcome narcotic drugs.
6. 4. The Office of the Narcotics Control Board shall expedite the administration and support, especially in the policy-making process, technical process, legislation and regulations, and cooperate, follow-up and evaluate the fight to overcome narcotic drugs, so that it can be implemented swiftly, efficiently and effectively as planned. In any case where there are problems relating to the implementation of organs, or agencies, such shall be presented to the Director of the NCCD to consider, judge, interpret and order accordingly.
6. 5. The Bureau of the Budget and the Ministry of Finance shall formulate a system and prepare the budget to support the operation and implementation of this order. They shall provide rewards or special levels of salary to the operating officials who fight to overcome narcotic drugs with outstanding performances and to the staff working at the National Command Centre for Combating Drugs and at the Operation Centres for Combating Drugs at all levels.
...

Prime Minister's Order
No. 30/2546
Re: The Establishment of the National Command Centre for Combating Drugs

...

2. Powers and Duties
2. 1. To prescribe policies on drug intelligence, to follow up, evaluate the situation of drug problems, to prevent and suppress drugs.
2. To formulate action plans to combat drugs pursuant to the "Concerted Effort of the Nation to Overcome Drugs" and guidelines of the fight to overcome narcotic drugs, but all these shall be in accordance with the guidelines of the Office of the Narcotics Control Board.
2. 3. To direct, command, expedite, supervise, follow-up and evaluate the implementation of government agencies and other organs concerned at all levels.
2. 4. To prescribe cooperation guidelines of due process at all levels, to expedite and become effective in preventing and suppressing drugs, including to make clear operation guidelines for such proceedings.
2. 5. To cooperate with foreign countries to reduce the problems of drug production, to control precursors, chemicals, drug producing equipment, transport, import, export and drug traffic.
2. 6. To coordinate the intelligence and security operations relating to drug problems, especially the problems of armed forces along the borders, the trade of war weapons, thefts of vehicles, foreign labour, terrorism and transnational criminal organs.
2. 7. To propose to the Prime Minister or the cabinet to transfer government staff or state enterprise officials who are not suitable in the area, to give rewards, to inflict punishments, to set stimulating criteria, to protect and to guard the civil servants and citizens who prevent and suppress drugs. With the exception of the case where the appointment and transfer of, or order for, officials working on the protection and suppression of drugs to perform other duties is made, the original body shall first seek the opinion of the Director of the NCCD.
2. 8. To appoint a sub-committee or a task force to perform any tasks as assigned by the NCCD.
2. 9. To report regularly on the results of the operations and the situation of drug problems.
2. 10. To perform other tasks as assigned by the Prime Minister and the cabinet.
3. To develop structure, assemble strength, direct, supply logistics, communicate, report, follow up and evaluate the operations of the NCCD and the Operation Centres for Combating Drugs at all levels as prescribed by the Director of the NCCD.
4. All central government agencies of all ministries and departments shall, in all cases, immediately respond to the execution of the NCCD. The Narcotics Suppression Bureau of the Royal Thai Police and provincial police shall particularly render assistance and support to investigate, hold inquiries into complicated cases and suppress large-scale narcotic producers and traffickers, influential persons concerned, as well as perform operations as requested by the Provincial Operation Centres for Combating Drugs.
5. The concerned government agencies shall provide officials to be on duty at the Centres 24 hours, as assigned by the Director of the NCCD. The Director of the NCCD shall have powers to assign duties and responsibilities to the deputy director, assistant director, directors, secretary, and direct the officials working at the Centres to perform any tasks within the powers and duties of the Centres.
6. This order shall substitute any orders contrary to or inconsistent with this order.
...

Prime Minister's Order
No. 31/2546
Re: The Establishment of the Operation Centres for Combating Drugs at Different Levels

...

Appendix A: Bangkok Metropolitan Operation Centre for Combating Drugs (BMOCCD) shall have the composition, powers and duties as follows:
...

2. Powers and Duties
2. 1. To develop an intelligence system on drugs, to follow up and evaluate the situation of drug problems in the Bangkok Metropolitan area and problems in connection with drugs.
2. 2. To make an action plan, plans and other projects to tackle drug problems in the Bangkok Metropolitan area. To support the action plan to overcome drug problems as prescribed, in cooperation with government agencies, the private sector and civil organs concerned.
2. 3. To order or assign government agencies and offices in the Bangkok Metropolitan area to execute the plans, budget and operations in an integrated approach to prevent and suppress drugs.
2. 4. To supervise, coordinate, expedite, monitor, follow up and evaluate the operations of drugs prevention and suppression by the government agencies and private sector as well as civil organs concerned in the Bangkok Metropolitan area.
2. 5. To organise campaigns to protect potential drug addicts and vulnerable groups as well as to provide sufficient treatment and rehabilitation for drug addicts in the communities.
2. 6. To set the targets in the suppression of drugs and to appoint a specific team to work in the target areas or to reinforce the operations as requested.
2. 7. To cooperate with the Narcotics Suppression Bureau of the Royal Thai Police, provincial police and government law enforcement agencies to implement the suppression, investigation, expansion of operations, property seizures and eradication of drug networks.
2. 8. To appoint an investigation team to examine the facts and public complaints and to quickly make operations.
2. 9. To propose authoritative officials or the Director of the NCCD to consider rewards or punishments to the operating staff in the Bangkok Metropolitan area and the areas concerned.
2. 10. To follow-up on and evaluate the operations of drug prevention and suppression in the Bangkok Metropolitan area and to advise agencies and organs for the improvement and development of the operations.
2. 11. To regularly report the results of the operations and the situation of drug problems in the Bangkok Metropolitan area to the NCCD.
2. 12. To perform other tasks as assigned or prescribed by the Director of the NCCD.

Appendix B: Provincial Operation Centres for Combating Drugs (POCCD) shall have the composition, powers and duties as follows:
...

2. Powers and Duties
[As for Appendix A, but substitute "Bangkok Metropolitan area" with "province".]

Appendix C: Metropolitan Police 1-9 Operation Centres for Combating Drugs (MPOCCD 1-9) shall have the composition, powers and duties as follows:
...

2. Powers and Duties
2. 1. To prepare information of all drug abusers, drug addicts and drug traffickers in the regions, to make the lists of communities with the spread of drug problems, including to survey and to pursue the movement of drug problems in the areas of responsibility.

2. 2. To implement and to cooperate with the government agencies, private sector or civil organs concerned in an integrated approach to be in accordance with the action plan, plans, and other projects as prescribed by the BMOCCD.
2. 3. To organise groups of resource persons and community-relations persons, to rouse the strength of the mass of people in every community in the areas of responsibility to make a concerted effort to fight against drugs and to organise civil voluntary teams for drug protection.
2. 4. To organise treatments and rehabilitation supporting teams for drug abusers and drug addicts in the communities.
2. 5. To organise development activities to support drug abusers and drug addicts to abstain from and quit drugs.
2. 6. To organise drug suppression teams to press, suppress and purge drug traffickers in the areas of responsibility and to coordinate with the BMOCCD to support the drug suppression operation teams to implement the tasks that are beyond their capability.
2. 7. To cooperate with the Narcotics Suppression Bureau of the Royal Thai Police, provincial police and government law enforcement agencies to execute the suppression, investigation, expansion of operations, property seizures and eradication of drug networks.
2. 8. To appoint investigation teams to examine the facts and public complaints and to quickly make operations.
2. 9. To propose to officials with authority or the Director of the BMOCCD to consider rewards or punishments to the operating staff in the areas of responsibility and the areas concerned.
2. 10. To regularly report the results of the operations and the situation of drug problems in the areas of responsibility to the BMOCCD.
2. 11. To perform other tasks as assigned or prescribed by the Director of the BMOCCD.

Appendix D: District or Minor District Operation Centres for Combating Drugs DOCCD/MDOCCD) shall have the composition, powers and duties as follows:
...

2. Powers and Duties
[As for Appendix C, but substitute "BMOCCD" with "POCCD".]
...

A chronology of Thailand's "war on drugs"

Meryam Dabhoiwala, Researcher, Asian Legal Resource Centre

On 28 January 2003 Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra signed Prime Minister's Order 29/2546, setting down guidelines for the "Concerted Effort of the Nation to Overcome Drugs", widely known as the 'war on drugs,' to begin on February 1. Of Thailand's sixty-three million citizens, three million—roughly five per cent—are estimated to use methamphetamines, or 'crazy pills'. Most are youths, and the growth of drug use among them is widely viewed with alarm. Thaksin stated that "Illicit drugs are a menace to society. Our country will have no future if our children are addicted to drugs. It is the duty of every citizen to fight this drug menace." [1]

Although the guidelines emphasized education and awareness, and the treating of drug users as patients rather than criminals, in practice the 'war on drugs' was managed in the manner implied by the expression: killing of enemies. A combination of incentives and warnings were used to have police eliminate as many suspected drug dealers, by whatever means possible, within the three months designated. The incentives were mainly financial, increasing bonuses to officers for drug hauls according to the size of the taking. Prime Minister Thaksin boasted that "at three Baht per methamphetamine tablet seized, a government official can become a millionaire by upholding the law, instead of begging for kickbacks from the scum of society".[2] Warnings to government officers included threats to transfer, demote or sack those failing to produce evidence of success.

The information forming the base of the government's drug war came from two types of lists compiled by various government agencies and departments – blacklists and watchlists. The Commissioner of the Narcotics Suppression Bureau stated that the names on the blacklists were of people who had been arrested or named in arrest warrants, while those on the watchlists were names of those pending investigation.[3] The lists were apparently prepared in August of 2002, as groundwork for the approaching drug war. Agencies were ordered to compile names of those individuals they suspected of being involved in the drug trade; the Interior Ministry received lists from provincial police, village headmen and district officers. These lists were submitted to the National Command Centre for Combating Drugs,[4] chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyuth. At that stage the government maintained that the lists were prepared scrupulously: lists were cross-checked, and any name appearing in just one list was deleted. Only names that appeared in several lists were added to the watchlist for further investigation. These individuals were then asked to come to the police station "for talks, which the police believe is the most effective and convenient way to find more information about drug-related activities," claimed a police spokesperson.[5] Initially, the government aimed to remove all the names on the blacklist by the end of the three-month 'war', although this target was later modified.

Four persons were killed on the first day of the campaign. Police Commissioner General Sant claimed that police would only fire in self-defense. Interior Minister Wan Mohamad Noor Matha reaffirmed that "the police would abide by the law in their campaign against drug trafficking".[6] However, he later defended killings and disappearances of targeted persons: "They [drug dealers] will be put behind bars or even vanish without a trace. Who cares? They are destroying our country."[7] The Prime Minister also endorsed this attitude, saying, "The government's strategy is to smoke out pushers, who will be eliminated by their own kind. I don't understand why some people are so concerned about them while neglecting to care for the future of one million children who are being lured into becoming drug-users."[8] He later concluded, "[Murder] is not an unusual fate for wicked people."[9]

By February 5, the Food and Drug Administration's warehouse for storing seized narcotics was practically full and the Interior Minister said that there had been more than 2000 arrests, along with 3148 promises by former drug dealers to give up the drug trade.[10] At that date "unknown gunmen" had so far killed six people, but by February 13 the death toll—which the government was announcing publicly as evidence of its success—had escalated to 154.[11] Disturbingly, while the police denied responsibility for most extrajudicial killings, they were also unwilling to conduct necessary investigations into the deaths. According to Amnesty International, "Authorities are not permitting pathologists to perform autopsies and bullets are reportedly being removed from the corpses."[12] And according to Dr Pornthip Rojanasunan, acting director of the Forensic Science Institute, in more than half of the cases seen by her the drugs appeared to have been planted on the victims after their deaths—jammed in pockets at unnatural angles.[13]

Among those killed were persons who had voluntarily joined police reform programs, in many cases months before the drug war began. One of them was Jamnian Nualwilai, a former drug peddler in Muang district of Ratchaburi, on February 13.[14] His wife believes the police killed him and blamed it on his old drug gang. Jamnian had joined a reform program two years ago, and sent in his urine every month to prove he was still clean. Five days before the killing, police commended Jamnian for his conduct and told him his name would be removed from the blacklist. "I had not the slightest idea that the delisting would end up with my husband being shot dead," his wife Kik said. According to her, traffickers would be better off not joining government reform schemes, because "at least they would not be making themselves sitting ducks".

Many people were also killed after going to the police station in response to their names being blacklisted. Boonyung Tangtong was one of ten persons in his neighborhood killed after surrendering to the police.[15] According to Boonyung's 16-year-old son Adirek, before being shot in his own home his father had reported to the Na Chaliang police station. Adirek is certain the police killed his father, alleging, "They were all wearing name and rank tags around their necks, but they didn't look familiar. They could have come from other places."

In Chiang Rai, police even put their informers in jail after they found it difficult to meet government targets for arrests.[16] Chiang Rai had started its own anti-drug campaign in October 2001, which according to officials had yielded more than nine million methamphetamine pills and had caused 13,000 drug users to turn themselves in. Officials now had to scramble to fill the new government quotas or risk losing their jobs. On February 15 the Interior Minister was reported as having voiced his displeasure at certain provinces that were not meeting their quotas, warning that they would be assessed on February 19 and at that date sacked, transferred or demoted:

Any provincial governor or police chief who continues to take it easy … is weighing down the government's war against drugs. They should check out history books about what King Naresuan did to his generals who failed to keep up with him on the battleground. The King had all of them beheaded.[17]
Initially, 90 per cent of the Thai population was reportedly behind the government's war on drugs, however this was before children began dying.[18] The first child to be killed was a nine-year-old boy, Chakraphan Srisa-ard, who was shot on February 23 as police fired at the car carrying him and his mother. His father had already been arrested. One of the boy's uncles stated, "The police kept shooting and shooting at the car. They wanted them to die. Even a child was not spared."[19] The next child to be killed was a 16-month-old baby, shot in her mother's arms by an "unknown gunman" on February 26.[20] A highland couple was shot dead on February 24 on suspicion of selling drugs.[21] Their three children were left homeless, the youngest of whom was a six-year-old girl. Since then, no evidence has been found to suggest the couple had any drug dealings. According to relatives, they "had to die to help make the state suppression records look good". The assistant village headman noted the irony of their deaths: "The couple were killed even though their names did not appear on the drug blacklist, while a major drug dealer faced only minor punishment—a two night stay at a local police station."

Such incidents also led people to question the accuracy of the government's drug suspect lists. On February 25 Police Chief Sant admitted that the Interior Ministry's list was "poorly prepared and could have affected innocent people".[22] While this could be seen as a signal to his subordinates to ease up on the campaign to kill suspects, some critics believe it was simply an attempt to deflect public attention from the tragic death of Chakraphan Srisa-ard. Police Lieutenant General Chalermdej Chomphunuj also later admitted that "some people might have been mistakenly blacklisted, perhaps due to the carelessness of officials".[23] He went on to concede that false information might have been submitted, for personal or business reasons. One example is the case of Abdul Roh Ning Yaha, who was arrested on February 7 at his house in Yarang district, Pattani province, and accused of possessing 300 metamphetamine pills, which the police claimed he had stored in the birdcage in front of his house. Abdul's neighbors and his village leaders believe that he was set up, knowing Abdul to be a strict Muslim and a respected community leader who teaches village children the Quran in his spare time. Abdul had had local political conflicts and villagers believe that his opponents framed him.

Some persons whose names found their way on to blacklists fought to get them off and clear their reputations. For instance, Wichai Samtung, an ethnic Lisu villager of Ban Huay Kiang Sang village, Phrao district, Chiang Mai province, was allegedly framed by police together with three other villagers during a search of their houses on April 26, when they produced one amphetamine pill as 'evidence' against him. Wichai, who has worked for three years as an anti-drug committee member, sought help from the Law Society of Thailand with the other villagers. Meanwhile, the police tried to talk Wichai out of taking the case to court, which they said would be "time consuming". According to Wichai,

At first there was one pill in the search. However, the number mysteriously increased to three when police pressed the charge in court as I refused to surrender. They (the police) said the penalty for possessing just one pill was minor, possibly just a few thousand Baht fine and it would be in my best interest to confess and end the case quickly. But I could not follow that advice since I am innocent. I will fight on even if it was one pill or just half a pill.

In another case, lawyer Somchai Limsgoon, president of the Law Society of Samut Songkram Province, was blacklisted for having earlier defended accused drug dealers in court. Somchai fought the listing and the provincial commanding officer later agreed with him that his name should not have been on the list, but in the meantime his reputation was seriously damaged and personal security compromised.

Another critique of the government's lists was made by Charan Pakdithanakul, secretary to the Supreme Court president, who said that, "People may take one look at the death toll and hail the government, but if you scrutinize the names of those killed, there's not a single big-time dealer."[24] Similarly, a New York Times article noted that the dozens of organized crime groups running the drug trade protected or led by powerful civilian and military figures were unaffected by the campaign.[25] The Interior Ministry finally ordered the Narcotics Control Board to check the lists on February 26.[26] A sub-committee to monitor operations taken under the anti-narcotics law was also established, with guidelines to ensure that proper legal procedure be followed with regards to incidents reported in relation to the 'war on drugs'. The panel asked the police to send all related data for it to examine within the month, and report on the causes of death and their investigations every 15 days.[27] However, the sub-committee was not taken seriously, and it was not until the end of April that police began submitting reports, by which time they would have been able to conceal or doctor any problematic evidence against them.

The Thai government not only repressed and ignored most of the criticism from its own public but also feigned indifference to international criticism. Dr Pradit Chareonthaitawee, a member of Thailand's National Human Rights Commission received political and physical threats after expressing concern about the high number of killings.[28] Dr Pradit made a presentation at a United Nations (UN) conference in February on the human rights situation in Thailand, including extrajudicial killings and the rising death toll of the anti-drug campaign.[29] Dr Pradit maintained that the National Human Rights Commission Act authorizes its commissioners to inform the world about on-going human rights violations in Thailand.[30] Prime Minister Thakshin, however, labeled his behaviour as "sickening" and questioned his authority to communicate with the UN.[31] A spokesman from the ruling Thai Rak Thai party threatened Dr Pradit with impeachment due to his actions being "biased and against national interests".[32] Dr Pradit also received death threats on March 5 and 6 from an anonymous caller who told him to "stop speaking to the United Nations or die".

Meanwhile, the Thai government continued to insist that the means justified the ends. A foreign ministry spokesperson told reporters that, "We want the international community to see our side of the story. It's necessary for the government to take decisive action to deal with the drug problem."[33] Prime Minister Thaksin was less diplomatic, commenting facetiously that "the United Nations is not my father". However, the Interior Ministry banned the release of statistics on drug-related deaths on February 28, in contrast to its earlier public tallies and apparently in part due to adverse international reaction.[34] After that date, reports of killings in newspapers also dwindled.

By the end of March, the government agreed to cut its drugs arrest target to 75%, after officially stating that some people on the lists did not exist.[35] The government also received reports on state officials suspected of drug involvement. The Local Administration Department fired or suspended 40 village chiefs, while a disciplinary investigation was being conducted against 141 chiefs. The Royal Thai Police Office blacklisted 477 officers, 135 of whom were fired, while 39 faced criminal prosecution. On April 1 the Prime Minister announced that all government officials suspected of involvement in the trade would be transferred to inactive posts.[36]

At a meeting on April 8, the government increased financial incentives to encourage arrests of drug traffickers by officials – informants would get 15 per cent of the value of seized assets, arresting officials 25 per cent, and if there were no informant, the official would get 40 per cent.[37] The government also decided that drug free villages would be entitled to additional state aid. Similarly, outstanding officials would be awarded medals, including the National Power medal for bravery. Along with such incentives, the government continued to discipline officials failing to meet its rigid targets. On April 25 the governors of three provinces were threatened with the sack if they did not meet the final arrest quota before the end of the war on April 30.[38]

At the start of May, Prime Minister Thaksin declared 'victory' in the war on drugs, although since that date the campaign has continued more surreptitiously, after a decision was made to extend elements of the policy over the coming year.[39] To achieve his 'victory', the Prime Minister instigated a shoot-to-kill policy that left nearly 2000 people dead in the three months. The persons killed were subject neither to judicial process nor effective investigation by the authorities, whether before or after death. Meanwhile, the major players in the drug trade were left untouched.

The campaign has brought about a disturbing new level of authoritarian administration in Thailand. Senior government officials have done little but acquiesce with their Prime Minister's orders, disregarding the fundamental principles of law, and this trend has since continued, under the Prime Minister's newest 'war', against nebulous "dark influences". Prior to this war on drugs, Thailand was seen as having made considerable progress in protection of human rights by comparison to neighbouring states. Regrettably, this can no longer be said to be the case.

End Notes

1 The Nation, 2 February 2003.[Back to content]
2 The Nation, 2 February 2003. At time of writing, there are roughly 40 Thai Baht to US. [Back to content]
3 'Named and shamed', Bangkok Post, 6 April 2003.[Back to content]
4 Which has also been referred to by the media as the National Committee on the War on Drugs, and National Centre to Defeat Drugs. [Back to content]
5 'Named and shamed'.[Back to content]
6 'Named and shamed'.[Back to content]
7 Brad Adams, 'Drug 'war' kills democracy too: Thailand's crackdown', International Herald Tribune, 24 April 2003. [Back to content]
8 The Nation, 1 March 2003.[Back to content]
9 The Nation, 9 March 2003.[Back to content]
10 The Nation, 9 March 2003.[Back to content]
11 The Nation, 13 February 2003.[Back to content]
12 Amnesty International Press Release, 20 February 2003.[Back to content]
13 Robert Horn, 'The killing season', Time Asia, 10 March 2003. [Back to content]
14 'Innocent victims suffer in silence', Bangkok Post, 17 February 2003. [Back to content]
15 'Families live in terror as suspects die', Bangkok Post, 1 March 2003. [Back to content]
16 'Police arrest informants to meet target', Bangkok Post, 10 March 2003.[Back to content]
17 The Nation, 15 February 2003.[Back to content]
18 Editorial, Vancouver Sun, 8 April 2003.[Back to content]
19 Seth Mydans, 'A wave of drug killings is linked to Thai police', New York Times, 8 April 2003.[Back to content]
20 The Nation, 27 February 2003.[Back to content]
21 'Campaign has torn some families apart', Bangkok Post, 19 May 2003. [Back to content]
22 The Nation, 26 February 2003.[Back to content]
23 'Named and shamed'.[Back to content]
24 The Nation, 26 February 2003.[Back to content]
25 Mydans, 'A wave of drug killings'.[Back to content]
26 The Nation, 27 February 2003. [Back to content]
27 'Lift the clouds of darkness and fear', Bangkok Post, 16 March 2003. [Back to content]
28 Forum Asia statement, 7 March 2003.[Back to content]
29 'Pradit subject of impeachment talk', The Nation, 6 March 2003. [Back to content]
30 Wassana Nanuam, 'Pradit accused of protecting dealers', Bangkok Post, 11 March 2003. [Back to content]
31 Yuwadee Tunyasiri, 'Thaksin blasts comments from Pradit as sickening', Bangkok Post, 9 March 2003. [Back to content]
32 'Pradit subject of impeachment talk', The Nation, 6 March 2003.[Back to content]
33 Editorial, Vancouver Sun, 8 April 2003. [Back to content]
34 Forum Asia statement.[Back to content]
35 'Target cut as some suspects don't exist.' Bangkok Post, 29 March 2003. [Back to content]
36 The Nation, 2 April 2003.[Back to content]
37 The Nation, 9 April 2003.[Back to content]
38 'Three governors face chop for failing to achieve targets', Bangkok Post, 26 April 2003.[Back to content]
39 The Nation, 24 April 2003. [Back to content]

Extrajudicial killings of alleged drug dealers in Thailand

Asian Legal Resource Centre

Prime Minister of Thailand Thaksin Shinawatra announced on 28 January 2003 that a 'war on drugs' would begin on February 1, and continue until April 30, at which time the country would be drug-free. As a result, over 2000 persons lost their lives during this three-month period, murdered on the streets, in houses, restaurants and shops around the country. Others who escaped death have been forced into hiding or had their reputations and livelihoods ruined. Below is a selection of cases compiled from complaints received and investigated by non-governmental organizations, the media and other sources.

Targeted killings by "unidentified gunmen"

The war on drugs got off to its promised start on the night of January 31-February 1, with "unidentified gunmen" killing Boonchuay and Yupin Unthong as they were about to return home with their son, eight-year-old Jirasak, in the streets of Ban Rai, Damnoen Saduak district, Ratchaburi. The family had spent the evening playing fairground games at a local temple, and had all climbed aboard a motorcycle to go home. They had not gone more than 200 metres when two men dressed in black wearing ski masks pulled up alongside on another motorcycle. The man on the back shot Jirasak's mother, and Boonchuay unsuccessfully tried to speed away. The motorcycle crashed onto the pavement, and bleeding on the road Boonchuay shouted to his son to run. Jirasak escaped over a fence and hiding, watched as the man shot his father in the head. Boonchay had been released from prison three months ago, where he had served 18 months for drug offenses, and Yupin was also on a drug blacklist. Relatives said that neither had been involved in drugs since Boonchuay's release from jail. Boonchay's brother Samruay Thinrung said that justice should have been allowed to take its course. "Being tried in court and executed in one day would have been more acceptable than having my brother shot dead in the street," he said. Phanom, his uncle, added that whatever their offences, "Killing people in the streets is just too cruel."

Many killings occurred shortly after the victims had been called to a police station. Suwit Baison, a 23 year-old assistant television cameraman kneeled down before Prime Minister Thaksin as he arrived at the Agriculture Ministry for a meeting on February 27. Suwit told Thaksin that his mother, Kwanla Puangchomphum, and stepfather, Thanom Montak, were shot dead on February 26 shortly after they left the Tha Chaliang police station in Nong Phai district, Phetchabun. The couple had gone to pay a 5000 Baht (US5) fine for marijuana possession. His parents were shot while riding a motorcycle home, about five kilometers from the police station. Witnesses said the gunman was driving a white sedan, which according to Suwit was spotted at the police station car park. With tears rolling down his cheeks and his voice trembling, Suwit handed a petition to Thaksin, asking for justice. He said local police had dismissed the shootings as "drugs-related" and made no effort to conduct a proper investigation. The Prime Minister promised to look into the matter. An hour later, Crime Suppression Division commander Major General Surasit Sangkapong talked to Suwit for about 10 minutes before they left together for further questioning at Surasit's office. Surasit said he would assign one of his deputies to investigate the shooting. According to Nong Phai district police superintendent, Colonel Phisan Iamla-or, however, Suwit's parents were on a list of people who allegedly possessed drugs that had been prepared at a gathering of villagers. He said the couple had been arrested separately on four occasions with marijuana and methamphetamine pills. However, Suwit claims that his stepfather was arrested during the month on a charge of marijuana use, at which time the police tried to make him admit to methamphetamine possession. He also alleged that his mother had been falsely charged with possession last year, but had been told by police that for 50,000 Baht (US,200) they would reduce the charge. After the couple consulted a lawyer, the police contacted them and told them to report to the station.

A day after Kwanla and Thanom's deaths, another person in the neighbourhood was murdered in a similar manner, again a 'reformed' drug user turned victim of the 'war'. Boonyung Tangtong, a 40 year-old father, had reported to Na Chaliang police station, Petchabun, as ordered. Shortly after, nine armed men came to his house, took him into his bedroom and shot him in the head and chest. His murder took place in full view of his wife and children, including a two-year-old daughter, and two other relatives, who were held captive with guns against their heads. Boonyung had turned himself in to the police about a year ago, and twice took part in the government's reform program. Adirek, his 16-year-old son, is positive that the police murdered his father. "They all were wearing name and rank tags around their necks, but they didn't look familiar. They could have come from other places," he said after the shooting. Ten persons in the area were reportedly killed after reporting to police during the first weeks of the campaign.

Likewise, on February 17, three days before eight "unidentified gunmen" entered her house in Ban Laem district, Petchaburi, and shot her eight times, Somjit Kuanyuyen, a 42 year-old mother, reported to the police after her name appeared on a blacklist. According to her nephew, 'Sak' she went to the Ban Laem police station with her husband and was told to go into a side room and sign a paper. However, Somjit was illiterate and did not know what it was. Terrified, she marked the document. The police informed her that after signing the paper she would be safe and could come to see them any time if anything suspicious happened. On February 20 her 7-months pregnant daughter saw a pickup truck with dark tinted windows and no license plates stop at the front of the house. It contained four men with crew cut hairstyles, wearing sunglasses and black clothes. Two of the men approached the grocery stand at the house ostensibly to buy some beer. One nodded his head and the other fired at Somjit, hitting her in the arm while her seven-year-old granddaughter clung to her leg. There were three other persons in the house, including Somjit's daughter. They watched as Somjit fell after the first shot and the man fired another six shots into her back, killing her. After the men left, although the house is very close to a main road and only 20 metres from a police box, the police took a long time to arrive and investigate. They did not set up checkpoints or take any other steps to arrest the murderers. They didn't collect the bullet shells, which were instead taken up by the family. They asked Somjit's daughter and cousin if her family was involved in drugs, but asked no questions about the murder itself. When the daughter made it clear that her mother had had nothing to do with drugs, the police warned her, "Don't speak too much". For his part, Ban Laem police commander, Colonel Taveesak na Songkhla said that Somjit's name was on a list submitted to them by the Drug Suppression Office in Bangkok. He claims his officers searched the scene, but found no bullet casings. "If the relatives have found bullet casings, they should give them to the police instead of keeping them and saying that we are ignoring the case," he said. Colonel Taveesak also mentioned that although the police were working on solving such murder cases, "investigation cannot be totally efficient because we need to use officers to arrest those blacklisted in order to fulfill the government quota." The family tried to complain to their local Member of Parliament, but could not find him. They then went to the provincial office of the Law Society of Thailand and were advised to tell the media.

The police and government preferred to characterize most killings by "unidentified gunmen" as "bad guys killing bad guys" or "killing to cut the link"(kar tad torn). In one particularly brutal case described in these terms, locals allege that uniformed police in fact tortured and murdered four ethnic Hmong men on February 12. The four men, 45-year-old Jai-jue Sae Thao, his younger brother Somchai Sae Thao, their 59-year-old cousin, Boonma Sae Thao, and Seng Sae Thao, the 59-year-old head of Doi Nam Pieng Nam Din village, Bann Neun sub district, Lom Kao district, Petchabun, were travelling by pickup truck after attending the Lom Kao district office. According to Jai-jue's son, Sornchai Sae Thao, his father had been charged with carrying an illegal shotgun, and on February 11 had received an order to go to court. Jai-jue was said to be getting a transfer of ownership on the gun, which he kept with him for protection when alone on his farm at nights. Jai-jue contacted the village head to go with him as guarantor in his case, and he found that the head had also received a notice, that his name was on a list and he had to report to the police. That notice was issued by the district office of Lom Kao, and the person who brought the charge sheet to Jai-jue was the same as the person who gave the notice to the village head. The following morning, both of them went to the district office in the village head's pickup truck. Jai-jue also asked his brother Somchai to go with him. Boonma was getting a lift to buy medicine for his 18-month-old daughter, who was suffering from acute diarrhoea. According to Sornchai, a villager who had met his father in court said that when his father appeared there the judge knew nothing about the charge and said he had not been the one to call him to the court. Seng Sae also did not report to the district office because the officer who should receive the report was out, and so they then began returning home. Around midday, about fourteen kilometres short of their village, they were all shot dead. According to Sornchai, one villager saw the incident and at first insisted that police in uniform shot them. However, that villager was called to Lom Kao police station for a talk, and after that became very quiet and apprehensive. Several villagers also witnessed at least one police motorcycle in the area at the time of the killings. A Doi Nam villager walking nearby was the first to see the bodies themselves. That person went to tell the men's relatives, and all of them went to the place and found that the pickup was gone but the four dead bodies were pulled together at the side of the road. All four had been shot in the head, and in addition all of them showed signs of brutal torture:

- Jai-jue had a broken chin and bruised eyes;
- Boonma's body was burnt on its left side, and his face had been stabbed with a sharp object, leaving a triangular shape; the back of his head was also reportedly severely damaged;
- Somchai had a broken neck and collarbone;
- Seng Sae appeared to have beaten.

According to Boonma's son, Tu Sae Thao, his father's wallet with 2000 Baht (US) and his watch were missing. According to Sornchai, the charge sheet against his father also was missing. The police on the scene claimed that they knew nothing of what had happened and that the pickup truck also was missing when they arrived. However, one police officer reportedly walked behind the village head's son and told him discreetly that it was not police from Lom Kao but from neighbouring Lom Sak who had killed the men. Although the bodies were sent to Somdej Yuppharaj hospital for autopsy, no result has been sent to relatives and they don't dare ask for it. The hospital also has not given any official paper to acknowledge the deaths, except one for Boonma because his relatives went to the district office to demand it. The paper says only that Boonma was shot and killed. Meanwhile, the doctor who conducted the autopsy is reported to have handed the bullets over to the police, but it is now not known where the bullets have been sent. According to the source of that information, however, the village head was killed with a .38 calibre weapon (the size of police-issue pistols).

While the target of the killing seems to have been Seng Sae, the family members of the three other men insist that it was impossible for them to be drug sellers, as they never even smoked cigarettes or drank alcohol. However, when the case was reported in the media the police informed newspapers that all four were "suspected drug dealers" When contacted further on this point, the investigating officer Major Amnuay Yamark said that police believed it was a case of "killing to cut the link" because the village head was a big drug seller. He said that he didn't have details about the other three men's backgrounds and their names were not on the blacklist. After relatives complained to him and other police that there had been no progress in the investigation, they were told that police are investigating the case 'secretly'.

In a similar case, six local leaders were shot dead in Ban Pang Khon, Huay Chompu sub district, Muang ('Central' district, Chiang Rai, while returning in a pick-up truck from an anti-drug meeting on February 27. They were all ethnic Yao villagers, identified as 46-year-old Ban Pa Luang village head Kiattisak Saksrichompoo, 40-year-old Kaoguay Sae Tern, 36-year-old Ulong Sae Fan, and 29-year-olds Bunma Sae Fan, Uguay Sae Tern and Somdej Sae Tern. All but Kiattisak were local administration officials of Huay Chomphu sub-district. At around 4pm, while they were away at the meeting at the Supanimit Foundation, a pickup truck with four men reportedly came to the village and stopped in front of the headman's house. One of the men told neighbours that they had come from the district governor's office regarding road construction matters. He explained they were newly transferred to the area, having previously been situated in Nan. A neighbour told them that the headman had gone to Pang Khon village and would return in the evening. One of them gave 200 Baht (US) and saying that they would be back the next day asked for some chicken to be prepared for them. After this they returned to their car and drove to Pang Khon village. Near the end of the road, they parked and asked another group of villagers about the Ban Pa Luang headman. At that time, one of the men in the car recognized a man among the villagers and told him, "Don't you remember me? I tried to arrest you but you fled." In fact, police had previously detained that villager on drug charges, but he and his associates had managed to escape custody. Ten days after this chance meeting, that villager was reportedly also shot dead. After the group of men in the car parted from the villagers, not long after the sound of repeated gunfire reached Ban Pang Khon from about two kilometres away. Shortly after, villagers saw the car carrying the four men driving away from the scene. When they went to the site, they saw the headman's car and the six men riddled with bullets. Kiattisak and Bunma, in the driver and passenger seats, had both been shot from behind; the other four men were all dead in the tray of the pickup truck. Police allege Kiattisak was a drug dealer and speculated that 'a drug ring might be behind the attack". They were investigating to find out whether the other five victims also had drug links. Kiattisak's name was on the local blacklist, however some villagers doubt that he was a drug dealer, as he was active in working with the local administration in drug suppression and anti-drug education programmes. Around 15 years ago he had been involved in opium trading, but at that time this was common in the area. In 1995, he was arrested on a charge of being a heroin producer, but after a two-year court case he was found not guilty. He had not been implicated in any drug-related affairs after that. Bunma's father, Lek Sae Fan, also denied his son had any drug-trafficking history. In other reported cases where victims were shot while returning from drug suppression meetings, in Narathiwat the head of Chanae Hahama Bado subdistrict, 44-year-old Hahama Bado, and his aide, Rapeng Teuramae, were shot while riding home on a motorbike on the night of February 28. Likewise, the 54-year-old head of Mae Tao sub-district, Mae Sot district, Tak, Bunpan Lanoi, was shot in the chest and right shoulder as he was returning from an anti-drug meeting at around 10pm of March 5. He was wounded in his right arm and shoulder, and later admitted to Mae Sot district hospital.

In another alleged case of "killing to cut the link" 42-year-old Jamnian Nualwilai, a former drug peddler who had turned into a police informant was shot dead in Hinkong sub-district, Muang district, Ratchaburi on February 13. Jamnian was found with four bullet wounds to the head and one in his back. Police said he had 200 methamphetamine pills, 11,000 Baht cash and a mobile phone in his possession. The police say that a drug gang killed him to prevent him betraying them, but Jamnian's wife 'Kik' does not agree. She believes the police killed her husband and made it look as though his old drug gang had done it. Kik said her husband had joined a voluntary government program under which small-time drug traffickers quit and helped authorities with their crackdown. Jamnian joined two years ago and sent in his urine sample every month to prove he was still clean. He even brought other traffickers to the program. Kik did not understand how her husband could be murdered when the police had guaranteed him protection. Five days before the killing, police commended Jamnian for his conduct and told him his name would be removed from the blacklist. "I had not the slightest idea that delisting would end up with my husband being shot dead," Kik said. "Traffickers would be reluctant to join the program if they had to expose themselves to vengeful acts by drug rings or police. People like my husband would be better off not joining - at least they would not be making themselves sitting ducks. The program application forms are like death warrants," Kik said. "Gunning someone down will not stop drugs. It is merely a way for officials to glorify their achievements," she observed. The wife of Jaruk sae Tan also called for authorities to protect - rather than kill - former drug dealers who had given up the illicit business. Jaruk, who had stopped selling drugs more than two years earlier, was shot dead on February 25 while watching television in his restaurant in Muang district, Phuket. During the shooting, a stray bullet injured a four-year-old girl, Suthanma Iamsam-ang, who lives in the neighborhood.

One characteristic of the killings across the country was that they often occurred in daylight and in the presence of witnesses, despite the killers being "unidentified'. For instance, Bussaporn Pung-am, a 39 year-old woman whom police allege to have been a major methamphetamine dealer, was shot dead in her home in Muang district, Nakhon Pathom, on February 11, while having lunch with two neighbors. Witnesses told police that an "unidentified man" got out of a pickup truck, walked inside the grocery store that is part of the house, and shot Bussaporn five times. Police said they found court documents in a bag in her house showing she had acted as a guarantor for more than 200 drug suspects who had been released on bail. Bussaporn herself was once arrested and released on bail, said the deputy commander of Muang district police station, Lt-Colonel Panlert Tangsriphairoj. Similarly, 37-year-old Sommai Thongmee was killed in his house in Pak Pun sub-district, Muang district, Nakhon Si Thammarat on February 4. His wife, Thippawan, said that three men in a double-cab pickup truck had arrived at their house, asking to see Sommai. The men went inside and talked to her husband, before one of them pulled out a pistol and shot Sommai dead. Police said Sommai was a "major drug dealer" and was on the regional blacklist. On the same day, 30-year-old Yongyuth Jongjit was shot dead by a group of nine "unidentified men" at his pig farm in Kanchanadit district, Surat Thani, in front of his workers. Again, the victim was on the local blacklist and police put the killing down to "killing to cut the link". Likewise, on March 6 a sub-district municipal councillor was shot dead in his car at the Udon intersection of Mitraphap highway, Muang district, Saraburi, while two passengers and three employees in a nearby shop were wounded. The Thap Kwang sub-district official, 40-year-old Manoj Khamsat, was shot in the face, head, chest, legs and arms when a pickup truck carrying about seven men pulled up alongside and one man opened fire with an M16 rifle. Manoj fired back with a pistol, jumped from the truck and attempted to flee, but was shot down. Police said Manoj was on a blacklist, and the killing may have related to drugs or other illicit businesses. Manoj had earlier survived an attack on February 21 in which his wife was shot.

The case of 75-year-old Samniang Chusri stands out as an example of how anybody with her name on a blacklist could be a target for execution. Samniang had been called in by village authorities in Koh Plabphla sub-district, Muang district, Ratchaburi and told she was on a blacklist. Officials tried to coerce her to sign a confession, and renounce drug-related activities. One of her daughters had last year been charged with possessing 21 methamphetamine pills, but Samniang insisted that she had nothing to do with it and refused to sign anything. Days later, on February 25, two men arrived on a motorcycle at the front of a neighbouring shop, where Samniang was having a soft drink on the porch. One pressed his hands in supplication and asked for Samniang's forgiveness before shooting her in the head and chest. Samniang's daughter, Pranee Fakchin, said that her mother had been blacklisted, and she had repeatedly gone to the police to try to convince them to take her name off. “Police prepared their suspect list on rumours and they didn’t try to get evidence,?Pranee said. “Now my mother had to die as a consequence. This isn’t fair.?Another daughter, Nitaya Poonsak, added, “They should have arrested her and put her in jail—at least then I could have visited her.?

Killings by the police

Although the majority of killings involved “unidentified?killers, in some 70 cases police have acknowledged responsibility for deaths. In each of these cases the police have excused themselves on the grounds of “self-defence? For instance, on February 12 police killed 32-year-old Chanchai Khamkhomkul in Bangkok’s Klong Toei district while reportedly trying to arrest him as he delivered methamphetamines to a customer. The police maintain that Chanchai started shooting while trying to escape and was killed when they returned fire, hitting him six times. Police said they found 20,000 pills in a bag he was carrying. The next day, police in the same district shot and killed 39-year-old Ukritthana Jesala when he allegedly shot at them as they tried to arrest him.

Also in Bangkok, on March 20 officers of Police Command 5 shot and killed 38-year-old Surasit Singchai in Bang Na district as he allegedly resisted arrest. Colonel Charoen Srisalak reported that police had set up Surasit and arranged to buy 6000 pills from him. When he realized that he was about to be arrested, he began shooting, said Colonel Charoen, causing police to return fire and kill him. On February 24 police on a highway in Chiang Mai province also shot dead an ethnic Hmong couple, Damrong and Somsri Thanomworakul, “on suspicion that they sold drugs? However, there has reportedly been no evidence to connect the handicraft vendors with drugs, nor were they on any blacklist, and nor had they behaved in any way to threaten the police. Relatives insist the couple “had to die to help make state drug suppression records look good?

In the case of 42-year-old Boonteem Chaiyang, the police may first have held him captive and tortured him before executing him. According to the police, Boonteem, of Pha Ham sub-district, Muang district, Chiang Mai, was the target of a sting operation. The police, from Thungkru police station, claim that on the night of February 2 he shot at them on Soi Pracha-uthit 76, in front of Burana Suksa School—police officers Worarit Sunyakanit and Chalothon Wantanachoth were forced to shoot back in “self defence? The police claim that 16,000 amphetamine pills were found in a car being driven by Boonteem. However, his wife, 45-year-old Saengtong Luangwiroj, lodged a complaint with the Forensic Science Institute that the police executed her husband. She alleges in the complaint that Boonteem disappeared on January 28, after he visited his brother Thaksin Chaiyang, who is serving a prison term for a drug conviction. She went to Pracha-chun police station to file a kidnapping complaint, but did not hear anything until receiving news that her husband had been killed. She saw her husband’s body and claims that there were wounds on it suggesting torture, however the body was cremated without forensic investigation. According to the police report, a doctor’s preliminary investigation found that the man was shot in the heart, lungs and spleen. The police also claim that Saengtong didn’t know her husband was a drug dealer, but said that it was the case as his brother is in jail for drug offences. Saengtong, however, says that they were very poor and there was no evidence that her husband had an income from buying and selling drugs.

In a rather different case, a Chinese Haw drug suspect Hong Khaphapu was “found dead?in a detention cell at Hua Mak police station, Bangkok, where he was being held after being arrested at around 3:30pm on March 28 at the Wat Thepleela pier, in possession of 4000 methamphetamine pills. Police claim to have also found around one million Baht (US,000) in his car, and when they searched Hong’s apartment they reportedly found a further 10,000 pills and eight passbooks for bank accounts totaling 600,000 Baht (US,000). Major Komsan Paksin, inspector at Hua Mak police station, said that Hong had admitted to buying a fake Thai citizen ID, and to distributing drugs in the Ramkhamhaeng area after smuggling them from northern provinces. Major Komsan claimed that Hong had drowned himself around 5am in a small bucket of water while in a detention room with several other suspects, none of whom saw what happened. According to Dr Pornthip Rojanasunan, the acting director of the Forensic Science Institute, however, it is impossible for someone to commit suicide by immersing his head in a small bucket of water. Dr Pornthip added that she was unable to investigate the case as it was outside her jurisdiction, but concluded, "We won't call this suicide."

Accidental killings of "innocents"

Where the government's campaign began to founder was when obviously innocent people became victims of shootings, particularly children. The turning point came with the highly publicized case of nine-year-old Chakraphan Srisa-ard, who was killed during a police operation on February 24, in Lan Luang district, Bangkok. Chakraphan was hit by three bullets, while sitting on the back seat of a car driven by his mother, Pornwipa Kerdrungruang, who was trying to flee after police had arrested her husband, Sathaporn, in a trap set up with an arrested dealer. The couple had arrived at Saphan Khao in the Lan Luang area around 9pm. Sathaporn left the car to deliver 6000 amphetamine pills to the plain-clothes police team, who then flashed their badges and arrested him. On seeing her husband's arrest, Pornwipa tried to drive off. Three policemen, Police Sergeant Major Pipat Sang-in, Police Lance Corporal Anusorn Tansuwan and Police Corporal Panumas Chanacham opened fire, but denied shooting into the car. Independent accounts at the scene suggest that the officers chased Pornwipa in their car as she was trying to drive away. They fired at the vehicle until it crashed into the pavement. The car had six bullet holes in it. The city police chief, Damrongsak Nilkuha, later said that Nang Lerng police had filed murder charges against the three officers, who had been freed on bail after Police Colonel Nipon Pupansri, deputy commander of city Police Command 4, went to guarantee them. Three pistols belonging to the accused police officers were sent to the Scientific Crime Detection Division on February 27 along with the three bullets removed from Chakraphan's body. The ballistics tests revealed that the spent shells from the bullets believed to have killed Chakraphan did not match the type of handguns carried by the officers. However, a senior policeman conceded that the three policemen might have handed in different guns for the ballistics examination. The examination did not result in a withdrawal of the murder charges against the officers.

National Police Commission spokesman Police Major General Pongsapat Pongcharoen gave the boy's family 20,000 Baht (US0) to help with funeral costs, however, he added, "Police will continue to take tough measures against drug dealers." Furthermore, Major General Pongsapat defended the shooting, saying that the officers followed procedure, but the boy's parents used their son as a shield. Criticism of the shooting came from other quarters, however, including Bangkok Senator and former police chief General Pratin Santiprapop, who called the incident a deliberate killing and said the officers who shot the boy must be held responsible, regardless of their intentions. According to the senator, the case involved an excessive use of arms with the police being intent on using their weapons, even though the suspects had shown no indication of threatening them. The Law Society of Thailand secretary-general Thana Benjathikul agreed that the case represented a deliberate killing since there was no evidence there were guns in the fleeing car. Metropolitan Police Bureau Commissioner Lieutenant General Damrongsak Nilkuha, however, has sought to excuse the police from their actions, saying that the car had dark tinted windows and police could not see that there was a boy on the back seat.

There have been suspicions of a cover-up, amid conflicting accounts of Chakraphan's death by the police. Police Major General Chakthip quoted the officers as having said that the couple was being secretly accompanied by "guards" who showed up after Sathaporn was arrested. "The policemen said they didn't fire at the car, and that the bullets were from the guards of the drug dealers," Chakthip said. Lieutenant Colonel Pakorn Pawilai, the inspector at Nang Lerng police station in charge of the investigation, has also claimed that the police did not fire at the car but rather, "There was a man suspected to be from the same drug ring riding a motorcycle who opened fire at the car and killed the boy." First Region Police commissioner Major General Theerasak Nguanbanchong has also asserted that there were witnesses who saw "guards" from the same drug ring helping Pornwipa escape the shooting scene. "This group is a major drug ring. They have a protection team when they distribute drugs. It is likely there was a protection team intervening during the commotion," he said. However, according to Chakraphan's father, it was the police who shot his son: "We had no protection team with us because we were supposed to be dealing with small-scale buyers - there was no 'VIP' involved with us that day," he said. In order to stem concerns, on February 25 Prime Minister Thaksin said he had already ordered the Special Investigations Department under the Ministry of Justice to investigate the case. However, Police Lieutentant General Noppadol Somboonsap, director-general of the Department, admitted that it would not be able to fully ensure justice in the case because it has yet to receive its full mandate. The draft legislation for the Department to carry out investigations and provide it with funds was still awaiting parliamentary approval.

Meanwhile, shortly after the killing of Chakraphan, a 16-month-old girl and her mother were killed on February 26. The girl's mother, 38-year-old Raiwan Khwanthongyen, was carrying her baby, nicknamed 'Ice' in the centre of Sadao district, Songkhla, police said, when "unidentified gunmen" shot them both. Police Lieutenant Colonel Phakdi Preechachon, the officer in-charge of the investigation, said police assumed the killing was gang-related because Raiwan's brother was allegedly involved in the drug trade. Raiwan might have known the hitman, Phakdi said, as witnesses saw Raiwan scream when she noticed the man and tried to run away with her daughter in her arms.

Earlier in the month, on February 13, 38-year-old Sam-ang Chumchom was killed by gunfire apparently aimed at a person in an adjacent vehicle at a red light in Udon Thani. Sam-ang was riding a bicycle back home when she stopped alongside the car carrying 27-year-old Sanya Khampatan, the apparent target of the killing, his 50-year-old father, Veera, and his sister, Buala Boonpa. Sanya had just been released on bail after being charged with methamphetamine trafficking. Two gunmen on a motorcycle pulled up alongside, killing Sanya, Veera and Sam-ang. Buala, who survived, said she did not know Sam-ang and the woman just stopped her bicycle at the red light next to the car. Sam-ang's sister-in-law Bang-orn Chumchom blamed the government for her death. She said the administration's tough action against drug trafficking had prompted widespread killings to silence small-time drug agents, while the relevant agencies lacked the necessary measures to protect "good people" Of 26 people shot dead in Udon Thani between February 1 to 18, only 18 were reportedly on the government blacklist. Police said they were investigating all cases but "had yet to catch any murder suspects" Sam-ang's sister-in-law added that no one had offered help with the funeral, and her family's reputation was ruined because most people presumed that her sister-in-law was also guilty of drug dealing.

Murder as public policy in Thailand

Nick Cheesman, Projects Officer, Asian Legal Resource Centre

Between February and April 2003 the Thai government incited police and public officials to organize and endorse murder in the name of ridding the country of drugs. Through a series of official orders and public statements, the government pushed officials to massively overstep their normal authority. It also set up numerous positive and negative incentives, including promises of financial rewards and promotions, and threats of transfers and dismissals. By May, more than 2000 persons were killed, and the country’s key institutions for the protection of human rights were seriously compromised.

Administering murder

On January 28 the Prime Minister of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra, set the anti-drug crusade in motion. Prime Minister’s Office Orders 29/2546, 30/2456 and 31/2546, effective from February 1, aimed to combat the enormous drug manufacture, trafficking and use in Thailand “quickly, consistently and permanently”. They ordered the establishment of the National Command Centre for Combating Drugs, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, to oversee the “Concerted Effort of the Nation to Overcome Drugs” campaign. They set out its basic responsibilities, including planning, coordination and reporting, and established an administrative structure and tasks throughout the country. The orders gave the programme the “highest priority”, indicating to officials that they would be closely monitored, and that the government was prepared both to reward high performers and punish laggards. The Prime Minister boosted incentives in two sets of regulations issued on February 11. One of those was the Prime Minister’s Office Regulations on Bonuses and Rewards Relating to Narcotics (No. 3). This document amended two earlier reward regimes, and effectively encouraged the murder of drug suspects by providing grades of bonuses where the most efficient and expedient means for officials to be rewarded was simply to kill the accused:

Article 18 of the Prime Minister’s Office Regulations on Bonuses and Rewards Relating to Narcotics BE 2537 (1994), which had been amended by the Prime Minister’s Office Regulations on Bonuses and Rewards Relating to Narcotics (No. 2) BE 2540 (1997)... shall be replaced by the following statements:

“Article 18: The bonus shall be given when officials proceed with a notified case leading to arrest according to the following rules and conditions:
(1) In a case where both the alleged offender is arrested and the exhibited narcotics are seized, if the value calculated based on the quantity of narcotics does not exceed 1000 Baht, each case shall be paid not exceeding 1000 Baht, after the Public Prosecutor has issued a prosecution order. If the case falls under Section 92 of the Narcotics Control Act BE 2522 (1979) and Section 17 of the Royal Ordinance of the Control on the Use of Volatile Substances BE 2533 (1990), the bonus shall not be paid.
(2) In a case where the alleged offender is arrested and the exhibited narcotics are seized, if the value calculated based on the quantity of narcotics exceeds 1000 Baht
(a) In a case where the Public Prosecutor issues a prosecution order, the bonus calculated based on the quantity of narcotics may be paid in half before the Public Prosecutor issues a prosecution order. The remaining amount is to be paid in full when the Public Prosecutor has issued a prosecution order.
(b) The bonus calculated based on the quantity of narcotics shall be paid only in half if the Public Prosecutor has issued a non-prosecution order, or ceased the proceedings.
(3) In a case where both the alleged offender is arrested and the exhibited narcotics are seized, but the alleged offender loses his life during the arrest or thereafter, if the value calculated based on the quantity of narcotics exceeds 1000 Baht, the bonus shall be paid according to the quantity of narcotics when the Public Prosecutor has ceased the proceedings.
(4) In a case where only the exhibited narcotics are seized after the Public Prosecutor has stayed the inquiry, issued a prosecution or non-prosecution order, if the value calculated based on the quantity of narcotics exceeds 1000 Baht, only half of the bonus shall be paid.”
(Unofficial translation of article 4, italics added to subsection 3)

At later dates, certain rewards were increased so that, for instance, a state official seizing property that had been purchased with drug money could get up to 40 per cent of its value.

Public statements enabled and encouraged what was on paper. The Prime Minister consistently portrayed drug dealers as sub-humans deserving to die. He also played down the deaths relative to the apparent successes of the campaign, wondering aloud why the killing of thousands of people who had not yet been proven guilty of any crime should be worthy of public attention or scrutiny. Even in reiterating the official line, that most deaths were just cases of “bad guys killing bad guys”, or “killing to cut the link”, he stated that the government had no responsibility to protect these undesirable citizens. This position, however, was already quite a step-down from remarks he reportedly made to senior government officials from across the country at a meeting in the lead-up to the campaign on January 15. “We have to shoot to kill and confiscate their assets as well, so their sinful inheritance will not be passed on,” he is reported to have said, adding, “We must be brutal enough because drug dealers have been brutal to our children. Today, three million Thai youths are into drugs and 700,000 are deeply addicted. To be cruel to drug dealers is therefore appropriate.” The Prime Minister’s remarks were supported at all levels of government, not least of all by the Interior Minister, Wan Mohamad Noor Matha, who remarked memorably that drug dealers “will be put behind bars or even vanish without a trace”. The language used by the Prime Minister and his officials throughout the campaign also sought to evoke a feeling of being at war, such as in a March 2 address when he said, “Don’t be moved by the high death figures. We must be adamant and finish this war... When you go to war and some of your enemies die, you cannot become soft-hearted, otherwise the surviving enemy will return to kill you.” He also referred to drug dealers and their accomplices as “traitors”. Over time, this language found its way into policy documents, such as Prime Minister’s Order No. 60/2546, which states in its preamble that “the ‘Concerted Effort of the Nation to Overcome Drugs’ is specifically regarded as a state of war”.

Provincial governors and police chiefs were motivated to act according to a strict timetable. Their performance was measured by statistics on drug dealers ‘removed’ from society on a month by month basis, starting with 25 per cent of the total by the end of February, 50 per cent by the of March, and 100 per cent by the end of April. The final figure was later reduced to 75 per cent, and a plan drawn up to deal with the remaining 25 per cent at a more leisurely pace by the King’s birthday in December. Underachieving provinces were announced publicly and senior officials openly threatened with the sack or transfers. Clearly an enormous amount of pressure was applied to meet unreasonable and arbitrary targets. And it was not enough for officials merely to present figures of arrests, convictions and deaths of dealers: they had to target thousands of specific persons, whose names were on lists.

Watchlists, blacklists, deathlists

From the start of the campaign, the lists of alleged drug dealers were a source of confusion. There were contradictory stories about how the lists were prepared, how many there were, and the implications of being on one. There appeared at times to be competing lists, and different ways of managing them in different provinces. They seem to have been drawn up from August 2002 by the police, village heads and local administrative bodies under the Interior Ministry, and the Office of the Narcotics Control Board. Whereas the police claim to have relied upon informants and leads, it appears that often they just added names from records of earlier convictions—some going back years. As for the lists prepared by local administrators, reports suggest that in many places the village or subdistrict chiefs simply called public meetings and asked people to inform on persons selling drugs in the neighbourhood, without any further investigation. The Interior Ministry claims that lists were cross-checked before final definitive versions were sent out, however in some places police refused to rely on the Interior Ministry lists after criticism that too many innocent persons were being arrested or killed. Meanwhile, the head of the Narcotics Suppression Bureau, Police Lieutenant General Chalermdej Chomphunuj tried to clarify matters by explaining that there were two types of lists in operation: a ‘blacklist’ of targets for arrest, and a ‘watchlist’ of those “pending investigation”. The police commander suggested that the watchlists were comprised of persons who would be investigated, and not arrested automatically. Only a month into the campaign, however, and there were admissions by senior officials that mistakes had been made on the lists. Around 4000 names were removed from the original 46,000-name watchlist, in response to public complaints. By that time over half of the total victims of the ‘war’ were already dead.

Whatever the mechanics of the lists, the consequence of being on one was possible death. Although the manner of killings varied across the country, the most commonly described pattern was as follows:
1. A victim’s name would appear on a list. The list would be made public knowledge, by word of mouth, or other means.
2. The victim would receive a letter or some other notice instructing her to go to the police station.
3. At the police station, the victim would be coerced to sign something admitting guilt, or otherwise acknowledge guilt, with promises by the police that her name would be removed from the list.
4. The victim would be shot on the way home, or within a few days, usually by a group of men in civilian clothes, in daylight and in a public place or at her house, often in front of and without regard to witnesses.
5. Police would fail to investigate the killing properly, and would concentrate on establishing the victim’s guilt as a drug dealer.

Although Lieutenant General Chalermdej tried to reassure a nervous public that, “We don’t simply write down the names of drug suspects on a list and go out to terminate them,” the death toll early in the campaign was dramatic. Dozens of people were being killed daily. An anonymous police colonel was reported as having said that his superiors had in fact ordered him to collect information on drug dealers and then kill the informants and track down and kill those named. “Why should we spare the scum?” he was quoted as saying, echoing the Prime Minister’s sentiments. A police station in the north got into the spirit of the campaign by piling a dozen coffins onto its doorstep.

At the end of February, police in most places had already dealt with their key targets, but were under pressure to continue meeting monthly percentiles imposed on them by Bangkok. Desperate to appear vigilant and keep their jobs, officers began arresting informants or questioning persons with tenuous links to suspects who had already been ‘removed’ from the lists. Persons who had merely participated in drug control programmes were targeted. In some places, ‘complaints boxes’ and anonymous hotlines were set up for people to inform on one another. Police are alleged to have increasingly resorted to planting of evidence and coercion to obtain confessions from suspects.

One characteristic of the campaign was the lack of police investigations after victims were murdered. Police sometimes excused themselves on the grounds that they needed all their resources to meet the government targets, however the acting director of the Forensic Science Institute, Dr Pornthip Rojanasunan, doubted these explanations. In mid-February she observed that her agency had resources available to help investigate cases, but the police were not seeking its assistance. Whereas before February the Institute had typically examined one to two extrajudicial killings per day, the number of referrals had since dropped to zero. She said that relatives of those killed had contacted the Institute directly to get help in having the deaths properly investigated, “But not much can be done if the first autopsy is conducted elsewhere and the lethal bullets removed.” Other doctors also reported that they were reluctant to attend the scenes of drug-related shootings as required by law, or record anything that did not verify the police version of events.

Where police did attend the murder scenes, their investigations and questions were typically directed towards establishing the victims’ guilt, rather than take action to arrest the murderers. For instance, in the case of Somjit Kuanyuyen, instead of collecting evidence the police reportedly interrogated her daughter about her mother’s presumed involvement in the drug trade. Where evidence of drug trading was uncovered, it was also used to justify the murder and effectively close the case. When Bussaporn Pung-am was killed, for instance, police briefed the media on how they found court documents in her house showing she had acted as a guarantor for drug suspects, and added that she had been previously arrested on drug charges. The implication of these remarks, as in so many other cases, was that she deserved to die.

Another feature of the campaign was the rise and subsequent fall of the death tally. In February, the Interior Ministry published a daily count of arrests, seizures and killings. As attention increasingly focused on the death toll, the government grew uneasy and accused journalists of misrepresenting the tally. By the end of February, public releases of statistics on killings were banned, in response to growing criticism. At the date of the last official tally, on February 26, 1140 persons had been murdered. However, later police did release statistics indicating that to April 16, 2275 persons were killed, 51 by their own agency in “self defence”. By the end of the month the figure was estimated to be around 2400, however by this stage the government was backing away from the statistic, arguing that perhaps half of the murders had been incorrectly recorded.

The death toll was retracted after the first month partly due to growing international alarm over the number of killings. However, as talk grew of possible United Nations involvement, the Prime Minister reacted with annoyance, as reported in The Nation on February 15:

Regarding the reported inquiry by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights into Thailand’s current crackdown against drugs, I believe we have nothing to hide. Nothing to worry about... The campaign against drugs will continue, unchanged... The international community owes us an expression of thanks [for reducing the drug trade]. We should not be over-sensitive to what others say. One should put things into perspective. How many policemen have been killed by drug dealers? I lost count of the number of wreaths that I have sent to funerals of policemen killed in the line of duty. Do our critics consider the wretched lives of drug dealers more precious than our policemen’s? Any policemen who kills an innocent person will be prosecuted. Don’t be too self-conscious. Don’t try too hard to live up to international standards. Our country already looks good in the eyes of the international community.

Whereas the Prime Minister pretended not to care about overseas opinion, his comments and actions betrayed otherwise. He eventually permitted a visit by Hina Jilani, the United Nations Special Representative on human rights defenders. Although the Special Representative spent most of her time on matters unrelated to the anti-drug campaign she did raise her concerns with the Prime Minister and the media. In response the Prime Minister launched a personal attack on the Special Representative, remarking, “She is biased and not acceptable. She made unfair remarks about our country. I complained in a talk with her that if she thought the human rights in Thailand are not up to standard, she should look at other UN members including Pakistan, her mother country.”

Media and public response

One of the reasons that the government could effectively get away with murder was the widespread belief, even among its critics, that an overwhelming number of people in Thailand supported the campaign. Tired of seeing drug dealers run rampant across the country, it was said, most were happy to see the government finally do something decisive. The generally accepted view was that the ends justified the means, so long as the persons killed could in fact be considered guilty of a crime. This attitude was captured in a non-government organization’s report on the killing of four ethnic Hmong men, among whom only the village head was thought to be guilty of drug trading:

The family members of village head don’t want to talk about this case and they could accept the killing because the head of the village did sell drugs and in their opinion he deserved to be punished (killed). But, the relatives of the other 3 could not accept their killing. They believe that this action was from the police and they are very angry the police executed innocent people.

At the same time, however, as the number of deaths rapidly increased, a wave of fear distorted polls and other means to assess the campaign’s popularity. Whatever the case, whether out of genuine support or intimidation, few people were prepared to come out in opposition to the ‘war’.

The media response also was problematic. Although daily reporting the latest events, coverage was mostly of comments by officials and chillingly verbatim descriptions of killings as given by police, such as this from the Bangkok Post of February 15:

Eight people were yesterday gunned down in Nakhon Phanom province in separate incidents, believed to be drug-related. Five of the victims were killed in Si Songkhram, two in Na Kae and one in That Phanom districts.
In Si Songkhram, Sermsiri Tamonnin, 34, the first victim, was found dead in her house in tambon Ban Uang at 6am. She had been shot in the head and body.
Thien Mokmeechai, 46, was gunned down in his house in tambon Phon Sawang at 6.30am. Witnesses said a man came on a motorcycle, walked into the house and opened fire at Thien.
At about the same time, Amporn Phiewkham, 43, was shot dead at his house in tambon Tha Bo.
Vinai Nakajat, 40, was killed by an assailant in tambon Sam Phong.
In tambon Hat Phaeng, Sompong Promson, 49, was shot at by gunmen while eating inside his house.
In That Phanom district, Suriya Thong-on was gunned down in front of his house in tambon Na Thon.
Killed in their home in Na Kae district about noon were Thanomsak Moonsurin, 40, and his wife Chalaolak, 39.
Nakhon Phanom police chief Pol Maj-Gen Paiboon Phetplai said all of those killed were on record as having been involved in the drug trade.

Media and public concern was restricted to the suffering of obvious innocents, rather than the practice of murder as public policy. An exemplary case was when police shot nine-year-old Chakraphan Srisa-ard in his family’s car, as his mother sped away. Had the child not been in the car, it would have been another simple affair of a dead drug dealer for the police to file away. Unfortunately for the officers involved, the young boy’s death aroused national ire, and somehow the need for justice in this one case overrode everything else that happened across these three months. The media also focused on the hardships endured by relatives of victims after their deaths. A May 28 article in The Nation, for instance, reported on the families of the four Hmong men mentioned above:

Somchai Sae Thao’s death has left his wife “Yeng” and their seven children in a distressing situation. The heritage left to them by his death is an uncertain future. As she contemplated her fate, Yeng dropped her eyes to her swelling stomach—a new baby is due soon but it will have no father to provide food and sustenance. Her 15-year-old eldest son is the family’s only hope now. Every day, the boy goes to ask his neighbours whether they want him to work on their farm. Some days the boy is able to return home with something for the family—other days his mother and younger sisters and brothers get nothing to eat.

The media narrowed its reporting onthe campaign in part due to overt and covert government threats. As Chaiyan Rajchagool, a lecturer in Social Science at Chiang Mai University noted, “No one objects to drug suppression. But if you raise questions, you can be blamed as someone who supports the drug dealers.” This was apparent when the Defense Minister responded to newspaper criticism by suggesting that journalists were in drug dealers’ pockets. Additionally, the Prime Minister is himself a media and communications tycoon whose influence and financial power can be used subtly in many ways, as Senator Mareerath Kaewkar noted, remarking that for a newspaper or magazine, “One criticism too many could cost millions of Baht in withdrawn advertising.”

The media’s inability to come to terms with the extent and depth of the crisis has left a hole where there used to be public debate in Thailand. Whereas television discussion forums had in recent years become places for lively exchange, with diverse opinions, analysis, and large audiences, now these are gone. The public space for dissent has been markedly reduced. Critics of government actions are restricted to seminars in universities or small gatherings of non-government organizations. Even in these forums, speakers may attack individuals or their actions, but are reluctant to address questions of policy. According to Mark Tamthai, a retired philosophy professor and consultant to the National Security Council, “There is no place in Thailand now where you can publicly study the consequences of government policies.”

Role of the National Human Rights Commission

The position of the National Human Rights Commission has been seriously compromised by the anti-drugs campaign. The Commission, which was only established in 1999, was effectively silenced by the government, and has been unable to excite the public in defence of the principles it represents.

From the beginning, the Commission received relatively few complaints, and most of those were from persons objecting to their names being on a list, not families of murder victims. The Commission did respond to the complaints it received and followed-up on them with the relevant authorities, resulting in amendments to lists made later. However, even this relatively small number of complaints stretched its resources, and it was restricted to dealing with individual cases rather than seriously addressing systemic problems.

The real difficulties for the Commission began when the government attacked one of its members, Professor Pradit Charoenthaithawee, for reporting on the extrajudicial killings during a UN meeting he attended overseas. After returning to Thailand, Professor Pradit received death threats, and calls for his impeachment. In a national radio address, the Prime Minister launched a personal attack on Professor Pradit, and accused him of overstepping his authority as a human rights commissioner. “Let us deal with the UN, because that is our job. Those who are not responsible for such duties should keep away,” the Prime Minister said. General Panlop Pinmanee, deputy chief of the Internal Security Operations Command, accused Professor Pradit of being an ally of drug dealers. As a result, the Commission was forced onto the back foot, and spent its time defending its mandate and the reputations of its members, rather than addressing the crisis directly. The Chairman of the Commission, Professor Saneh Chamarik, was obliged to announce that in principle the Commission supported the government’s drug suppression policies, so long as in practice they did not violate human rights and the country’s Constitution. His conciliatory approach, however, was not responded to favourably by the Prime Minister, who later refused to meet with the commissioners.

Responding to criticism about his management of the campaign, rather than engage the National Human Rights Commission, the Prime Minister opted for another approach. He set up committees to report directly to him, thereby sidelining the country’s permanent national human rights institution. In two orders of February 28, the Prime Minister established the Committee to Examine the Performance of Competent Narcotics Law Enforcement Officials in Drug Suppression and, the Committee to Monitor the Protection of Informants and Witnesses in Drug Suppression. “I expect the two committees to ensure the rule of law and fairness in the anti-drug campaign,” the Prime Minister said. “Critics of the campaign should now direct their empathy to our children who are victims of the drug menace, instead of sounding the alarm for falling traffickers.” The first committee sought police and public cooperation in investigating killings, and whether police had followed procedures in making reports, researching crimes and performing autopsies. However, in April the Deputy Attorney General responsible for overseeing the work complained that the committee had not yet received a single report from the police, let alone clear figures on the number of the cases to investigate. In response, police claimed that they hadn’t received any requests for reports. Meanwhile, the committee also failed to draw any response from a silent and intimidated public, despite appeals for victims to come forward.

The aftermath

On May 1 the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra declared the ‘war on drugs’ a success and immediately launched his newest war, against rather more nebulous “dark influences”. Within a few days, local authorities in Mae Sot district, Tak, had summarily executed six Burmese migrant labourers, under the impression that they could now ‘remove’ whatever target suited them. Meanwhile, the ‘war on drugs’ is set to continue throughout the year, albeit more low-key; the Prime Minister, it seems, has not tired of the fight.

The anti-drug campaign may have temporarily stemmed the flow and consumption of amphetamines throughout Thailand, but the damage to its institutions will be much more enduring, among them, the parliament, judiciary, police and media. Thailand now has a Prime Minister, a legislative head, who is acting like the head of the executive. It has a police force and government that are complicit in mass murder and have learnt that performance is tied to the payment of commissions. It has a cowed and submissive bureaucracy, and a diminished media.

Above all, a widespread attitude apparently exists that certain types of criminals should simply be shot dead. If this mentality prevails, there is little hope of maintaining an effectively functioning judicial system, as the presumption will be that courts and their procedures can be bypassed or done away with altogether when convenient. In neighbouring Cambodia, where the legal system is still barely operational ten years after the United Nations completed its tenure, alleged motorcycle thieves are beaten to death on the streets rather than it being left to the state to mete out justice. By comparison, what has happened in Thailand this year, where there is an established legal system, is far worse. The killings of alleged drug dealers were organized and approved by decree. The perception that a particular category of persons could be gunned down in their houses and cars was officially approved. The sidestepping of due process was authorized by the state. When clearly innocent people were listed or killed, the state was resented, but so long as the majority of victims were successfully portrayed as guilty, the state proclaimed overwhelming approval. The real challenge for human rights defenders in Thailand, then, lies not in fighting for the rights of the innocent, but rather in fighting for the rights of the guilty.

A comment on the consequences of extrajudicial killings in Thailand

Basil Fernando, Excecutive Director, Asian Legal Resource centre

The effect of drugs on a population can be very dangerous. However, the effect of extrajudicial killings on a justice system is lethal. The latter can contribute much more to the instability, insecurity and degeneration of society than the former. Law enforcement agencies involved directly or indirectly in extrajudicial killings lose all legitimacy.

When a newly emerging democracy such as Thailand allows extrajudicial killings to occur, in fact it is reviving old practices where punishments were meted out at the wish of the rulers without any references to limits imposed by law and morality. Such practices were there for centuries and are part of the people¡¯s psyche. The principles of the rule of law introduced by constitutions have only a short history. Any hope of their internalization by people is seriously interrupted by the reintroduction of old practices. This has a tremendously negative impact on democratization. Only those who oppose democratization benefit when such an abrupt reintroduction of old practices takes place. It may be said that with such large-scale extrajudicial killings, Thailand has been pushed many steps backwards.

A law enforcement agency that knows it has blood on its hands due to direct or indirect involvement in extrajudicial killings cannot think of itself with a sense of integrity. When there is such doubt in an organization, it is difficult to control corruption. Thai law enforcement agencies are not known to be free from corruption, however, there have been many moves in recent years to introduce greater measures to control its spread. The present wave of extrajudicial killings has set such developments back a long way.

Another disastrous consequence of this situation is the establishment or hardening of criminal and police links. The extrajudicial killings that have occurred in Thailand across recent months have involved the specialization of functions shared between law enforcement agency personnel and some criminal elements. For example, a person is called to a police station to make a statement and then on his way back home is killed by unknown persons. Such activities are well coordinated, and will not end with these killings. A new relationship has been established between the actual killers and the planners of the killings. Law enforcement officers are in normal circumstances expected to catch criminals. However, now they have become collaborators in murder. How a law enforcement agency can get out of this trap is hard to imagine.

Extrajudicial killings bring in secrecy and deception. There will be a need to deny the responsibility of individuals and also the entire system. For this the law enforcement agency will have to develop a communication policy in which complete or partial falsehood will be allowed out of necessity. When the number of killings has exceeded 2000 persons, such falsifications will have to be done on a large scale. It is only natural that such falsification will have an effect within the institution. Besides that, the public image of the institution will change, as those persons who are quite aware of the facts will be cynical due to institutional fabrications of events.

The group that will be lied to the most will be the family members and associates of those who have been killed. The institution will have to withhold information about the death of a particular person and give family members false information. This will also have to be done to other members of the public, and the media. Thus, the relationship with the public will be marked by deception. The result is that the institution will be lowered in the estimation of the people. Such loss of prestige of a public institution is seriously harmful to the rule of law and democracy.

As the Prime Minister has encouraged this policy, his government will have to protect the officers who are directly or indirectly involved in these killings. Thus, the moral authority of the government over its law enforcement agencies has been greatly diminished. The involved politicians will now have to enter into many compromises with officers. Thus disciplinary control of law enforcement agencies will be even more difficult after these incidents.

These are but a few consequences of allowing such extrajudicial killings to occur. Anyone who cares for democracy and the rule of law should worry about this turn of events. Perhaps many years of struggle for democracy are now being undermined in a very subtle but brutal way. The anti-corruption drive, right to information law, autopsy law and other achiements like the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission have all been undermined in one stroke.

It is necessary to investigate this whole affair and to redress those who have been wronged. Above all, law enforcement agencies should be cleansed of those who have blood on their hands.

Why has the rule of law been made a victim of Thailand's anti-drug campaign?

Asian Human Rights Commission

Since February, when the government of Thailand opened the way for alleged drug traffickers to be murdered with impunity, over 2000 persons have been killed. This relentless carnage poses an enormous threat. Unless quickly averted, the consequences of mass extrajudicial killings will be far deeper and more insidious than the damage caused by the trade and use of drugs in Thailand.

Behind the worst atrocities in history lies the mentality that there exists a class of persons who can be eradicated simply because they are deemed socially undesirable- in this case, alleged drug dealers. Irrespective of what a person is said to have done, if they and their kind are pursued without regard for due process, a deep social crisis is sure to follow.

The Asian Human Rights Commission has consistently reported on cases in Asia where tacit state approval of one human rights violation has led to an intractable cycle of abuse. Extrajudicial killings have led to mass disappearances and torture. Censorship has led to political opponents and human rights defenders being targeted as alleged criminals. Undermining of the judiciary and independent bodies established to monitor abuses has eventually rendered them irrelevant.

By endorsing murder, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has set his country on a path with dire consequences. Some are already being felt. The Prime Minister has himself attacked the National Human Rights Commission simply for attempting to fulfill its mandate. One of the commissioners has been warned that he may face impeachment, and has received death threats. The Defence Minister has implied that drug dealers are paying members of the media to criticize the government, opening the door for sanctions against journalists.

Why did the rule of law need to be undermined to rid Thailand of drugs? The Prime Minister remains answerable both to this question and the consequences of his actions. He must now introduce a number of quick remedial measures to stay the disaster he has precipitated.

The Prime Minister must be unequivocal that offences in Thailand will be dealt with according to established judicial norms. The killings must be stopped, and those already facing charges must be permitted fair trials. The Prime Minister must also guarantee the authority of the National Human Rights Commission, and the safety of its members.

Finally, the Prime Minister must permit a thorough, independent, international enquiry into the atrocities to date, under United Nations auspices. He has remarked that he has nothing to fear from the United Nations and international scrutiny. If this is so then he should be more than willing to oblige. He has said that he can explain everything. And indeed he must do so.

Addressing extrajudicial killings of alleged drug dealers in Thailand

Asian Legal Resource Centre

After a profound crisis hits the law enforcement and administrative organs of a country, it can be difficult to see a way forward. With the extrajudicial killing of over 2000 people accused of dealing in drugs this year, Thailand has been affected by such a crisis. Coming after a period that saw a growing commitment to human rights and democratization, many will be struggling to understand what has happened. Certain agencies and persons must now take it upon themselves to lead their society out of this mess.

The National Human Rights Commission for one must address this crisis as if a matter of its own survival. It must persist in investigating all complaints of killings and other rights violations arising from the ¡®war on drugs¡¯, and make public its findings in each and every case. It must consistently and deliberately lobby through the media and every other available means for a full accounting of these killings. It should also set a target to complete and publicize a thorough report on the killings and related abuses, and present its findings to the National Assembly. Among matters this report should consider is the adequate compensating of all victims and their families. To do all this it must be able to fulfill its mandate, which means that the Prime Minister and other government officials must cease launching attacks against the Commission and its members. They must also respect its powers and respond to its enquiries in keeping with section 32 of the National Human Rights Commission Act of 1999. Furthermore, the Commission must be provided with adequate resources, as stipulated in section 75 of the Constitution.

The Ministry of Justice also must vigorously pursue all cases of murder, and enforce the law equally and without delay. It must respond to all complaints and in particular ensure that in every possible case full and proper autopsies and forensic examinations are conducted. Where bodies or evidence have been destroyed or ¡®lost¡¯, the police officers responsible must be held to account. The Ministry should also consider providing better incentives to doctors to undertake autopsies and site investigations, and establish the means to ensure that they are not subjected to police intimidation.

Internationally, the United Nations and other groups too must take a much more assertive role in dealing with these events. In particular, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial killings should approach the Government of Thailand and raise these murders as a subject of special concern. The Special Rapporteur must urge the government to grant an international team access to investigate the killings thoroughly. The United Nations must also respond to attacks on its credibility, and that of its representatives, by the Prime Minister and other officials in the Government of Thailand. Furthermore, it should provide material assistance to agencies genuinely committed to investigating these killings, and likewise suspend partnerships with those that are failing to cooperate. Similarly, international donor agencies should also as a matter of policy raise their concerns regarding these events, and tie the provision of assistance for programmes in Thailand to evidence of progress in investigations.

All of this requires the leadership and participation of concerned Thai citizens. Lawyers, doctors, human rights advocates, victims and their relatives must be prepared to come together and voice their concerns over what has happened. They must exchange ideas on practical, locally devised solutions to the crisis. They must be prepared to act in the face of government threats, and unchallenged assumptions that the vast majority of Thai citizens have been swayed by the propaganda that accompanied this campaign. Indeed, without alternative voices making themselves heard, the public will continue to be held captive to this propaganda and subjected to a climate of fear and intimidation from which only more bloodshed, deceit and animosity can be expected to come.

Lawyers sue Thaksin for dereliction

2006-05-19T09:33:00.000-04:00

The Bangkok Post

The Supreme Administrative Court today accepted a case filed last week by two lawyers representing the Lawyers Council of Thailand against caretaker Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra for failure to perform his duties.

However, the court said that the case did not warrant an urgent hearing nor a temporary injunction barring the three parties - Mr Thaksin, the Cabinet, and the Secretary-General of the Cabinet - from enforcing any royal decree pending the court ruling as requested by the complainants.

Nitithorn Lamlua and Nakorn Chompuchart sued Mr Thaksin, the Cabinet and the Secretary-General of the Cabinet for failure to perform their duties, following Cabinet approval on April 5 permitting Mr Thaksin to take leave, in an act deemed to be in violation of the law on public administration and the Constitution, among others.

It is elaborated in the suit that after informing the Cabinet of his planned leave on April 5, Mr Thaksin did not attend Cabinet meetings since April 7; nor has he performed the duties entrusted to him by the Thai people.

Instead, the caretaker premier has spent his time on private leisure activities such as shopping, golfing, and travelling abroad.

Citing various laws, the suit claims that Mr Thaksin's holiday is illegal. It states that there are rules on business leave, and a requirement for a medical certificate for sick leave of over three days.

Additionally, Thailand's Civil Service Act specifies that an act of intending to not work for 15 days is considered a dereliction of duty, which incurs the penalty of dismissal.

Moreover, Mr Thaksin's appointment of Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai Vanasatidya as acting prime minister is therefore also illegal, the suit charged, as the law only provides for such appointment in the event that the prime minister is away or incapacitated; while Mr Thaksin was in the country and was not ill.

As Mr Thaksin had made it clear that he did not wish to serve as prime minister, his act could be treated as resignation by dereliction of duty, and that he is, therefore, not entitled to salary or compensation from April 5.

The Lawyers Council of Thailand asked the Court to revoke the Cabinet resolution of April 5, 2006, which acknowledged Mr Thaksin's leave request and the appointment of Gen. Chidchai as acting prime minister, and to order Mr Thaksin to reimburse any salary and benefits as of April 5 to the state coffers. - (TNA)

PM back to work

2006-05-19T09:20:00.000-04:00

Piyanart Srivalo, The Nation, Bangkok

Government House returned to life again on Monday when the master of the house came back to work after spending the last 47 days "taking a break from politics."

The main Thai Khufa Building, which houses caretaker Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's office, was bustling with activity as bureaucrats and political officials took turns to report the latest developments to the premier.

He had several meetings with officials from the relevant agencies throughout the day yesterday. It appears the same old energetic Thaksin has made a comeback.

On April 4, two days after a snap election, Thaksin said in a nationwide address that he would not assume his normal duties until a new government was formed after the polls. He made that statement official in a document submitted to the Cabinet the next day.

While Thaksin's No 1 deputy, Chidchai Vanasatidya, took over his responsibilities, Thaksin focused on ceremonial duties, such as receiving foreign dignitaries and chairing the organising committee for the 60th anniversary celebrations of His Majesty the King's accession to the throne.

Yesterday, Cabinet members and senior permanent officials were in full force to welcome Thaksin back to Government House. Those included government ministers who were absent while Thaksin was away.

There were also more reporters and photographers than during recent weeks as those covering Thaksin's activities during his absence from Government House returned to join forces with those stationed in the compound.

Preparations were made to the last minute yesterday morning to make sure Government House was ready for Thaksin's return. All the buildings were cleaned up and roads inside the compound were dried of rainwater.

One official said her colleagues had plenty of time for shopping and private business while the premier was away, but that yesterday they were on stand by all day.

A food vendor at its canteen said sales had dropped sharply during Thaksin's absence as many officials went out to shop and ate their lunches outside. "I think I can do good business again now that the prime minister has returned," she said.

Thai Rak Thai looks to the heavens as dark clouds gather

Jintana Panyaarvudh, The Nation, Bangkok

Facing threat of being disbanded for funding rival parties in April 2 poll

A pair of statues of the mythical creature singha, complete with marbles in their mouths, was recently erected at the entrance to the Thai Rak Thai Party's headquarters in the belief they might be able to improve the party's waning fortunes.

Along with the new look, the party also changed its motto from "thanks for all the votes" to "the party will face all kinds of political obstacles with a smile, to soldier on and solve the problems of the country and people".

Perhaps mythology and philosophy will change the fortunes of the embattled party - unless the result of a recent investigation into an electoral scandal comes to the surface, to show the party's dark side.

A sub-committee of the Election Commission (EC) has voted unanimously to recommend the EC files charges against Thai Rak Thai leader Thaksin Shinawatra over the contracting of small parties to contest the April 2 election. It says Thai Rak Thai hired small parties to field candidates in some constituencies to avoid the legal requirement that to win, candidates without opponents must receive a minimum of 20 per cent of the eligible votes.

The investigation report concludes the party was involved in campaign fraud, deemed detrimental to both democracy and national security, which is an offence punishable by party dissolution.

Article 67 of the Political Parties Act prescribes that the Political Parties Registrar (the Election Commission) is obliged to request that the Office of the Attorney General petition the Constitution Court for a party dissolution.

As the EC's chairman also acts as the Political Party Registrar, chairman Vasana Puemlarp is the only person required by law to kick-start the case into the justice system.

For those who have wondered why Vasana and the other EC commissioners insisted on staying put - even against the recommendations of the country's three top courts - this may provide an answer.

Vasana has sat on the report since Monday and has maintained his silence over a leaked paper that was given wide media attention yesterday. He was reportedly upset with the findings of the original investigation and made further inquiries by himself, to counter the earlier result.

Vasana no longer has the liberty to drag his feet because public pressure is mounting on him and the EC as a whole to take action against the ruling party - just as it did earlier when it filed a petition with the Constitution Court seeking the dissolution of the two small parties involved in the scandal.

Luck no longer seems to be on Thaksin's side, as he has taken a series of blows since April 25, when His Majesty the King referred to the political situation as "a mess".

Since then, the top three courts have rushed to pick up the electoral cases, perhaps marking the beginning of the end for Thaksin. The first whip fell on his back on Monday when the Constitution Court ruled to nullify the April 2 poll and ordered a new one, thereby avoiding a "one-party" Parliament and government.

It appeared the whole country was back to square one. All parties agreed to join in the new election.

The second hit was the recommendation from the three top courts on Tuesday that the EC stand down to ensure the next election is fair. The courts suggested the commissioners resign, to solve the political crisis. In fact, it was implied people no longer trust the EC. The courts also said they were ready to take control of the management of the new election.

The third blow may throw Thaksin into great trouble. If a correct decision is made concerning the controversial investigation report, he may be banned from politics for at least half a decade.

Article 69 of the Political Parties Act prescribes a ban against executives of a dissolved party from forming a new party, or holding office in a party, for five years.

The embattled EC now holds the power to achieve what people's movements and street protestors have been calling for for months: the removal of Thaksin Shinawatra.

Thaksin returns from palace but refuses to speak

2006-05-18T09:25:00.000-04:00

The Nation, Bangkok

Caretaker Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra boarded a helicopter back from an audience with HM the King at Hua Hin Palace to Bangkok but declined to reveal about the audience.

Thaksin arrived Bangkok at about 7pm. His motorcade headed back to his Chansongla residence.

Thaksin met the King who is now at Klaikangwon Place in Hua Hin at about 5pm, Prachub Khiri Khan.

Government Spokesman Surapong Suebwonglee described it as a routine meeting.

But it comes as parties in and outside government are seeking to resolve political dilemma.

Earlier Thaksin who refused to resign announced his resignation in March hours after he was granted audience with HM the King.

HM the King last month called on the nation's three top courts to act to end the deadlock, and they responded by nullifying the results of an April 2 general election won by Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party.

The courts as well as opposition parties have called on members of the Election Commission to resign before new polls are held. They claim the commissioners unfairly favor Thaksin's government.

Three commissioners remain in their jobs, however, leaving the situation in a stalemate.

A year of living ominously - with a lame-duck govt

2006-05-17T14:31:00.000-04:00

by Suthichai Yoon, The Nation, Bangkok

Now that the moribund Election Commission (EC) has set October 22 as the new election day, the whole country will have to learn to live with a lame-duck government for most of this year. In fact, one can safely say 2006 will go down in the nation's political history as the "Year of Non-government".

And all things considered, that isn't necessarily a bad thing.

We can't seem to settle for the middle way. The Thaksin regime wanted to place everybody under its tight control. Then suddenly, when the pressure grew to an immorally high level, people took to the streets. Thaksin at first tried to clamp even tighter control over our lives. But when he couldn't, he simply went into a hiatus. He should have quit, of course. But he didn't. He thought he could run the country by appearing not to run it. Now, he is a lame duck in self-denial.

Banharn Silapa-archa, the Chat Thai Party leader who is officially with the opposition but unofficially a Thaksin well-wisher, suggested the other day the "acting prime minister on vacation" should return to work, because it's embarrassing for an acting premier to be seen shopping on weekdays with his wife and children day in and day out. In other words, Banharn is saying even a lame-duck leader should be seen to be doing things. He is after all still drawing his monthly salary .

This unprecedented leave-taking issue could well turn into a serious political hot potato. Two members of the Law Society of Thailand have lodged a suit with the Administrative Court charging that Thaksin's going off on holiday is unlawful. It was never clear how long that vacation was going to be. (My question: Who has the right to approve or turn down the prime minister's application for leave after all?)

You may have forgotten all about it, but it's important that we, the tax-paying citizens of a legitimate nation-state, should know - and remember - the reason given by this elected prime minister for taking an extended break in the first place. Yes, Thaksin said he wasn't going to work for a while because he wanted "national reconciliation".

But the two lawyers say in their suit that citing "reconciliation" as a reason for taking a holiday is not permissible under regulations covering government officials taking leave. And if the PM's taking leave is not legal, the naming of an acting premier naturally becomes an issue. The suit also charges that under the law, a deputy prime minister is authorised to serve as acting prime minister only when the prime minister goes abroad or falls ill. The lawyers point out that Thaksin has remained in the country - and he did not take sick leave, either. In other words, he has been playing truant. Labour-law experts could chime in to point out that a CEO absent from work for three successive days without formal permission or a good reason would be subject to dismissal without compensation.

By playing golf and going shopping on weekdays, the lawyers say, the prime minister has shown his reluctance to fulfil his duties as prime minister. But the lawyers don't stop there. They are also requesting that the court bar the three defendants (Thaksin, the Cabinet and the Cabinet's secretary-general) from submitting any laws for royal endorsement. The legal argument is loud and clear: the prime minister's status remains unclear.

Of course, if he formally submitted his resignation, it would be a totally different story. At least, he wouldn't be paid as a premier. He could take up a leadership position at Thai Rak Thai Party headquarters; perhaps his salary would come from his wife's own purse. And newsmen would not have to go through the daily routine of reporting: "The caretaker premier who is on holiday refused to offer any comment on the issues of the day." If the Thai Rak Thai leader says nothing meaningful, that's not news; but if a country's premier keeps shaking his head when asked about all the major happenings in the country, it makes a major headline on the 7 o'clock evening news. And that could very well shake the confidence of foreign investors who still don't quite understand what's really going on in this country.

For Thais in general, though, Thaksin's unclear and confusing political status is proving a very valuable lesson on how we will have to learn to get used to living with a lame-duck prime minister, a crippled Cabinet and a paralysed government. The new election may not be held for at least five months, and it is very likely that the new coalition government won't be in place until early next year.

And that won't even be the end of our great period of virtual "absence of government", because the October 22 election is supposed to produce only an "interim government", one that oversees a new round of political reform. And that's supposedly the "Big Mission" - which is meant to be even more important than all the political posturing over the upcoming poll.

But nobody knows who will be in charge of that process, or how long it will all take - because a genuine government won't be in place until all those questions are cleared.

But don't panic. The lame duck is putting us through a real test of "self-sufficiency". If we can survive him, we can survive anything else.

Judges to unravel mess

2006-05-13T11:08:00.000-04:00

by The Nation, Bangkok

Acting on this week's royal advice that the judiciary put an end to the political turmoil, the country's three top courts will tomorrow meet to map out a solution.

"Presidents of the Supreme, Constitution and Supreme Administrative courts are to discuss how best to guide the country out of the political crisis caused by the election," Judge Jaran Pakdithanakul said on Wednesday.

Legally, the issues are not too difficult to overcome and it is vital the situation be rectified with care in a manner that upholds the national interest, Jaran said.

He suggested the opposing sides stop fanning the flames of political bitterness to give the judiciary a chance to resolve the electoral trouble.

The full bench of 87 Supreme Court judges are expected Wednesday to hold a closed meeting to find a common stand regarding the electoral outcome.

Based on the judges' recommendations, Supreme Court president Chanchai Likhitjittha will discuss the issues with his two counterparts, Phan Chantarapan, of the Constitution Court, and Ackaratorn Chularat, of the Supreme Administrative Court.

The three presidents will rule on whether the election should be cancelled and held again.

If they validate the results, the judges will have to rule on whether the House can convene while some of the 500 seats remain vacant.

Legal pundits predict the three court presidents will cancel the election and call for fresh polls now the Democrat Party has ended its electoral boycott.

Ackaratorn said the courts and politicians should follow the royal advice and work together to overcome the crisis.

"Everyone has clearly heard the royal statement and should have understood it," he said, adding he had no opinion yet on whether the election results should be cancelled.

"Please do not try to interpret the royal statement and jump to conclusions about the election cancellation because every dispute will be resolved in accordance with the law," he said.

Phan, of the Constitution Court, said he expected the judicial intervention to lead to an amicable solution.

At tomorrow's meeting he said he would listen to his fellow judges for ideas on how to resolve the crisis and would discuss the jurisdiction of his court.

King: It's a mess!

2006-05-12T08:46:00.000-04:00

His Majesty the King speaks to Administrative Court judges yesterday at Klai Kangwol Palace in Hua Hin. He rejected calls for royal intervention in the political crisis.

In his most direct and critically timed political message, HM questions legitimacy of April 2 poll, but rules out exercising his power under Article 7

In his strongest political message, His Majesty the King yesterday told the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court to explore all legal solutions to get the country out of the current "political mess", saying that an election that produced a one-party Parlia-ment is undemocratic.

The King criticised the Constitution Court for failing to accept complaints about the polls, and ruled out the possibility of a royally appointed prime minister.

"You have the right to say what's appropriate or not," His Majesty told the Administrative Court judges during a Royal audience at Klai Kangwol Palace in Prachuap Khiri Khan. "[I] did not say the government is not good. But as far as I'm concerned, a one-party election is not normal. The one-candidate [situation] is undemocratic. This is about administration. Do your best. You, not the government, have to resign if you cannot do the best of your duty."

The King urged the Adminis-trative Court judges to work with the Supreme Court and the Constitution Court to find solutions to resolve the impending political impasse.

His remarks came as the deadline for the new, controversially elected House of Representatives to convene its first session draws extremely near. It remains to be seen if the government, which is said to be planning to submit a royal decree to convene the House, will proceed with the plan.

The Constitution requires the House to convene its first session within 30 days of the April 2 general election.

Opposition MPs earlier petitioned the Administrative Court to invalidate the election, alleging that the caretaker government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawa-tra had scheduled the election only 37 days after the House dissolution to give an advantage to candidates from Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party. The court rejected the complaints, saying it had no authority to rule on such a matter.

"Without the House of Representatives, there won't be democracy. We have many types of courts and councils, every one of them have to work in unity and find solutions," the King told the judges.

His Majesty rejected calls to intervene by exercising Article 7 of the Constitution to name a royally appointed prime minister as demanded in the past few months by the People's Alliance for Democracy, opposition parties and some academics.

"Article 7 does not empower the King to make a unilateral decision. It talks about constitutional monarchy but does not give the King power to do anything he wants. If the King made a decision, he would overstep his duty and it would be undemocratic."

His Majesty the King referred to his appointment of Prime Minister Sanya Dharmasakti in 1973, saying that his action

was democratic because there was still a House of Representatives, House speaker and deputy House speaker to function under

the Constitution at the time.

"Installing a royally appointed prime minister means appointing the prime minister without any rule. At that time there were rules. Professor Sanya was royally appointed as prime minister and his appointment was then legally countersigned by a deputy House speaker. Go review history."

His Majesty later spoke to Supreme Court judges, emphasising the importance of democracy and that they should work with the Administrative Court to find a solution to the current constitutional crisis since there are now less than 500 MPs.

"Now I have suffered a great deal because whatever happened there will always be calls for a royally appointed prime minister. It is not democratic. Go back and read Article 7. This is a wrong citation of Article 7. The article only has two lines; that is, whatever not stated by the Constitution, then should follow the traditional practices. But asking for the royally appointed prime minister is undemocratic. It is irrational, it is a mess.

"People have hope in courts, especially the Supreme Court. Other courts also see that the Supreme Court is honest, rational and knowledgeable because you study law. If the country does not follow the rule of law, it will not survive."

A triumph for democracy

2006-05-11T11:17:00.000-04:00

Thaksin's departure will pave the way for national reconciliation and rebuilding of democratic institutions

There is no better proof of the resilience of Thailand's democracy under the constitutional monarchy than the interplay of political forces that has compelled Thai Rak Thai leader Thaksin Shinawatra to forego his chance to become a third-term prime minister only two days after scoring yet another electoral landslide. The most remarkable thing is that the titanic struggle between Thaksin, a seriously-flawed, but democratically-elected leader, and the people who have taken to the streets to oppose him was played out over two volatile months without violence.

Even more wonderful is the fact that such a peaceful resolution to the most dangerous political conflict since the 1992 bloodbath was achieved through the exercise of ordinary citizens' constitutional rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, which are the hallmarks of well-functioning democracies everywhere. The People's Alliance for Democracy, the organiser of the anti-Thaksin campaign, has made effective use of non-violent protest as a weapon against the regime, which stands accused of corruption and anti-democratic tendencies.

The sustained peaceful protest - which first galvanised the middle-class elite and then persuaded members of society at all levels to rise up in defence of democracy, uphold the national interests and reassert their constitutional rights - enabled the whole society to engage in an intense public discourse on the most important question of the day: what constitutes the political legitimacy of a democratic leader?

It helped focus the collective mind of the people on the true spirit of democracy, not just the facade of democracy that has been cynically manipulated by Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai Party. The awakening of the usually apathetic public proved to be the desperately needed catalyst for positive change in Thailand's political landscape, which had been completely dominated by Thaksin for the past five years.

Without a doubt, a valuable lesson has been learned by the Thai people about democracy and how it can be made to work the way it is intended. People learned that they can take their fight to the streets against a government that has lost its legitimacy to rule, and they can also take their fight to the ballot box. The avalanche of abstention votes cast by democratic-loving citizens was a resounding rejection of Thaksin, his Thai Rak Thai Party and the culture of deceit and corruption that they stand for.

Credit must be given to security forces, assigned by the government to maintain peace and order, which consistently carried out their duty with restraint and discipline. They deserve praise for not allowing themselves to be used by the Thaksin government to suppress peaceful demonstrators.

Thaksin's announcement that he will step down as caretaker prime minister after the House of Representatives elects a new prime minister is a great source of relief for the nation, which is beset by an unprecedented divisiveness that has pitted mostly wealthy urban middle-class citizens against poverty-stricken rural masses.

This is a time for national reconciliation. The Election Commission is planning new rounds of elections in single-candidate constituencies where the sole contestant failed to garner the requisite 20 per cent of eligible votes. The continuing election process must be completed without further delay now that rules have been relaxed to allow new candidates to take part in subsequent rounds.

One of the likeliest scenarios is that the Thai Rak Thai Party will form the core of the new government to oversee constitutional reforms, perhaps with some level of participation by impartial public figures or even members of opposition parties, which boycotted the election. And perhaps that sort of arrangement will still allow Thaksin to pull the strings behind the Thai Rak Thai-led government.

Be that as it may, Thaksin's resignation to pave the way for a new prime minister did break the potentially violent impasse. All sides must now work together to ensure that the new government makes a clean break from the corruption-prone legacy and anti-democratic tendencies of the Thaksin regime. Under intense public scrutiny, it will be extremely difficult, if at all possible, for the new government to deviate from the people's renewed democratic aspirations.

How it came to this

Jan 23: The prime minister's family officially announces the tax-free sale of its stake in Shin Corp to Singapore's Temasek Holdings.

Feb 4: Up to 50,000 people gather at the Royal Plaza demanding that Thaksin step down due to his lack of legitimacy and ethics.

Feb 24: Thaksin dissolves Parliament and calls a snap election for April 2.

Feb 26: At least 50,000 protesters rally peacefully to demand the premier's resignation.

Feb 27: Three main opposition parties announce a boycott of the April 2 elections.

March 25: More than 200,000 people attend an anti-Thaksin rally outside Government House.

March 29: About 100,000 people join another protest in the Siam Square area.

Sunday: Voters go to the polls.

Monday: A defiant Thaksin claims victory in Sunday's general elections, saying his Thai Rak Thai Party won 16 million party-list votes against 10 million abstention votes.

Yesterday: Thaksin announces in a national address that he will step down after a new parliament is convened.

Following Review by 2bangkok.com:

April 2006 news

Thaksin steps down

Earlier

Anti-Thaksin protests on Rama I Road

March 26, 2006 - Anti-Thaksin protest at Rajaprasong

March 21-31, 2006 news

Pro-Thaksin demonstrators at Chatuchak Park

March 9-20, 2006 news

March 14 - What is on Thai TV now?

March 5 - What is on Thai TV now?

March 5 anti-Thaksin rally news

Photos of the March 5 anti-Thaksin rally

March 3 - Pro-Thaksin rally

February 27, 2006 - Protest moves to Democracy Monument

February 27-March 8, 2006 news

February 26, 2006 - Photos from the anti-Thaksin protests

February 26, 2006 - Putting out the truck fire at the anti-Thaksin protests

February 26, 2006 - Almost like being there: Start of the rally

February 26, 2006 - Dissolution headlines

February 13-26, 2006 - House dissolution and other news

February 11, 2006 protest news
February 11, 2006 - Photos from the anti-Thaksin protest

February 4, 2006 protest news

February 4, 2006 - Photos from Sondhi's anti-Thaksin protest

February 4, 2006 - Sondhi's protest instructions

January-February, 2006 - The Shin Corp sale

January, 2006

November-December, 2005