Drug war, freebies seen as Thaksin plot
Hallucinating about drugs
Thaksin's claimed surge in drug in drug use is not borne out by statistics from
the top anti-narcotics agency
When caretaker Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra announced last week that he would
resume active duty following a 45-day vacation, he suggested the country needed him
at the helm to deal effectively with a plethora of problems that had cropped up in
his absence. One of the key problems cited to justify his return to the political
centre stage was the supposed higher incidence of drug addiction among young
people.
With more than a hint of drama, Thaksin made his announcement in front of a group
of supporters who claimed to be grieving parents whose children had supposedly fallen
prey to amphetamine addiction. It was not clear if the meeting between Thaksin and
drug addicts' parents was a coincidence or whether it was stage-managed, but
television viewers couldn't have missed the allusion to a knight in shining armour
coming to the rescue of a damsel in distress.
If only Thaksin could back up his claim with reliable and accurate statistics to
show that the scourge of drugs has come back with a vengeance and that the society as
a whole is in jeopardy as a result.
A group of journalists went to Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB), the
government's leading agency in the fight against illicit drugs, to look for evidence
of the "worsening drug situation" spoken of by the caretaker prime minister, and
found none to support his claim.
According to the ONCB, there has been no indication whatsoever that the drug
situation is getting worse. Indeed, the anti-drug agency's statistics point to the
opposite: the number of arrests in connection with drug trafficking has dropped
dramatically in the past three years.
In 2002, the number of drugs-related arrests hit an all-time high of 215,209. The
number of arrests dropped to 102,417 in 2003, 55,505 in 2004, 58,853 in 2005, and
13,712 in the first quarter of this year.
Methamphetamines have been the most popular drug among addicts and casual users in
Thailand. The synthetic drug can be cheaply produced using widely available
chemicals, which also have legitimate uses, in makeshift laboratories along the
porous border between Thailand and Burma.
Several drug kingpins backed by personal armies, based in Burma and thus beyond
the reach of Thai law enforcement, are capable of moving their amphetamine-producing
labs to avoid detection and adjusting their production at short notice in response to
the rise and fall in demand. Unlike producers of drugs like opium, heroin and
marijuana, they don't have to wait for drug-yielding plants to grow.
According to the latest available estimates, there are about three million people
in this country who have dabbled with drugs at one time or another. Of those, about
10 per cent, or 300,000, are regular drug users.
There is no denying that the sharp reduction in the number of drugs-related
arrests can be attributed to the Thaksin administration's bloody war against
traffickers in 2003. More than 2,000 suspected drug traffickers were killed during
the six-month campaign that started in February 2003. During this period, the
government appeared to have given tacit permission for police to implement targeted
killings of suspected drug traffickers. The killings tarnished Thailand's
human-rights record and attracted worldwide condemnation, but there was scant
criticism at home thanks to Thaksin's mastery of propaganda.
Thaksin declared victory in the 2003 drug war but subsequently declared several
more wars against drugs after he found that doing so enabled him to score easy
political points.
Let's hope the ONCB does not get into trouble for the professionalism with which
it compiles its statistics and for sharing such information with members of the press
so the public can make their own assessment of the drug situation and distinguish
between reality and Thaksin's political spin.
Lest people believe they need a superhero like Thaksin to keep the drug situation
under control, society should keep sight of the fundamental fact that the war on
drugs cannot be won unless Thailand succeeds in reducing the demand for drugs, in
addition to law enforcement. As such, the war on drugs will necessarily take time and
people should be sceptical about any quack doctor offering quick fix.
Populist policies 'will let him take back PM's job'
The Bangkok Post
The caretaker government's new declaration of a war on drugs and offers of
scholarships and handouts to the poor have sparked debate that a plan is afoot for
caretaker Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to return to the political leadership.
The plans instantly drew flak from Mr Thaksin's opponents who said he had tricked
people by pretending to go into a political hiatus in recent weeks.
Chaturon Chaisaeng, chairman of the committee overseeing the scholarship scheme
for underprivileged students, said the panel would hand over an extra 400,000
scholarships this year.
The one-year grants, expected to be distributed in August, would help cushion
economic hardship in the wake of rising costs of living and skyrocketing oil prices,
he said.
Mr Chaturon said the scholarship scheme, an ''urgent'' policy, will be funded by
sales of the two- and three-digit lottery.
''We have made a profit of 24 billion baht from lottery sales. Why wouldn't we use
it to help people who are suffering increased household expenses?
''It has nothing to do with politics, the election campaign or stimulating the
economy,'' said Mr Chaturon.
As the caretaker education minister and authorities gather to sort out who should
be eligible candidates, Wan Muhamad Nor Matha, director of the Centre to Fight
Narcotics, is gearing up for a renewed war on drugs.
The drugs war, the fifth of its kind, follows Mr Thaksin's meeting yesterday with
Pol Lt-Gen Krissana Pol-anant, secretary-general of the Narcotics Control Board and
Mr Wan Nor to discuss emerging drug problems.
Mr Wan Nor said drugs abuse and trafficking had increased in 20 provinces
including Bangkok and major tourist provinces.
''I'll call a meeting in those provinces next week. Mr Thaksin will visit if he
has time,'' he said.
Meanwhile, caretaker Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister Somkid
Jatusripitak has ordered CEO-style governors to speed up disbursement of
30-billion-baht funds to prop up the local economy.
A source at Government House said the disbursement was part of a four-point plan
to sustain the economy during the caretaker administration when a limit on the
implementation of economic projects was expected to affect growth.
Mr Somkid laid down guidelines to ensure the money went to people at the
grassroots level.
He told provincial governors to organise low-price consumer goods sales every
month to help low-income earners, under the so-called Blue Flag scheme.
Such policies, however, are seen by government critics as mere election campaign
gimmicks. They believe Mr Thaksin will renew his bid for national leadership in the
upcoming general election, likely to take place in 4-5 months.
Narong Boonsuayfan, of Walailak University in Nakhon Si Thammarat, said the three
schemes drive home the point that the ruling party is up to its usual tricks to woo
voters with social policy.
''These policies have struck a chord with voters, more than 60% of whom are
grassroots people.''
Mr Narong said that the government's failure to tackle the southern unrest, the
economic crunch and civic group movement were not deciding factors. Other parties
were unlikely to come up with anything challenging, he said.
It did not matter whether Mr Thaksin would accept the prime minister's job again
if Thai Rak Thai won. ''He still has negotiating power which will protect him in
future,'' said Mr Narong.
Suriyasai Katasila, coordinator of the People's Alliance for Democracy, said the
populist policies were just a means for Mr Thaksin to regain power. ''He can't prove
himself to middle-class people. So he tries to keep grassroots voters happy,'' Mr
Suriyasai said. However, populist policies have lost their magic in several areas
because people have grown wiser, he added.
List of activists killed during the Thaksin era
The Bangkok Post
Fifteen community leaders, community rights activists or environmentalists have
been killed since Jan 30, 2001:
- Jan 30, 2001 _ Jurin Ratchapo of tambon Pa Khlok in Phuket's Thalang district
was gunned down. Jurin had resisted businessmen destroying local mangrove forests.
The trial of two suspected gunmen is proceeding.
- March 28, 2001 _ Suwat Wongpiyasathit was killed after heading opposition
against the Rachathewa garbage dump site in Samut Prakan's Bang Phli
district.
- May 1, 2001 _ Narin Phodaeng, former chairman of a conservationist group in
Khao Cha-ang Klangthung in Rayong's Khao Chamao sub-district was shot dead. He was
a staunch opponent of a rock quarry owned by a local politician. Nobody has been
arrested in the case.
- May 17, 2001 _ Pithak Tonwut, who led villagers against a rock quarry owned by
a national-level politician in a forest reserve in Phitsanulok's Noen Ma Prang
district was shot dead. Two men were arrested but acquitted by the provincial
court.
- May 21, 2001 _ Chaweewan Pueksungnoen, a member of the Na Klang tambon
administration organisation, was shot dead. She had resisted a construction project
suspected of involving local influential figures and corrupt officials. Nobody was
arrested.
- July 2001 _ Somporn Chanapol was shot dead after he resisted the building of a
dam in Surat Thani's Kanchanadit district.
- June 20, 2002 _ Kaew Binpanma of Chiang Mai's Doi Lo sub-district was shot
dead, believed to the result of a land dispute.
- Sept 2, 2002 _ Boonsom Nimnoi, who headed a protest against a condensate
separation project in Phetchaburi's Ban Laem district, was killed by unknown
assailants.
- Sept 27, 2002 _ Preecha Thongpaen was shot dead after opposing a waste
treatment project in Thung Song district of Nakhon Si Thammarat.
- Dec 15, 2002 _ Boonrit Channanrong was shot dead after protesting against the
illegal trade in logs taken from Kaeng Krung National Park in Tha Chana district of
Surat Thani by state officials
- Dec 20, 2002 _ Boonyong Intawong, leader of a protest against a rock quarry in
Wiang Chai district in Chiang Rai, was killed.
- Feb 1, 2003 _ Khampan Suksai, a village chief from Chiang Mai's Chiang Dao
district, was shot dead after opposing encroachment on a community forest.
- Feb 4, 2003 _ Chuan Chamnankit, a community leader who fought the spread of
drugs, was shot dead in Chawang district, Nakhon Si Thammarat.
- May 25, 2003 _ Samnao Srisongkhram, chairman of a conservation group protecting
the Nam Phong river basin in Khon Kaen, was killed.
- June 21, 2004 _ Charoen Wat-aksorn, leader of a conservation group from Bo Nok
in Prachuap Khiri Khan province, was shot dead returning from Bangkok, where he
testified before a House committee about a land dispute.
Introduction: Extrajudicial killings of alleged drug dealers in Thailand
The following REPORT is available as a PDF file Download It Here
Editorial Board, article 2
The extrajudicial killing of some 2000 people accused of involvement in the drug
trade in Thailand between February and April of the year 2001 is the subject of the
special report in this edition of article 2. For the most part, these persons were
shot dead by "unidentified gunmen" after reporting to police stations undertaking a
campaign to eradicate drug dealers in Thailand within a three-month period. The
campaign was begun via a raft of orders issued by the Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin
Shinawatra, and was buoyed on by comments made throughout this period by the Prime
Minster and his subordinates to the effect that the lives of alleged drug dealers are
worthless.
Sections 33 and 75 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand contain provisions
corresponding to article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), to the effect that all persons are equal before the law and are
presumed innocent till proven guilty. However, in implementing this campaign the Thai
Prime Minister created a special category of persons, alleged drug dealers, for whom
these provisions needed no longer apply, for whom any pretence of ordinary criminal
procedure could be abandoned. In so doing, the killings may amount to a crime against
humanity under article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
This begs the question as to whether Thailand has in fact declined to join the Court
on the grounds that the King would be subject to its jurisdiction, as was argued
publicly, or rather because its Prime Minister was afraid that he might one day find
himself in the dock.
This report opens with translations of the Prime Minister's orders that precipitated
the three months of murder. A chronology of events by Meryam Dabhoiwala follows, then
some case studies of killings that occurred during the campaign. Nick Cheesman writes
about aspects of the campaign in more detail, and a comment on its implications for
human rights and the rule of law in Thailand by Basil Fernando follows. The report
concludes with a statement by the Asian Human Rights Commission from early in the
campaign, and finally, some reflections on how to address the consequences of this
crisis. The editorial board also wishes to acknowledge Kishori Kedlaya for
undertaking most of the field research that formed the basis for these
articles.
The report is dedicated to the 2000-plus victims of the 'war on drugs', whoever they
were and without regard to whatever accusations may have been leveled against them.
It reaffirms their right to have received due process in accordance with their
country's Constitution and its obligations under international law.
Prime Minister's Orders Nos 29/2546
Note: These are unofficial partial translations of the three orders by the Prime
Minister of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra, on 28 January 2003, launching the
"Concerted Effort of the Nation to Overcome Drugs" campaign on 1 February 2003,
popularized as the ‘war on drugs’. No official English translations of
these documents exist. Other parts of the orders give organisational charts and
further subsidiary details of administration.
Prime Minister's Order
No. 29/2546
Re: The Fight to Overcome Narcotic Drugs
...
2. Purpose
To quickly, consistently and permanently eradicate the spread of narcotic drugs and
to overcome narcotic problems, which threaten the nation.
...
6. Administration
6. 1. In order to overcome narcotic drugs, there shall be the National Command
Centre for Combating Drugs (NCCD), to be a command organ at the national level. There
shall also be Operation Centres for Combating Drugs at different levels, to be the
prevention and suppression centres for drugs in the regions. The appointed Deputy
Prime Minister shall be the Director of the NCCD, who shall have the powers and
duties to establish, amend or increase the number of centres or operating organs in
the central and regional areas, including along the borders by land and by sea; so
that they shall be responsible for the fight to overcome narcotic drugs.
6. 2. To develop structure, assemble strength, administer, direct, supply logistics,
communicate, report, follow-up and evaluate the operations of the National Command
Centre for Combating Drugs and the operation centres or organs for combating drugs at
all levels, in accordance with the assignments made by the Director of the
NCCD.
6. 3. All government agencies, local administration organs and public enterprises
shall give the National Command Centre for Combating Drugs and the operation centres
or organs to overcome narcotic drugs at all levels support as the highest priority.
There shall be a unified and result-oriented management system to respond to the
"Concerted Effort of the Nation to Overcome Drugs" policy and the action plans to
overcome narcotic drugs.
6. 4. The Office of the Narcotics Control Board shall expedite the administration
and support, especially in the policy-making process, technical process, legislation
and regulations, and cooperate, follow-up and evaluate the fight to overcome narcotic
drugs, so that it can be implemented swiftly, efficiently and effectively as planned.
In any case where there are problems relating to the implementation of organs, or
agencies, such shall be presented to the Director of the NCCD to consider, judge,
interpret and order accordingly.
6. 5. The Bureau of the Budget and the Ministry of Finance shall formulate a system
and prepare the budget to support the operation and implementation of this order.
They shall provide rewards or special levels of salary to the operating officials who
fight to overcome narcotic drugs with outstanding performances and to the staff
working at the National Command Centre for Combating Drugs and at the Operation
Centres for Combating Drugs at all levels.
...
Prime Minister's Order
No. 30/2546
Re: The Establishment of the National Command Centre for Combating Drugs
...
2. Powers and Duties
2. 1. To prescribe policies on drug intelligence, to follow up, evaluate the
situation of drug problems, to prevent and suppress drugs.
2. To formulate action plans to combat drugs pursuant to the "Concerted Effort of
the Nation to Overcome Drugs" and guidelines of the fight to overcome narcotic drugs,
but all these shall be in accordance with the guidelines of the Office of the
Narcotics Control Board.
2. 3. To direct, command, expedite, supervise, follow-up and evaluate the
implementation of government agencies and other organs concerned at all levels.
2. 4. To prescribe cooperation guidelines of due process at all levels, to expedite
and become effective in preventing and suppressing drugs, including to make clear
operation guidelines for such proceedings.
2. 5. To cooperate with foreign countries to reduce the problems of drug production,
to control precursors, chemicals, drug producing equipment, transport, import, export
and drug traffic.
2. 6. To coordinate the intelligence and security operations relating to drug
problems, especially the problems of armed forces along the borders, the trade of war
weapons, thefts of vehicles, foreign labour, terrorism and transnational criminal
organs.
2. 7. To propose to the Prime Minister or the cabinet to transfer government staff
or state enterprise officials who are not suitable in the area, to give rewards, to
inflict punishments, to set stimulating criteria, to protect and to guard the civil
servants and citizens who prevent and suppress drugs. With the exception of the case
where the appointment and transfer of, or order for, officials working on the
protection and suppression of drugs to perform other duties is made, the original
body shall first seek the opinion of the Director of the NCCD.
2. 8. To appoint a sub-committee or a task force to perform any tasks as assigned by
the NCCD.
2. 9. To report regularly on the results of the operations and the situation of drug
problems.
2. 10. To perform other tasks as assigned by the Prime Minister and the
cabinet.
3. To develop structure, assemble strength, direct, supply logistics, communicate,
report, follow up and evaluate the operations of the NCCD and the Operation Centres
for Combating Drugs at all levels as prescribed by the Director of the NCCD.
4. All central government agencies of all ministries and departments shall, in all
cases, immediately respond to the execution of the NCCD. The Narcotics Suppression
Bureau of the Royal Thai Police and provincial police shall particularly render
assistance and support to investigate, hold inquiries into complicated cases and
suppress large-scale narcotic producers and traffickers, influential persons
concerned, as well as perform operations as requested by the Provincial Operation
Centres for Combating Drugs.
5. The concerned government agencies shall provide officials to be on duty at the
Centres 24 hours, as assigned by the Director of the NCCD. The Director of the NCCD
shall have powers to assign duties and responsibilities to the deputy director,
assistant director, directors, secretary, and direct the officials working at the
Centres to perform any tasks within the powers and duties of the Centres.
6. This order shall substitute any orders contrary to or inconsistent with this
order.
...
Prime Minister's Order
No. 31/2546
Re: The Establishment of the Operation Centres for Combating Drugs at Different
Levels
...
Appendix A: Bangkok Metropolitan Operation Centre for Combating Drugs (BMOCCD) shall
have the composition, powers and duties as follows:
...
2. Powers and Duties
2. 1. To develop an intelligence system on drugs, to follow up and evaluate the
situation of drug problems in the Bangkok Metropolitan area and problems in
connection with drugs.
2. 2. To make an action plan, plans and other projects to tackle drug problems in
the Bangkok Metropolitan area. To support the action plan to overcome drug problems
as prescribed, in cooperation with government agencies, the private sector and civil
organs concerned.
2. 3. To order or assign government agencies and offices in the Bangkok Metropolitan
area to execute the plans, budget and operations in an integrated approach to prevent
and suppress drugs.
2. 4. To supervise, coordinate, expedite, monitor, follow up and evaluate the
operations of drugs prevention and suppression by the government agencies and private
sector as well as civil organs concerned in the Bangkok Metropolitan area.
2. 5. To organise campaigns to protect potential drug addicts and vulnerable groups
as well as to provide sufficient treatment and rehabilitation for drug addicts in the
communities.
2. 6. To set the targets in the suppression of drugs and to appoint a specific team
to work in the target areas or to reinforce the operations as requested.
2. 7. To cooperate with the Narcotics Suppression Bureau of the Royal Thai Police,
provincial police and government law enforcement agencies to implement the
suppression, investigation, expansion of operations, property seizures and
eradication of drug networks.
2. 8. To appoint an investigation team to examine the facts and public complaints
and to quickly make operations.
2. 9. To propose authoritative officials or the Director of the NCCD to consider
rewards or punishments to the operating staff in the Bangkok Metropolitan area and
the areas concerned.
2. 10. To follow-up on and evaluate the operations of drug prevention and
suppression in the Bangkok Metropolitan area and to advise agencies and organs for
the improvement and development of the operations.
2. 11. To regularly report the results of the operations and the situation of drug
problems in the Bangkok Metropolitan area to the NCCD.
2. 12. To perform other tasks as assigned or prescribed by the Director of the
NCCD.
Appendix B: Provincial Operation Centres for Combating Drugs (POCCD) shall have the
composition, powers and duties as follows:
...
2. Powers and Duties
[As for Appendix A, but substitute "Bangkok Metropolitan area" with
"province".]
Appendix C: Metropolitan Police 1-9 Operation Centres for Combating Drugs (MPOCCD
1-9) shall have the composition, powers and duties as follows:
...
2. Powers and Duties
2. 1. To prepare information of all drug abusers, drug addicts and drug traffickers
in the regions, to make the lists of communities with the spread of drug problems,
including to survey and to pursue the movement of drug problems in the areas of
responsibility.
2. 2. To implement and to cooperate with the government agencies, private sector or
civil organs concerned in an integrated approach to be in accordance with the action
plan, plans, and other projects as prescribed by the BMOCCD.
2. 3. To organise groups of resource persons and community-relations persons, to
rouse the strength of the mass of people in every community in the areas of
responsibility to make a concerted effort to fight against drugs and to organise
civil voluntary teams for drug protection.
2. 4. To organise treatments and rehabilitation supporting teams for drug abusers
and drug addicts in the communities.
2. 5. To organise development activities to support drug abusers and drug addicts to
abstain from and quit drugs.
2. 6. To organise drug suppression teams to press, suppress and purge drug
traffickers in the areas of responsibility and to coordinate with the BMOCCD to
support the drug suppression operation teams to implement the tasks that are beyond
their capability.
2. 7. To cooperate with the Narcotics Suppression Bureau of the Royal Thai Police,
provincial police and government law enforcement agencies to execute the suppression,
investigation, expansion of operations, property seizures and eradication of drug
networks.
2. 8. To appoint investigation teams to examine the facts and public complaints and
to quickly make operations.
2. 9. To propose to officials with authority or the Director of the BMOCCD to
consider rewards or punishments to the operating staff in the areas of responsibility
and the areas concerned.
2. 10. To regularly report the results of the operations and the situation of drug
problems in the areas of responsibility to the BMOCCD.
2. 11. To perform other tasks as assigned or prescribed by the Director of the
BMOCCD.
Appendix D: District or Minor District Operation Centres for Combating Drugs
DOCCD/MDOCCD) shall have the composition, powers and duties as follows:
...
2. Powers and Duties
[As for Appendix C, but substitute "BMOCCD" with "POCCD".]
...
A chronology of Thailand's "war on drugs"
Meryam Dabhoiwala, Researcher, Asian Legal Resource Centre
On 28 January 2003 Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra signed
Prime Minister's Order 29/2546, setting down guidelines for the
"Concerted Effort of the Nation to Overcome Drugs", widely known as the
'war on drugs,' to begin on February 1. Of Thailand's sixty-three
million citizens, three million—roughly five per cent—are estimated to
use methamphetamines, or 'crazy pills'. Most are youths, and the growth
of drug use among them is widely viewed with alarm. Thaksin stated that
"Illicit drugs are a menace to society. Our country will have no future
if our children are addicted to drugs. It is the duty of every citizen
to fight this drug menace." [1]
Although the guidelines emphasized education and awareness, and the
treating of drug users as patients rather than criminals, in practice
the 'war on drugs' was managed in the manner implied by the expression:
killing of enemies. A combination of incentives and warnings were used
to have police eliminate as many suspected drug dealers, by whatever
means possible, within the three months designated. The incentives were
mainly financial, increasing bonuses to officers for drug hauls
according to the size of the taking. Prime Minister Thaksin boasted
that "at three Baht per methamphetamine tablet seized, a government
official can become a millionaire by upholding the law, instead of
begging for kickbacks from the scum of society".[2] Warnings to government officers included threats to transfer, demote or sack those failing to produce evidence of success.
The information forming the base of the government's drug war came
from two types of lists compiled by various government agencies and
departments – blacklists and watchlists. The Commissioner of the
Narcotics Suppression Bureau stated that the names on the blacklists
were of people who had been arrested or named in arrest warrants, while
those on the watchlists were names of those pending investigation.[3]
The lists were apparently prepared in August of 2002, as groundwork for
the approaching drug war. Agencies were ordered to compile names of
those individuals they suspected of being involved in the drug trade;
the Interior Ministry received lists from provincial police, village
headmen and district officers. These lists were submitted to the
National Command Centre for Combating Drugs,[4]
chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyuth. At that stage
the government maintained that the lists were prepared scrupulously:
lists were cross-checked, and any name appearing in just one list was
deleted. Only names that appeared in several lists were added to the
watchlist for further investigation. These individuals were then asked
to come to the police station "for talks, which the police believe is
the most effective and convenient way to find more information about
drug-related activities," claimed a police spokesperson.[5]
Initially, the government aimed to remove all the names on the
blacklist by the end of the three-month 'war', although this target was
later modified.
Four persons were killed on the first day of the campaign. Police
Commissioner General Sant claimed that police would only fire in
self-defense. Interior Minister Wan Mohamad Noor Matha reaffirmed that
"the police would abide by the law in their campaign against drug
trafficking".[6] However, he later defended
killings and disappearances of targeted persons: "They [drug dealers]
will be put behind bars or even vanish without a trace. Who cares? They
are destroying our country."[7] The Prime
Minister also endorsed this attitude, saying, "The government's
strategy is to smoke out pushers, who will be eliminated by their own
kind. I don't understand why some people are so concerned about them
while neglecting to care for the future of one million children who are
being lured into becoming drug-users."[8] He later concluded, "[Murder] is not an unusual fate for wicked people."[9]
By February 5, the Food and Drug Administration's warehouse for
storing seized narcotics was practically full and the Interior Minister
said that there had been more than 2000 arrests, along with 3148
promises by former drug dealers to give up the drug trade.[10]
At that date "unknown gunmen" had so far killed six people, but by
February 13 the death toll—which the government was announcing publicly
as evidence of its success—had escalated to 154.[11]
Disturbingly, while the police denied responsibility for most
extrajudicial killings, they were also unwilling to conduct necessary
investigations into the deaths. According to Amnesty International,
"Authorities are not permitting pathologists to perform autopsies and
bullets are reportedly being removed from the corpses."[12]
And according to Dr Pornthip Rojanasunan, acting director of the
Forensic Science Institute, in more than half of the cases seen by her
the drugs appeared to have been planted on the victims after their
deaths—jammed in pockets at unnatural angles.[13]
Among those killed were persons who had voluntarily joined police
reform programs, in many cases months before the drug war began. One of
them was Jamnian Nualwilai, a former drug peddler in Muang district of
Ratchaburi, on February 13.[14] His wife
believes the police killed him and blamed it on his old drug gang.
Jamnian had joined a reform program two years ago, and sent in his
urine every month to prove he was still clean. Five days before the
killing, police commended Jamnian for his conduct and told him his name
would be removed from the blacklist. "I had not the slightest idea that
the delisting would end up with my husband being shot dead," his wife
Kik said. According to her, traffickers would be better off not joining
government reform schemes, because "at least they would not be making
themselves sitting ducks".
Many people were also killed after going to the police station in
response to their names being blacklisted. Boonyung Tangtong was one of
ten persons in his neighborhood killed after surrendering to the police.[15]
According to Boonyung's 16-year-old son Adirek, before being shot in
his own home his father had reported to the Na Chaliang police station.
Adirek is certain the police killed his father, alleging, "They were
all wearing name and rank tags around their necks, but they didn't look
familiar. They could have come from other places."
In Chiang Rai, police even put their informers in jail after they found it difficult to meet government targets for arrests.[16]
Chiang Rai had started its own anti-drug campaign in October 2001,
which according to officials had yielded more than nine million
methamphetamine pills and had caused 13,000 drug users to turn
themselves in. Officials now had to scramble to fill the new government
quotas or risk losing their jobs. On February 15 the Interior Minister
was reported as having voiced his displeasure at certain provinces that
were not meeting their quotas, warning that they would be assessed on
February 19 and at that date sacked, transferred or demoted:
Any provincial governor or police chief who continues to take it
easy … is weighing down the government's war against drugs. They should
check out history books about what King Naresuan did to his generals
who failed to keep up with him on the battleground. The King had all of
them beheaded.[17]
Initially, 90 per
cent of the Thai population was reportedly behind the government's war
on drugs, however this was before children began dying.[18]
The first child to be killed was a nine-year-old boy, Chakraphan
Srisa-ard, who was shot on February 23 as police fired at the car
carrying him and his mother. His father had already been arrested. One
of the boy's uncles stated, "The police kept shooting and shooting at
the car. They wanted them to die. Even a child was not spared."[19] The next child to be killed was a 16-month-old baby, shot in her mother's arms by an "unknown gunman" on February 26.[20] A highland couple was shot dead on February 24 on suspicion of selling drugs.[21]
Their three children were left homeless, the youngest of whom was a
six-year-old girl. Since then, no evidence has been found to suggest
the couple had any drug dealings. According to relatives, they "had to
die to help make the state suppression records look good". The
assistant village headman noted the irony of their deaths: "The couple
were killed even though their names did not appear on the drug
blacklist, while a major drug dealer faced only minor punishment—a two
night stay at a local police station."
Such incidents also led people to question the accuracy of the
government's drug suspect lists. On February 25 Police Chief Sant
admitted that the Interior Ministry's list was "poorly prepared and
could have affected innocent people".[22]
While this could be seen as a signal to his subordinates to ease up on
the campaign to kill suspects, some critics believe it was simply an
attempt to deflect public attention from the tragic death of Chakraphan
Srisa-ard. Police Lieutenant General Chalermdej Chomphunuj also later
admitted that "some people might have been mistakenly blacklisted,
perhaps due to the carelessness of officials".[23]
He went on to concede that false information might have been submitted,
for personal or business reasons. One example is the case of Abdul Roh
Ning Yaha, who was arrested on February 7 at his house in Yarang
district, Pattani province, and accused of possessing 300
metamphetamine pills, which the police claimed he had stored in the
birdcage in front of his house. Abdul's neighbors and his village
leaders believe that he was set up, knowing Abdul to be a strict Muslim
and a respected community leader who teaches village children the Quran
in his spare time. Abdul had had local political conflicts and
villagers believe that his opponents framed him.
Some persons whose names found their way on to blacklists fought to
get them off and clear their reputations. For instance, Wichai Samtung,
an ethnic Lisu villager of Ban Huay Kiang Sang village, Phrao district,
Chiang Mai province, was allegedly framed by police together with three
other villagers during a search of their houses on April 26, when they
produced one amphetamine pill as 'evidence' against him. Wichai, who
has worked for three years as an anti-drug committee member, sought
help from the Law Society of Thailand with the other villagers.
Meanwhile, the police tried to talk Wichai out of taking the case to
court, which they said would be "time consuming". According to Wichai,
At first there was one pill in the search. However, the number
mysteriously increased to three when police pressed the charge in court
as I refused to surrender. They (the police) said the penalty for
possessing just one pill was minor, possibly just a few thousand Baht
fine and it would be in my best interest to confess and end the case
quickly. But I could not follow that advice since I am innocent. I will
fight on even if it was one pill or just half a pill.
In another case, lawyer Somchai Limsgoon, president of the Law
Society of Samut Songkram Province, was blacklisted for having earlier
defended accused drug dealers in court. Somchai fought the listing and
the provincial commanding officer later agreed with him that his name
should not have been on the list, but in the meantime his reputation
was seriously damaged and personal security compromised.
Another critique of the government's lists was made by Charan
Pakdithanakul, secretary to the Supreme Court president, who said that,
"People may take one look at the death toll and hail the government,
but if you scrutinize the names of those killed, there's not a single
big-time dealer."[24] Similarly, a New
York Times article noted that the dozens of organized crime groups
running the drug trade protected or led by powerful civilian and
military figures were unaffected by the campaign.[25] The Interior Ministry finally ordered the Narcotics Control Board to check the lists on February 26.[26]
A sub-committee to monitor operations taken under the anti-narcotics
law was also established, with guidelines to ensure that proper legal
procedure be followed with regards to incidents reported in relation to
the 'war on drugs'. The panel asked the police to send all related data
for it to examine within the month, and report on the causes of death
and their investigations every 15 days.[27]
However, the sub-committee was not taken seriously, and it was not
until the end of April that police began submitting reports, by which
time they would have been able to conceal or doctor any problematic
evidence against them.
The Thai government not only repressed and ignored most of the
criticism from its own public but also feigned indifference to
international criticism. Dr Pradit Chareonthaitawee, a member of
Thailand's National Human Rights Commission received political and
physical threats after expressing concern about the high number of
killings.[28] Dr Pradit made a
presentation at a United Nations (UN) conference in February on the
human rights situation in Thailand, including extrajudicial killings
and the rising death toll of the anti-drug campaign.[29]
Dr Pradit maintained that the National Human Rights Commission Act
authorizes its commissioners to inform the world about on-going human
rights violations in Thailand.[30] Prime Minister Thakshin, however, labeled his behaviour as "sickening" and questioned his authority to communicate with the UN.[31]
A spokesman from the ruling Thai Rak Thai party threatened Dr Pradit
with impeachment due to his actions being "biased and against national
interests".[32] Dr Pradit also received
death threats on March 5 and 6 from an anonymous caller who told him to
"stop speaking to the United Nations or die".
Meanwhile, the Thai government continued to insist that the means
justified the ends. A foreign ministry spokesperson told reporters
that, "We want the international community to see our side of the
story. It's necessary for the government to take decisive action to
deal with the drug problem."[33] Prime
Minister Thaksin was less diplomatic, commenting facetiously that "the
United Nations is not my father". However, the Interior Ministry banned
the release of statistics on drug-related deaths on February 28, in
contrast to its earlier public tallies and apparently in part due to
adverse international reaction.[34] After that date, reports of killings in newspapers also dwindled.
By the end of March, the government agreed to cut its drugs arrest
target to 75%, after officially stating that some people on the lists
did not exist.[35] The government also
received reports on state officials suspected of drug involvement. The
Local Administration Department fired or suspended 40 village chiefs,
while a disciplinary investigation was being conducted against 141
chiefs. The Royal Thai Police Office blacklisted 477 officers, 135 of
whom were fired, while 39 faced criminal prosecution. On April 1 the
Prime Minister announced that all government officials suspected of
involvement in the trade would be transferred to inactive posts.[36]
At a meeting on April 8, the government increased financial
incentives to encourage arrests of drug traffickers by officials –
informants would get 15 per cent of the value of seized assets,
arresting officials 25 per cent, and if there were no informant, the
official would get 40 per cent.[37] The
government also decided that drug free villages would be entitled to
additional state aid. Similarly, outstanding officials would be awarded
medals, including the National Power medal for bravery. Along with such
incentives, the government continued to discipline officials failing to
meet its rigid targets. On April 25 the governors of three provinces
were threatened with the sack if they did not meet the final arrest
quota before the end of the war on April 30.[38]
At the start of May, Prime Minister Thaksin declared 'victory' in
the war on drugs, although since that date the campaign has continued
more surreptitiously, after a decision was made to extend elements of
the policy over the coming year.[39] To
achieve his 'victory', the Prime Minister instigated a shoot-to-kill
policy that left nearly 2000 people dead in the three months. The
persons killed were subject neither to judicial process nor effective
investigation by the authorities, whether before or after death.
Meanwhile, the major players in the drug trade were left untouched.
The campaign has brought about a disturbing new level of
authoritarian administration in Thailand. Senior government officials
have done little but acquiesce with their Prime Minister's orders,
disregarding the fundamental principles of law, and this trend has
since continued, under the Prime Minister's newest 'war', against
nebulous "dark influences". Prior to this war on drugs, Thailand was
seen as having made considerable progress in protection of human rights
by comparison to neighbouring states. Regrettably, this can no longer
be said to be the case.
End Notes
1 The Nation, 2 February 2003.[Back to content]
2 The Nation, 2 February 2003. At time of writing, there are roughly 40 Thai Baht to US. [Back to content]
3 'Named and shamed', Bangkok Post, 6 April 2003.[Back to content]
4
Which has also been referred to by the media as the National Committee
on the War on Drugs, and National Centre to Defeat Drugs. [Back to content]
5 'Named and shamed'.[Back to content]
6 'Named and shamed'.[Back to content]
7 Brad Adams, 'Drug 'war' kills democracy too: Thailand's crackdown', International Herald Tribune, 24 April 2003. [Back to content]
8 The Nation, 1 March 2003.[Back to content]
9 The Nation, 9 March 2003.[Back to content]
10 The Nation, 9 March 2003.[Back to content]
11 The Nation, 13 February 2003.[Back to content]
12 Amnesty International Press Release, 20 February 2003.[Back to content]
13 Robert Horn, 'The killing season', Time Asia, 10 March 2003. [Back to content]
14 'Innocent victims suffer in silence', Bangkok Post, 17 February 2003. [Back to content]
15 'Families live in terror as suspects die', Bangkok Post, 1 March 2003. [Back to content]
16 'Police arrest informants to meet target', Bangkok Post, 10 March 2003.[Back to content]
17 The Nation, 15 February 2003.[Back to content]
18 Editorial, Vancouver Sun, 8 April 2003.[Back to content]
19 Seth Mydans, 'A wave of drug killings is linked to Thai police', New York Times, 8 April 2003.[Back to content]
20 The Nation, 27 February 2003.[Back to content]
21 'Campaign has torn some families apart', Bangkok Post, 19 May 2003. [Back to content]
22 The Nation, 26 February 2003.[Back to content]
23 'Named and shamed'.[Back to content]
24 The Nation, 26 February 2003.[Back to content]
25 Mydans, 'A wave of drug killings'.[Back to content]
26 The Nation, 27 February 2003. [Back to content]
27 'Lift the clouds of darkness and fear', Bangkok Post, 16 March 2003. [Back to content]
28 Forum Asia statement, 7 March 2003.[Back to content]
29 'Pradit subject of impeachment talk', The Nation, 6 March 2003. [Back to content]
30 Wassana Nanuam, 'Pradit accused of protecting dealers', Bangkok Post, 11 March 2003. [Back to content]
31 Yuwadee Tunyasiri, 'Thaksin blasts comments from Pradit as sickening', Bangkok Post, 9 March 2003. [Back to content]
32 'Pradit subject of impeachment talk', The Nation, 6 March 2003.[Back to content]
33 Editorial, Vancouver Sun, 8 April 2003. [Back to content]
34 Forum Asia statement.[Back to content]
35 'Target cut as some suspects don't exist.' Bangkok Post, 29 March 2003. [Back to content]
36 The Nation, 2 April 2003.[Back to content]
37 The Nation, 9 April 2003.[Back to content]
38 'Three governors face chop for failing to achieve targets', Bangkok Post, 26 April 2003.[Back to content]
39 The Nation, 24 April 2003. [Back to content]
Extrajudicial killings of alleged drug dealers in Thailand
Asian Legal Resource Centre
Prime Minister of Thailand Thaksin Shinawatra announced on 28 January 2003 that a
'war on drugs' would begin on February 1, and continue until April 30, at which time
the country would be drug-free. As a result, over 2000 persons lost their lives
during this three-month period, murdered on the streets, in houses, restaurants and
shops around the country. Others who escaped death have been forced into hiding or
had their reputations and livelihoods ruined. Below is a selection of cases compiled
from complaints received and investigated by non-governmental organizations, the
media and other sources.
Targeted killings by "unidentified gunmen"
The war on drugs got off to its promised start on the night of January 31-February 1,
with "unidentified gunmen" killing Boonchuay and Yupin Unthong as they were about to
return home with their son, eight-year-old Jirasak, in the streets of Ban Rai,
Damnoen Saduak district, Ratchaburi. The family had spent the evening playing
fairground games at a local temple, and had all climbed aboard a motorcycle to go
home. They had not gone more than 200 metres when two men dressed in black wearing
ski masks pulled up alongside on another motorcycle. The man on the back shot
Jirasak's mother, and Boonchuay unsuccessfully tried to speed away. The motorcycle
crashed onto the pavement, and bleeding on the road Boonchuay shouted to his son to
run. Jirasak escaped over a fence and hiding, watched as the man shot his father in
the head. Boonchay had been released from prison three months ago, where he had
served 18 months for drug offenses, and Yupin was also on a drug blacklist. Relatives
said that neither had been involved in drugs since Boonchuay's release from jail.
Boonchay's brother Samruay Thinrung said that justice should have been allowed to
take its course. "Being tried in court and executed in one day would have been more
acceptable than having my brother shot dead in the street," he said. Phanom, his
uncle, added that whatever their offences, "Killing people in the streets is just too
cruel."
Many killings occurred shortly after the victims had been called to a police station.
Suwit Baison, a 23 year-old assistant television cameraman kneeled down before Prime
Minister Thaksin as he arrived at the Agriculture Ministry for a meeting on February
27. Suwit told Thaksin that his mother, Kwanla Puangchomphum, and stepfather, Thanom
Montak, were shot dead on February 26 shortly after they left the Tha Chaliang police
station in Nong Phai district, Phetchabun. The couple had gone to pay a 5000 Baht
(US5) fine for marijuana possession. His parents were shot while riding a motorcycle
home, about five kilometers from the police station. Witnesses said the gunman was
driving a white sedan, which according to Suwit was spotted at the police station car
park. With tears rolling down his cheeks and his voice trembling, Suwit handed a
petition to Thaksin, asking for justice. He said local police had dismissed the
shootings as "drugs-related" and made no effort to conduct a proper investigation.
The Prime Minister promised to look into the matter. An hour later, Crime Suppression
Division commander Major General Surasit Sangkapong talked to Suwit for about 10
minutes before they left together for further questioning at Surasit's office.
Surasit said he would assign one of his deputies to investigate the shooting.
According to Nong Phai district police superintendent, Colonel Phisan Iamla-or,
however, Suwit's parents were on a list of people who allegedly possessed drugs that
had been prepared at a gathering of villagers. He said the couple had been arrested
separately on four occasions with marijuana and methamphetamine pills. However, Suwit
claims that his stepfather was arrested during the month on a charge of marijuana
use, at which time the police tried to make him admit to methamphetamine possession.
He also alleged that his mother had been falsely charged with possession last year,
but had been told by police that for 50,000 Baht (US,200) they would reduce the
charge. After the couple consulted a lawyer, the police contacted them and told them
to report to the station.
A day after Kwanla and Thanom's deaths, another person in the neighbourhood was
murdered in a similar manner, again a 'reformed' drug user turned victim of the
'war'. Boonyung Tangtong, a 40 year-old father, had reported to Na Chaliang police
station, Petchabun, as ordered. Shortly after, nine armed men came to his house, took
him into his bedroom and shot him in the head and chest. His murder took place in
full view of his wife and children, including a two-year-old daughter, and two other
relatives, who were held captive with guns against their heads. Boonyung had turned
himself in to the police about a year ago, and twice took part in the government's
reform program. Adirek, his 16-year-old son, is positive that the police murdered his
father. "They all were wearing name and rank tags around their necks, but they didn't
look familiar. They could have come from other places," he said after the shooting.
Ten persons in the area were reportedly killed after reporting to police during the
first weeks of the campaign.
Likewise, on February 17, three days before eight "unidentified gunmen" entered her
house in Ban Laem district, Petchaburi, and shot her eight times, Somjit Kuanyuyen, a
42 year-old mother, reported to the police after her name appeared on a blacklist.
According to her nephew, 'Sak' she went to the Ban Laem police station with her
husband and was told to go into a side room and sign a paper. However, Somjit was
illiterate and did not know what it was. Terrified, she marked the document. The
police informed her that after signing the paper she would be safe and could come to
see them any time if anything suspicious happened. On February 20 her 7-months
pregnant daughter saw a pickup truck with dark tinted windows and no license plates
stop at the front of the house. It contained four men with crew cut hairstyles,
wearing sunglasses and black clothes. Two of the men approached the grocery stand at
the house ostensibly to buy some beer. One nodded his head and the other fired at
Somjit, hitting her in the arm while her seven-year-old granddaughter clung to her
leg. There were three other persons in the house, including Somjit's daughter. They
watched as Somjit fell after the first shot and the man fired another six shots into
her back, killing her. After the men left, although the house is very close to a main
road and only 20 metres from a police box, the police took a long time to arrive and
investigate. They did not set up checkpoints or take any other steps to arrest the
murderers. They didn't collect the bullet shells, which were instead taken up by the
family. They asked Somjit's daughter and cousin if her family was involved in drugs,
but asked no questions about the murder itself. When the daughter made it clear that
her mother had had nothing to do with drugs, the police warned her, "Don't speak too
much". For his part, Ban Laem police commander, Colonel Taveesak na Songkhla said
that Somjit's name was on a list submitted to them by the Drug Suppression Office in
Bangkok. He claims his officers searched the scene, but found no bullet casings. "If
the relatives have found bullet casings, they should give them to the police instead
of keeping them and saying that we are ignoring the case," he said. Colonel Taveesak
also mentioned that although the police were working on solving such murder cases,
"investigation cannot be totally efficient because we need to use officers to arrest
those blacklisted in order to fulfill the government quota." The family tried to
complain to their local Member of Parliament, but could not find him. They then went
to the provincial office of the Law Society of Thailand and were advised to tell the
media.
The police and government preferred to characterize most killings by "unidentified
gunmen" as "bad guys killing bad guys" or "killing to cut the link"(kar tad torn). In
one particularly brutal case described in these terms, locals allege that uniformed
police in fact tortured and murdered four ethnic Hmong men on February 12. The four
men, 45-year-old Jai-jue Sae Thao, his younger brother Somchai Sae Thao, their
59-year-old cousin, Boonma Sae Thao, and Seng Sae Thao, the 59-year-old head of Doi
Nam Pieng Nam Din village, Bann Neun sub district, Lom Kao district, Petchabun, were
travelling by pickup truck after attending the Lom Kao district office. According to
Jai-jue's son, Sornchai Sae Thao, his father had been charged with carrying an
illegal shotgun, and on February 11 had received an order to go to court. Jai-jue was
said to be getting a transfer of ownership on the gun, which he kept with him for
protection when alone on his farm at nights. Jai-jue contacted the village head to go
with him as guarantor in his case, and he found that the head had also received a
notice, that his name was on a list and he had to report to the police. That notice
was issued by the district office of Lom Kao, and the person who brought the charge
sheet to Jai-jue was the same as the person who gave the notice to the village head.
The following morning, both of them went to the district office in the village head's
pickup truck. Jai-jue also asked his brother Somchai to go with him. Boonma was
getting a lift to buy medicine for his 18-month-old daughter, who was suffering from
acute diarrhoea. According to Sornchai, a villager who had met his father in court
said that when his father appeared there the judge knew nothing about the charge and
said he had not been the one to call him to the court. Seng Sae also did not report
to the district office because the officer who should receive the report was out, and
so they then began returning home. Around midday, about fourteen kilometres short of
their village, they were all shot dead. According to Sornchai, one villager saw the
incident and at first insisted that police in uniform shot them. However, that
villager was called to Lom Kao police station for a talk, and after that became very
quiet and apprehensive. Several villagers also witnessed at least one police
motorcycle in the area at the time of the killings. A Doi Nam villager walking nearby
was the first to see the bodies themselves. That person went to tell the men's
relatives, and all of them went to the place and found that the pickup was gone but
the four dead bodies were pulled together at the side of the road. All four had been
shot in the head, and in addition all of them showed signs of brutal torture:
- Jai-jue had a broken chin and bruised eyes;
- Boonma's body was burnt on its left side, and his face had been stabbed with a
sharp object, leaving a triangular shape; the back of his head was also reportedly
severely damaged;
- Somchai had a broken neck and collarbone;
- Seng Sae appeared to have beaten.
According to Boonma's son, Tu Sae Thao, his father's wallet with 2000 Baht (US) and
his watch were missing. According to Sornchai, the charge sheet against his father
also was missing. The police on the scene claimed that they knew nothing of what had
happened and that the pickup truck also was missing when they arrived. However, one
police officer reportedly walked behind the village head's son and told him
discreetly that it was not police from Lom Kao but from neighbouring Lom Sak who had
killed the men. Although the bodies were sent to Somdej Yuppharaj hospital for
autopsy, no result has been sent to relatives and they don't dare ask for it. The
hospital also has not given any official paper to acknowledge the deaths, except one
for Boonma because his relatives went to the district office to demand it. The paper
says only that Boonma was shot and killed. Meanwhile, the doctor who conducted the
autopsy is reported to have handed the bullets over to the police, but it is now not
known where the bullets have been sent. According to the source of that information,
however, the village head was killed with a .38 calibre weapon (the size of
police-issue pistols).
While the target of the killing seems to have been Seng Sae, the family members of
the three other men insist that it was impossible for them to be drug sellers, as
they never even smoked cigarettes or drank alcohol. However, when the case was
reported in the media the police informed newspapers that all four were "suspected
drug dealers" When contacted further on this point, the investigating officer Major
Amnuay Yamark said that police believed it was a case of "killing to cut the link"
because the village head was a big drug seller. He said that he didn't have details
about the other three men's backgrounds and their names were not on the blacklist.
After relatives complained to him and other police that there had been no progress in
the investigation, they were told that police are investigating the case
'secretly'.
In a similar case, six local leaders were shot dead in Ban Pang Khon, Huay Chompu sub
district, Muang ('Central' district, Chiang Rai, while returning in a pick-up truck
from an anti-drug meeting on February 27. They were all ethnic Yao villagers,
identified as 46-year-old Ban Pa Luang village head Kiattisak Saksrichompoo,
40-year-old Kaoguay Sae Tern, 36-year-old Ulong Sae Fan, and 29-year-olds Bunma Sae
Fan, Uguay Sae Tern and Somdej Sae Tern. All but Kiattisak were local administration
officials of Huay Chomphu sub-district. At around 4pm, while they were away at the
meeting at the Supanimit Foundation, a pickup truck with four men reportedly came to
the village and stopped in front of the headman's house. One of the men told
neighbours that they had come from the district governor's office regarding road
construction matters. He explained they were newly transferred to the area, having
previously been situated in Nan. A neighbour told them that the headman had gone to
Pang Khon village and would return in the evening. One of them gave 200 Baht (US) and
saying that they would be back the next day asked for some chicken to be prepared for
them. After this they returned to their car and drove to Pang Khon village. Near the
end of the road, they parked and asked another group of villagers about the Ban Pa
Luang headman. At that time, one of the men in the car recognized a man among the
villagers and told him, "Don't you remember me? I tried to arrest you but you fled."
In fact, police had previously detained that villager on drug charges, but he and his
associates had managed to escape custody. Ten days after this chance meeting, that
villager was reportedly also shot dead. After the group of men in the car parted from
the villagers, not long after the sound of repeated gunfire reached Ban Pang Khon
from about two kilometres away. Shortly after, villagers saw the car carrying the
four men driving away from the scene. When they went to the site, they saw the
headman's car and the six men riddled with bullets. Kiattisak and Bunma, in the
driver and passenger seats, had both been shot from behind; the other four men were
all dead in the tray of the pickup truck. Police allege Kiattisak was a drug dealer
and speculated that 'a drug ring might be behind the attack". They were investigating
to find out whether the other five victims also had drug links. Kiattisak's name was
on the local blacklist, however some villagers doubt that he was a drug dealer, as he
was active in working with the local administration in drug suppression and anti-drug
education programmes. Around 15 years ago he had been involved in opium trading, but
at that time this was common in the area. In 1995, he was arrested on a charge of
being a heroin producer, but after a two-year court case he was found not guilty. He
had not been implicated in any drug-related affairs after that. Bunma's father, Lek
Sae Fan, also denied his son had any drug-trafficking history. In other reported
cases where victims were shot while returning from drug suppression meetings, in
Narathiwat the head of Chanae Hahama Bado subdistrict, 44-year-old Hahama Bado, and
his aide, Rapeng Teuramae, were shot while riding home on a motorbike on the night of
February 28. Likewise, the 54-year-old head of Mae Tao sub-district, Mae Sot
district, Tak, Bunpan Lanoi, was shot in the chest and right shoulder as he was
returning from an anti-drug meeting at around 10pm of March 5. He was wounded in his
right arm and shoulder, and later admitted to Mae Sot district hospital.
In another alleged case of "killing to cut the link" 42-year-old Jamnian Nualwilai, a
former drug peddler who had turned into a police informant was shot dead in Hinkong
sub-district, Muang district, Ratchaburi on February 13. Jamnian was found with four
bullet wounds to the head and one in his back. Police said he had 200 methamphetamine
pills, 11,000 Baht cash and a mobile phone in his possession. The police say that a
drug gang killed him to prevent him betraying them, but Jamnian's wife 'Kik' does not
agree. She believes the police killed her husband and made it look as though his old
drug gang had done it. Kik said her husband had joined a voluntary government program
under which small-time drug traffickers quit and helped authorities with their
crackdown. Jamnian joined two years ago and sent in his urine sample every month to
prove he was still clean. He even brought other traffickers to the program. Kik did
not understand how her husband could be murdered when the police had guaranteed him
protection. Five days before the killing, police commended Jamnian for his conduct
and told him his name would be removed from the blacklist. "I had not the slightest
idea that delisting would end up with my husband being shot dead," Kik said.
"Traffickers would be reluctant to join the program if they had to expose themselves
to vengeful acts by drug rings or police. People like my husband would be better off
not joining - at least they would not be making themselves sitting ducks. The program
application forms are like death warrants," Kik said. "Gunning someone down will not
stop drugs. It is merely a way for officials to glorify their achievements," she
observed. The wife of Jaruk sae Tan also called for authorities to protect - rather
than kill - former drug dealers who had given up the illicit business. Jaruk, who had
stopped selling drugs more than two years earlier, was shot dead on February 25 while
watching television in his restaurant in Muang district, Phuket. During the shooting,
a stray bullet injured a four-year-old girl, Suthanma Iamsam-ang, who lives in the
neighborhood.
One characteristic of the killings across the country was that they often occurred in
daylight and in the presence of witnesses, despite the killers being "unidentified'.
For instance, Bussaporn Pung-am, a 39 year-old woman whom police allege to have been
a major methamphetamine dealer, was shot dead in her home in Muang district, Nakhon
Pathom, on February 11, while having lunch with two neighbors. Witnesses told police
that an "unidentified man" got out of a pickup truck, walked inside the grocery store
that is part of the house, and shot Bussaporn five times. Police said they found
court documents in a bag in her house showing she had acted as a guarantor for more
than 200 drug suspects who had been released on bail. Bussaporn herself was once
arrested and released on bail, said the deputy commander of Muang district police
station, Lt-Colonel Panlert Tangsriphairoj. Similarly, 37-year-old Sommai Thongmee
was killed in his house in Pak Pun sub-district, Muang district, Nakhon Si Thammarat
on February 4. His wife, Thippawan, said that three men in a double-cab pickup truck
had arrived at their house, asking to see Sommai. The men went inside and talked to
her husband, before one of them pulled out a pistol and shot Sommai dead. Police said
Sommai was a "major drug dealer" and was on the regional blacklist. On the same day,
30-year-old Yongyuth Jongjit was shot dead by a group of nine "unidentified men" at
his pig farm in Kanchanadit district, Surat Thani, in front of his workers. Again,
the victim was on the local blacklist and police put the killing down to "killing to
cut the link". Likewise, on March 6 a sub-district municipal councillor was shot dead
in his car at the Udon intersection of Mitraphap highway, Muang district, Saraburi,
while two passengers and three employees in a nearby shop were wounded. The Thap
Kwang sub-district official, 40-year-old Manoj Khamsat, was shot in the face, head,
chest, legs and arms when a pickup truck carrying about seven men pulled up alongside
and one man opened fire with an M16 rifle. Manoj fired back with a pistol, jumped
from the truck and attempted to flee, but was shot down. Police said Manoj was on a
blacklist, and the killing may have related to drugs or other illicit businesses.
Manoj had earlier survived an attack on February 21 in which his wife was shot.
The case of 75-year-old Samniang Chusri stands out as an example of how anybody with
her name on a blacklist could be a target for execution. Samniang had been called in
by village authorities in Koh Plabphla sub-district, Muang district, Ratchaburi and
told she was on a blacklist. Officials tried to coerce her to sign a confession, and
renounce drug-related activities. One of her daughters had last year been charged
with possessing 21 methamphetamine pills, but Samniang insisted that she had nothing
to do with it and refused to sign anything. Days later, on February 25, two men
arrived on a motorcycle at the front of a neighbouring shop, where Samniang was
having a soft drink on the porch. One pressed his hands in supplication and asked for
Samniang's forgiveness before shooting her in the head and chest. Samniang's
daughter, Pranee Fakchin, said that her mother had been blacklisted, and she had
repeatedly gone to the police to try to convince them to take her name off.
“Police prepared their suspect list on rumours and they didn’t try to get
evidence,?Pranee said. “Now my mother had to die as a consequence. This
isn’t fair.?Another daughter, Nitaya Poonsak, added, “They should have
arrested her and put her in jail—at least then I could have visited her.?
Killings by the police
Although the majority of killings involved “unidentified?killers, in some 70
cases police have acknowledged responsibility for deaths. In each of these cases the
police have excused themselves on the grounds of “self-defence? For instance,
on February 12 police killed 32-year-old Chanchai Khamkhomkul in Bangkok’s
Klong Toei district while reportedly trying to arrest him as he delivered
methamphetamines to a customer. The police maintain that Chanchai started shooting
while trying to escape and was killed when they returned fire, hitting him six times.
Police said they found 20,000 pills in a bag he was carrying. The next day, police in
the same district shot and killed 39-year-old Ukritthana Jesala when he allegedly
shot at them as they tried to arrest him.
Also in Bangkok, on March 20 officers of Police Command 5 shot and killed 38-year-old
Surasit Singchai in Bang Na district as he allegedly resisted arrest. Colonel Charoen
Srisalak reported that police had set up Surasit and arranged to buy 6000 pills from
him. When he realized that he was about to be arrested, he began shooting, said
Colonel Charoen, causing police to return fire and kill him. On February 24 police on
a highway in Chiang Mai province also shot dead an ethnic Hmong couple, Damrong and
Somsri Thanomworakul, “on suspicion that they sold drugs? However, there has
reportedly been no evidence to connect the handicraft vendors with drugs, nor were
they on any blacklist, and nor had they behaved in any way to threaten the police.
Relatives insist the couple “had to die to help make state drug suppression
records look good?
In the case of 42-year-old Boonteem Chaiyang, the police may first have held him
captive and tortured him before executing him. According to the police, Boonteem, of
Pha Ham sub-district, Muang district, Chiang Mai, was the target of a sting
operation. The police, from Thungkru police station, claim that on the night of
February 2 he shot at them on Soi Pracha-uthit 76, in front of Burana Suksa
School—police officers Worarit Sunyakanit and Chalothon Wantanachoth were
forced to shoot back in “self defence? The police claim that 16,000 amphetamine
pills were found in a car being driven by Boonteem. However, his wife, 45-year-old
Saengtong Luangwiroj, lodged a complaint with the Forensic Science Institute that the
police executed her husband. She alleges in the complaint that Boonteem disappeared
on January 28, after he visited his brother Thaksin Chaiyang, who is serving a prison
term for a drug conviction. She went to Pracha-chun police station to file a
kidnapping complaint, but did not hear anything until receiving news that her husband
had been killed. She saw her husband’s body and claims that there were wounds
on it suggesting torture, however the body was cremated without forensic
investigation. According to the police report, a doctor’s preliminary
investigation found that the man was shot in the heart, lungs and spleen. The police
also claim that Saengtong didn’t know her husband was a drug dealer, but said
that it was the case as his brother is in jail for drug offences. Saengtong, however,
says that they were very poor and there was no evidence that her husband had an
income from buying and selling drugs.
In a rather different case, a Chinese Haw drug suspect Hong Khaphapu was “found
dead?in a detention cell at Hua Mak police station, Bangkok, where he was being held
after being arrested at around 3:30pm on March 28 at the Wat Thepleela pier, in
possession of 4000 methamphetamine pills. Police claim to have also found around one
million Baht (US,000) in his car, and when they searched Hong’s apartment they
reportedly found a further 10,000 pills and eight passbooks for bank accounts
totaling 600,000 Baht (US,000). Major Komsan Paksin, inspector at Hua Mak police
station, said that Hong had admitted to buying a fake Thai citizen ID, and to
distributing drugs in the Ramkhamhaeng area after smuggling them from northern
provinces. Major Komsan claimed that Hong had drowned himself around 5am in a small
bucket of water while in a detention room with several other suspects, none of whom
saw what happened. According to Dr Pornthip Rojanasunan, the acting director of the
Forensic Science Institute, however, it is impossible for someone to commit suicide
by immersing his head in a small bucket of water. Dr Pornthip added that she was
unable to investigate the case as it was outside her jurisdiction, but concluded, "We
won't call this suicide."
Accidental killings of "innocents"
Where the government's campaign began to founder was when obviously innocent people
became victims of shootings, particularly children. The turning point came with the
highly publicized case of nine-year-old Chakraphan Srisa-ard, who was killed during a
police operation on February 24, in Lan Luang district, Bangkok. Chakraphan was hit
by three bullets, while sitting on the back seat of a car driven by his mother,
Pornwipa Kerdrungruang, who was trying to flee after police had arrested her husband,
Sathaporn, in a trap set up with an arrested dealer. The couple had arrived at Saphan
Khao in the Lan Luang area around 9pm. Sathaporn left the car to deliver 6000
amphetamine pills to the plain-clothes police team, who then flashed their badges and
arrested him. On seeing her husband's arrest, Pornwipa tried to drive off. Three
policemen, Police Sergeant Major Pipat Sang-in, Police Lance Corporal Anusorn
Tansuwan and Police Corporal Panumas Chanacham opened fire, but denied shooting into
the car. Independent accounts at the scene suggest that the officers chased Pornwipa
in their car as she was trying to drive away. They fired at the vehicle until it
crashed into the pavement. The car had six bullet holes in it. The city police chief,
Damrongsak Nilkuha, later said that Nang Lerng police had filed murder charges
against the three officers, who had been freed on bail after Police Colonel Nipon
Pupansri, deputy commander of city Police Command 4, went to guarantee them. Three
pistols belonging to the accused police officers were sent to the Scientific Crime
Detection Division on February 27 along with the three bullets removed from
Chakraphan's body. The ballistics tests revealed that the spent shells from the
bullets believed to have killed Chakraphan did not match the type of handguns carried
by the officers. However, a senior policeman conceded that the three policemen might
have handed in different guns for the ballistics examination. The examination did not
result in a withdrawal of the murder charges against the officers.
National Police Commission spokesman Police Major General Pongsapat Pongcharoen gave
the boy's family 20,000 Baht (US0) to help with funeral costs, however, he added,
"Police will continue to take tough measures against drug dealers." Furthermore,
Major General Pongsapat defended the shooting, saying that the officers followed
procedure, but the boy's parents used their son as a shield. Criticism of the
shooting came from other quarters, however, including Bangkok Senator and former
police chief General Pratin Santiprapop, who called the incident a deliberate killing
and said the officers who shot the boy must be held responsible, regardless of their
intentions. According to the senator, the case involved an excessive use of arms with
the police being intent on using their weapons, even though the suspects had shown no
indication of threatening them. The Law Society of Thailand secretary-general Thana
Benjathikul agreed that the case represented a deliberate killing since there was no
evidence there were guns in the fleeing car. Metropolitan Police Bureau Commissioner
Lieutenant General Damrongsak Nilkuha, however, has sought to excuse the police from
their actions, saying that the car had dark tinted windows and police could not see
that there was a boy on the back seat.
There have been suspicions of a cover-up, amid conflicting accounts of Chakraphan's
death by the police. Police Major General Chakthip quoted the officers as having said
that the couple was being secretly accompanied by "guards" who showed up after
Sathaporn was arrested. "The policemen said they didn't fire at the car, and that the
bullets were from the guards of the drug dealers," Chakthip said. Lieutenant Colonel
Pakorn Pawilai, the inspector at Nang Lerng police station in charge of the
investigation, has also claimed that the police did not fire at the car but rather,
"There was a man suspected to be from the same drug ring riding a motorcycle who
opened fire at the car and killed the boy." First Region Police commissioner Major
General Theerasak Nguanbanchong has also asserted that there were witnesses who saw
"guards" from the same drug ring helping Pornwipa escape the shooting scene. "This
group is a major drug ring. They have a protection team when they distribute drugs.
It is likely there was a protection team intervening during the commotion," he said.
However, according to Chakraphan's father, it was the police who shot his son: "We
had no protection team with us because we were supposed to be dealing with
small-scale buyers - there was no 'VIP' involved with us that day," he said. In order
to stem concerns, on February 25 Prime Minister Thaksin said he had already ordered
the Special Investigations Department under the Ministry of Justice to investigate
the case. However, Police Lieutentant General Noppadol Somboonsap, director-general
of the Department, admitted that it would not be able to fully ensure justice in the
case because it has yet to receive its full mandate. The draft legislation for the
Department to carry out investigations and provide it with funds was still awaiting
parliamentary approval.
Meanwhile, shortly after the killing of Chakraphan, a 16-month-old girl and her
mother were killed on February 26. The girl's mother, 38-year-old Raiwan
Khwanthongyen, was carrying her baby, nicknamed 'Ice' in the centre of Sadao
district, Songkhla, police said, when "unidentified gunmen" shot them both. Police
Lieutenant Colonel Phakdi Preechachon, the officer in-charge of the investigation,
said police assumed the killing was gang-related because Raiwan's brother was
allegedly involved in the drug trade. Raiwan might have known the hitman, Phakdi
said, as witnesses saw Raiwan scream when she noticed the man and tried to run away
with her daughter in her arms.
Earlier in the month, on February 13, 38-year-old Sam-ang Chumchom was killed by
gunfire apparently aimed at a person in an adjacent vehicle at a red light in Udon
Thani. Sam-ang was riding a bicycle back home when she stopped alongside the car
carrying 27-year-old Sanya Khampatan, the apparent target of the killing, his
50-year-old father, Veera, and his sister, Buala Boonpa. Sanya had just been released
on bail after being charged with methamphetamine trafficking. Two gunmen on a
motorcycle pulled up alongside, killing Sanya, Veera and Sam-ang. Buala, who
survived, said she did not know Sam-ang and the woman just stopped her bicycle at the
red light next to the car. Sam-ang's sister-in-law Bang-orn Chumchom blamed the
government for her death. She said the administration's tough action against drug
trafficking had prompted widespread killings to silence small-time drug agents, while
the relevant agencies lacked the necessary measures to protect "good people" Of 26
people shot dead in Udon Thani between February 1 to 18, only 18 were reportedly on
the government blacklist. Police said they were investigating all cases but "had yet
to catch any murder suspects" Sam-ang's sister-in-law added that no one had offered
help with the funeral, and her family's reputation was ruined because most people
presumed that her sister-in-law was also guilty of drug dealing.
Murder as public policy in Thailand
Nick Cheesman, Projects Officer, Asian Legal Resource Centre
Between February and April 2003 the Thai government incited police and public
officials to organize and endorse murder in the name of ridding the country of drugs.
Through a series of official orders and public statements, the government pushed
officials to massively overstep their normal authority. It also set up numerous
positive and negative incentives, including promises of financial rewards and
promotions, and threats of transfers and dismissals. By May, more than 2000 persons
were killed, and the country’s key institutions for the protection of human
rights were seriously compromised.
Administering murder
On January 28 the Prime Minister of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra, set the anti-drug
crusade in motion. Prime Minister’s Office Orders 29/2546, 30/2456 and 31/2546,
effective from February 1, aimed to combat the enormous drug manufacture, trafficking
and use in Thailand “quickly, consistently and permanently”. They ordered
the establishment of the National Command Centre for Combating Drugs, chaired by
Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, to oversee the “Concerted Effort
of the Nation to Overcome Drugs” campaign. They set out its basic
responsibilities, including planning, coordination and reporting, and established an
administrative structure and tasks throughout the country. The orders gave the
programme the “highest priority”, indicating to officials that they would
be closely monitored, and that the government was prepared both to reward high
performers and punish laggards. The Prime Minister boosted incentives in two sets of
regulations issued on February 11. One of those was the Prime Minister’s Office
Regulations on Bonuses and Rewards Relating to Narcotics (No. 3). This document
amended two earlier reward regimes, and effectively encouraged the murder of drug
suspects by providing grades of bonuses where the most efficient and expedient means
for officials to be rewarded was simply to kill the accused:
Article 18 of the Prime Minister’s Office Regulations on Bonuses and Rewards
Relating to Narcotics BE 2537 (1994), which had been amended by the Prime
Minister’s Office Regulations on Bonuses and Rewards Relating to Narcotics (No.
2) BE 2540 (1997)... shall be replaced by the following statements:
“Article 18: The bonus shall be given when officials proceed with a notified
case leading to arrest according to the following rules and conditions:
(1) In a case where both the alleged offender is arrested and the exhibited narcotics
are seized, if the value calculated based on the quantity of narcotics does not
exceed 1000 Baht, each case shall be paid not exceeding 1000 Baht, after the Public
Prosecutor has issued a prosecution order. If the case falls under Section 92 of the
Narcotics Control Act BE 2522 (1979) and Section 17 of the Royal Ordinance of the
Control on the Use of Volatile Substances BE 2533 (1990), the bonus shall not be
paid.
(2) In a case where the alleged offender is arrested and the exhibited narcotics are
seized, if the value calculated based on the quantity of narcotics exceeds 1000
Baht
(a) In a case where the Public Prosecutor issues a prosecution order, the bonus
calculated based on the quantity of narcotics may be paid in half before the Public
Prosecutor issues a prosecution order. The remaining amount is to be paid in full
when the Public Prosecutor has issued a prosecution order.
(b) The bonus calculated based on the quantity of narcotics shall be paid only in
half if the Public Prosecutor has issued a non-prosecution order, or ceased the
proceedings.
(3) In a case where both the alleged offender is arrested and the exhibited narcotics
are seized, but the alleged offender loses his life during the arrest or thereafter,
if the value calculated based on the quantity of narcotics exceeds 1000 Baht, the
bonus shall be paid according to the quantity of narcotics when the Public Prosecutor
has ceased the proceedings.
(4) In a case where only the exhibited narcotics are seized after the Public
Prosecutor has stayed the inquiry, issued a prosecution or non-prosecution order, if
the value calculated based on the quantity of narcotics exceeds 1000 Baht, only half
of the bonus shall be paid.”
(Unofficial translation of article 4, italics added to subsection 3)
At later dates, certain rewards were increased so that, for instance, a state
official seizing property that had been purchased with drug money could get up to 40
per cent of its value.
Public statements enabled and encouraged what was on paper. The Prime Minister
consistently portrayed drug dealers as sub-humans deserving to die. He also played
down the deaths relative to the apparent successes of the campaign, wondering aloud
why the killing of thousands of people who had not yet been proven guilty of any
crime should be worthy of public attention or scrutiny. Even in reiterating the
official line, that most deaths were just cases of “bad guys killing bad
guys”, or “killing to cut the link”, he stated that the government
had no responsibility to protect these undesirable citizens. This position, however,
was already quite a step-down from remarks he reportedly made to senior government
officials from across the country at a meeting in the lead-up to the campaign on
January 15. “We have to shoot to kill and confiscate their assets as well, so
their sinful inheritance will not be passed on,” he is reported to have said,
adding, “We must be brutal enough because drug dealers have been brutal to our
children. Today, three million Thai youths are into drugs and 700,000 are deeply
addicted. To be cruel to drug dealers is therefore appropriate.” The Prime
Minister’s remarks were supported at all levels of government, not least of all
by the Interior Minister, Wan Mohamad Noor Matha, who remarked memorably that drug
dealers “will be put behind bars or even vanish without a trace”. The
language used by the Prime Minister and his officials throughout the campaign also
sought to evoke a feeling of being at war, such as in a March 2 address when he said,
“Don’t be moved by the high death figures. We must be adamant and finish
this war... When you go to war and some of your enemies die, you cannot become
soft-hearted, otherwise the surviving enemy will return to kill you.” He also
referred to drug dealers and their accomplices as “traitors”. Over time,
this language found its way into policy documents, such as Prime Minister’s
Order No. 60/2546, which states in its preamble that “the ‘Concerted
Effort of the Nation to Overcome Drugs’ is specifically regarded as a state of
war”.
Provincial governors and police chiefs were motivated to act according to a strict
timetable. Their performance was measured by statistics on drug dealers
‘removed’ from society on a month by month basis, starting with 25 per
cent of the total by the end of February, 50 per cent by the of March, and 100 per
cent by the end of April. The final figure was later reduced to 75 per cent, and a
plan drawn up to deal with the remaining 25 per cent at a more leisurely pace by the
King’s birthday in December. Underachieving provinces were announced publicly
and senior officials openly threatened with the sack or transfers. Clearly an
enormous amount of pressure was applied to meet unreasonable and arbitrary targets.
And it was not enough for officials merely to present figures of arrests, convictions
and deaths of dealers: they had to target thousands of specific persons, whose names
were on lists.
Watchlists, blacklists, deathlists
From the start of the campaign, the lists of alleged drug dealers were a source of
confusion. There were contradictory stories about how the lists were prepared, how
many there were, and the implications of being on one. There appeared at times to be
competing lists, and different ways of managing them in different provinces. They
seem to have been drawn up from August 2002 by the police, village heads and local
administrative bodies under the Interior Ministry, and the Office of the Narcotics
Control Board. Whereas the police claim to have relied upon informants and leads, it
appears that often they just added names from records of earlier
convictions—some going back years. As for the lists prepared by local
administrators, reports suggest that in many places the village or subdistrict chiefs
simply called public meetings and asked people to inform on persons selling drugs in
the neighbourhood, without any further investigation. The Interior Ministry claims
that lists were cross-checked before final definitive versions were sent out, however
in some places police refused to rely on the Interior Ministry lists after criticism
that too many innocent persons were being arrested or killed. Meanwhile, the head of
the Narcotics Suppression Bureau, Police Lieutenant General Chalermdej Chomphunuj
tried to clarify matters by explaining that there were two types of lists in
operation: a ‘blacklist’ of targets for arrest, and a
‘watchlist’ of those “pending investigation”. The police
commander suggested that the watchlists were comprised of persons who would be
investigated, and not arrested automatically. Only a month into the campaign,
however, and there were admissions by senior officials that mistakes had been made on
the lists. Around 4000 names were removed from the original 46,000-name watchlist, in
response to public complaints. By that time over half of the total victims of the
‘war’ were already dead.
Whatever the mechanics of the lists, the consequence of being on one was possible
death. Although the manner of killings varied across the country, the most commonly
described pattern was as follows:
1. A victim’s name would appear on a list. The list would be made public
knowledge, by word of mouth, or other means.
2. The victim would receive a letter or some other notice instructing her to go to
the police station.
3. At the police station, the victim would be coerced to sign something admitting
guilt, or otherwise acknowledge guilt, with promises by the police that her name
would be removed from the list.
4. The victim would be shot on the way home, or within a few days, usually by a group
of men in civilian clothes, in daylight and in a public place or at her house, often
in front of and without regard to witnesses.
5. Police would fail to investigate the killing properly, and would concentrate on
establishing the victim’s guilt as a drug dealer.
Although Lieutenant General Chalermdej tried to reassure a nervous public that,
“We don’t simply write down the names of drug suspects on a list and go
out to terminate them,” the death toll early in the campaign was dramatic.
Dozens of people were being killed daily. An anonymous police colonel was reported as
having said that his superiors had in fact ordered him to collect information on drug
dealers and then kill the informants and track down and kill those named. “Why
should we spare the scum?” he was quoted as saying, echoing the Prime
Minister’s sentiments. A police station in the north got into the spirit of the
campaign by piling a dozen coffins onto its doorstep.
At the end of February, police in most places had already dealt with their key
targets, but were under pressure to continue meeting monthly percentiles imposed on
them by Bangkok. Desperate to appear vigilant and keep their jobs, officers began
arresting informants or questioning persons with tenuous links to suspects who had
already been ‘removed’ from the lists. Persons who had merely
participated in drug control programmes were targeted. In some places,
‘complaints boxes’ and anonymous hotlines were set up for people to
inform on one another. Police are alleged to have increasingly resorted to planting
of evidence and coercion to obtain confessions from suspects.
One characteristic of the campaign was the lack of police investigations after
victims were murdered. Police sometimes excused themselves on the grounds that they
needed all their resources to meet the government targets, however the acting
director of the Forensic Science Institute, Dr Pornthip Rojanasunan, doubted these
explanations. In mid-February she observed that her agency had resources available to
help investigate cases, but the police were not seeking its assistance. Whereas
before February the Institute had typically examined one to two extrajudicial
killings per day, the number of referrals had since dropped to zero. She said that
relatives of those killed had contacted the Institute directly to get help in having
the deaths properly investigated, “But not much can be done if the first
autopsy is conducted elsewhere and the lethal bullets removed.” Other doctors
also reported that they were reluctant to attend the scenes of drug-related shootings
as required by law, or record anything that did not verify the police version of
events.
Where police did attend the murder scenes, their investigations and questions were
typically directed towards establishing the victims’ guilt, rather than take
action to arrest the murderers. For instance, in the case of Somjit Kuanyuyen,
instead of collecting evidence the police reportedly interrogated her daughter about
her mother’s presumed involvement in the drug trade. Where evidence of drug
trading was uncovered, it was also used to justify the murder and effectively close
the case. When Bussaporn Pung-am was killed, for instance, police briefed the media
on how they found court documents in her house showing she had acted as a guarantor
for drug suspects, and added that she had been previously arrested on drug charges.
The implication of these remarks, as in so many other cases, was that she deserved to
die.
Another feature of the campaign was the rise and subsequent fall of the death tally.
In February, the Interior Ministry published a daily count of arrests, seizures and
killings. As attention increasingly focused on the death toll, the government grew
uneasy and accused journalists of misrepresenting the tally. By the end of February,
public releases of statistics on killings were banned, in response to growing
criticism. At the date of the last official tally, on February 26, 1140 persons had
been murdered. However, later police did release statistics indicating that to April
16, 2275 persons were killed, 51 by their own agency in “self defence”.
By the end of the month the figure was estimated to be around 2400, however by this
stage the government was backing away from the statistic, arguing that perhaps half
of the murders had been incorrectly recorded.
The death toll was retracted after the first month partly due to growing
international alarm over the number of killings. However, as talk grew of possible
United Nations involvement, the Prime Minister reacted with annoyance, as reported in
The Nation on February 15:
Regarding the reported inquiry by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights into
Thailand’s current crackdown against drugs, I believe we have nothing to hide.
Nothing to worry about... The campaign against drugs will continue, unchanged... The
international community owes us an expression of thanks [for reducing the drug
trade]. We should not be over-sensitive to what others say. One should put things
into perspective. How many policemen have been killed by drug dealers? I lost count
of the number of wreaths that I have sent to funerals of policemen killed in the line
of duty. Do our critics consider the wretched lives of drug dealers more precious
than our policemen’s? Any policemen who kills an innocent person will be
prosecuted. Don’t be too self-conscious. Don’t try too hard to live up to
international standards. Our country already looks good in the eyes of the
international community.
Whereas the Prime Minister pretended not to care about overseas opinion, his comments
and actions betrayed otherwise. He eventually permitted a visit by Hina Jilani, the
United Nations Special Representative on human rights defenders. Although the Special
Representative spent most of her time on matters unrelated to the anti-drug campaign
she did raise her concerns with the Prime Minister and the media. In response the
Prime Minister launched a personal attack on the Special Representative, remarking,
“She is biased and not acceptable. She made unfair remarks about our country. I
complained in a talk with her that if she thought the human rights in Thailand are
not up to standard, she should look at other UN members including Pakistan, her
mother country.”
Media and public response
One of the reasons that the government could effectively get away with murder was the
widespread belief, even among its critics, that an overwhelming number of people in
Thailand supported the campaign. Tired of seeing drug dealers run rampant across the
country, it was said, most were happy to see the government finally do something
decisive. The generally accepted view was that the ends justified the means, so long
as the persons killed could in fact be considered guilty of a crime. This attitude
was captured in a non-government organization’s report on the killing of four
ethnic Hmong men, among whom only the village head was thought to be guilty of drug
trading:
The family members of village head don’t want to talk about this case and they
could accept the killing because the head of the village did sell drugs and in their
opinion he deserved to be punished (killed). But, the relatives of the other 3 could
not accept their killing. They believe that this action was from the police and they
are very angry the police executed innocent people.
At the same time, however, as the number of deaths rapidly increased, a wave of fear
distorted polls and other means to assess the campaign’s popularity. Whatever
the case, whether out of genuine support or intimidation, few people were prepared to
come out in opposition to the ‘war’.
The media response also was problematic. Although daily reporting the latest events,
coverage was mostly of comments by officials and chillingly verbatim descriptions of
killings as given by police, such as this from the Bangkok Post of February 15:
Eight people were yesterday gunned down in Nakhon Phanom province in separate
incidents, believed to be drug-related. Five of the victims were killed in Si
Songkhram, two in Na Kae and one in That Phanom districts.
In Si Songkhram, Sermsiri Tamonnin, 34, the first victim, was found dead in her house
in tambon Ban Uang at 6am. She had been shot in the head and body.
Thien Mokmeechai, 46, was gunned down in his house in tambon Phon Sawang at 6.30am.
Witnesses said a man came on a motorcycle, walked into the house and opened fire at
Thien.
At about the same time, Amporn Phiewkham, 43, was shot dead at his house in tambon
Tha Bo.
Vinai Nakajat, 40, was killed by an assailant in tambon Sam Phong.
In tambon Hat Phaeng, Sompong Promson, 49, was shot at by gunmen while eating inside
his house.
In That Phanom district, Suriya Thong-on was gunned down in front of his house in
tambon Na Thon.
Killed in their home in Na Kae district about noon were Thanomsak Moonsurin, 40, and
his wife Chalaolak, 39.
Nakhon Phanom police chief Pol Maj-Gen Paiboon Phetplai said all of those killed were
on record as having been involved in the drug trade.
Media and public concern was restricted to the suffering of obvious innocents, rather
than the practice of murder as public policy. An exemplary case was when police shot
nine-year-old Chakraphan Srisa-ard in his family’s car, as his mother sped
away. Had the child not been in the car, it would have been another simple affair of
a dead drug dealer for the police to file away. Unfortunately for the officers
involved, the young boy’s death aroused national ire, and somehow the need for
justice in this one case overrode everything else that happened across these three
months. The media also focused on the hardships endured by relatives of victims after
their deaths. A May 28 article in The Nation, for instance, reported on the families
of the four Hmong men mentioned above:
Somchai Sae Thao’s death has left his wife “Yeng” and their seven
children in a distressing situation. The heritage left to them by his death is an
uncertain future. As she contemplated her fate, Yeng dropped her eyes to her swelling
stomach—a new baby is due soon but it will have no father to provide food and
sustenance. Her 15-year-old eldest son is the family’s only hope now. Every
day, the boy goes to ask his neighbours whether they want him to work on their farm.
Some days the boy is able to return home with something for the family—other
days his mother and younger sisters and brothers get nothing to eat.
The media narrowed its reporting onthe campaign in part due to overt and covert
government threats. As Chaiyan Rajchagool, a lecturer in Social Science at Chiang Mai
University noted, “No one objects to drug suppression. But if you raise
questions, you can be blamed as someone who supports the drug dealers.” This
was apparent when the Defense Minister responded to newspaper criticism by suggesting
that journalists were in drug dealers’ pockets. Additionally, the Prime
Minister is himself a media and communications tycoon whose influence and financial
power can be used subtly in many ways, as Senator Mareerath Kaewkar noted, remarking
that for a newspaper or magazine, “One criticism too many could cost millions
of Baht in withdrawn advertising.”
The media’s inability to come to terms with the extent and depth of the crisis
has left a hole where there used to be public debate in Thailand. Whereas television
discussion forums had in recent years become places for lively exchange, with diverse
opinions, analysis, and large audiences, now these are gone. The public space for
dissent has been markedly reduced. Critics of government actions are restricted to
seminars in universities or small gatherings of non-government organizations. Even in
these forums, speakers may attack individuals or their actions, but are reluctant to
address questions of policy. According to Mark Tamthai, a retired philosophy
professor and consultant to the National Security Council, “There is no place
in Thailand now where you can publicly study the consequences of government
policies.”
Role of the National Human Rights Commission
The position of the National Human Rights Commission has been seriously compromised
by the anti-drugs campaign. The Commission, which was only established in 1999, was
effectively silenced by the government, and has been unable to excite the public in
defence of the principles it represents.
From the beginning, the Commission received relatively few complaints, and most of
those were from persons objecting to their names being on a list, not families of
murder victims. The Commission did respond to the complaints it received and
followed-up on them with the relevant authorities, resulting in amendments to lists
made later. However, even this relatively small number of complaints stretched its
resources, and it was restricted to dealing with individual cases rather than
seriously addressing systemic problems.
The real difficulties for the Commission began when the government attacked one of
its members, Professor Pradit Charoenthaithawee, for reporting on the extrajudicial
killings during a UN meeting he attended overseas. After returning to Thailand,
Professor Pradit received death threats, and calls for his impeachment. In a national
radio address, the Prime Minister launched a personal attack on Professor Pradit, and
accused him of overstepping his authority as a human rights commissioner. “Let
us deal with the UN, because that is our job. Those who are not responsible for such
duties should keep away,” the Prime Minister said. General Panlop Pinmanee,
deputy chief of the Internal Security Operations Command, accused Professor Pradit of
being an ally of drug dealers. As a result, the Commission was forced onto the back
foot, and spent its time defending its mandate and the reputations of its members,
rather than addressing the crisis directly. The Chairman of the Commission, Professor
Saneh Chamarik, was obliged to announce that in principle the Commission supported
the government’s drug suppression policies, so long as in practice they did not
violate human rights and the country’s Constitution. His conciliatory approach,
however, was not responded to favourably by the Prime Minister, who later refused to
meet with the commissioners.
Responding to criticism about his management of the campaign, rather than engage the
National Human Rights Commission, the Prime Minister opted for another approach. He
set up committees to report directly to him, thereby sidelining the country’s
permanent national human rights institution. In two orders of February 28, the Prime
Minister established the Committee to Examine the Performance of Competent Narcotics
Law Enforcement Officials in Drug Suppression and, the Committee to Monitor the
Protection of Informants and Witnesses in Drug Suppression. “I expect the two
committees to ensure the rule of law and fairness in the anti-drug campaign,”
the Prime Minister said. “Critics of the campaign should now direct their
empathy to our children who are victims of the drug menace, instead of sounding the
alarm for falling traffickers.” The first committee sought police and public
cooperation in investigating killings, and whether police had followed procedures in
making reports, researching crimes and performing autopsies. However, in April the
Deputy Attorney General responsible for overseeing the work complained that the
committee had not yet received a single report from the police, let alone clear
figures on the number of the cases to investigate. In response, police claimed that
they hadn’t received any requests for reports. Meanwhile, the committee also
failed to draw any response from a silent and intimidated public, despite appeals for
victims to come forward.
The aftermath
On May 1 the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra declared the ‘war on
drugs’ a success and immediately launched his newest war, against rather more
nebulous “dark influences”. Within a few days, local authorities in Mae
Sot district, Tak, had summarily executed six Burmese migrant labourers, under the
impression that they could now ‘remove’ whatever target suited them.
Meanwhile, the ‘war on drugs’ is set to continue throughout the year,
albeit more low-key; the Prime Minister, it seems, has not tired of the fight.
The anti-drug campaign may have temporarily stemmed the flow and consumption of
amphetamines throughout Thailand, but the damage to its institutions will be much
more enduring, among them, the parliament, judiciary, police and media. Thailand now
has a Prime Minister, a legislative head, who is acting like the head of the
executive. It has a police force and government that are complicit in mass murder and
have learnt that performance is tied to the payment of commissions. It has a cowed
and submissive bureaucracy, and a diminished media.
Above all, a widespread attitude apparently exists that certain types of criminals
should simply be shot dead. If this mentality prevails, there is little hope of
maintaining an effectively functioning judicial system, as the presumption will be
that courts and their procedures can be bypassed or done away with altogether when
convenient. In neighbouring Cambodia, where the legal system is still barely
operational ten years after the United Nations completed its tenure, alleged
motorcycle thieves are beaten to death on the streets rather than it being left to
the state to mete out justice. By comparison, what has happened in Thailand this
year, where there is an established legal system, is far worse. The killings of
alleged drug dealers were organized and approved by decree. The perception that a
particular category of persons could be gunned down in their houses and cars was
officially approved. The sidestepping of due process was authorized by the state.
When clearly innocent people were listed or killed, the state was resented, but so
long as the majority of victims were successfully portrayed as guilty, the state
proclaimed overwhelming approval. The real challenge for human rights defenders in
Thailand, then, lies not in fighting for the rights of the innocent, but rather in
fighting for the rights of the guilty.
A comment on the consequences of extrajudicial killings in Thailand
Basil Fernando, Excecutive Director, Asian Legal Resource centre
The effect of drugs on a population can be very dangerous. However, the effect of
extrajudicial killings on a justice system is lethal. The latter can contribute much
more to the instability, insecurity and degeneration of society than the former. Law
enforcement agencies involved directly or indirectly in extrajudicial killings lose
all legitimacy.
When a newly emerging democracy such as Thailand allows extrajudicial killings to
occur, in fact it is reviving old practices where punishments were meted out at the
wish of the rulers without any references to limits imposed by law and morality. Such
practices were there for centuries and are part of the people¡¯s psyche.
The principles of the rule of law introduced by constitutions have only a short
history. Any hope of their internalization by people is seriously interrupted by the
reintroduction of old practices. This has a tremendously negative impact on
democratization. Only those who oppose democratization benefit when such an abrupt
reintroduction of old practices takes place. It may be said that with such
large-scale extrajudicial killings, Thailand has been pushed many steps
backwards.
A law enforcement agency that knows it has blood on its hands due to direct or
indirect involvement in extrajudicial killings cannot think of itself with a sense of
integrity. When there is such doubt in an organization, it is difficult to control
corruption. Thai law enforcement agencies are not known to be free from corruption,
however, there have been many moves in recent years to introduce greater measures to
control its spread. The present wave of extrajudicial killings has set such
developments back a long way.
Another disastrous consequence of this situation is the establishment or hardening of
criminal and police links. The extrajudicial killings that have occurred in Thailand
across recent months have involved the specialization of functions shared between law
enforcement agency personnel and some criminal elements. For example, a person is
called to a police station to make a statement and then on his way back home is
killed by unknown persons. Such activities are well coordinated, and will not end
with these killings. A new relationship has been established between the actual
killers and the planners of the killings. Law enforcement officers are in normal
circumstances expected to catch criminals. However, now they have become
collaborators in murder. How a law enforcement agency can get out of this trap is
hard to imagine.
Extrajudicial killings bring in secrecy and deception. There will be a need to deny
the responsibility of individuals and also the entire system. For this the law
enforcement agency will have to develop a communication policy in which complete or
partial falsehood will be allowed out of necessity. When the number of killings has
exceeded 2000 persons, such falsifications will have to be done on a large scale. It
is only natural that such falsification will have an effect within the institution.
Besides that, the public image of the institution will change, as those persons who
are quite aware of the facts will be cynical due to institutional fabrications of
events.
The group that will be lied to the most will be the family members and associates of
those who have been killed. The institution will have to withhold information about
the death of a particular person and give family members false information. This will
also have to be done to other members of the public, and the media. Thus, the
relationship with the public will be marked by deception. The result is that the
institution will be lowered in the estimation of the people. Such loss of prestige of
a public institution is seriously harmful to the rule of law and democracy.
As the Prime Minister has encouraged this policy, his government will have to protect
the officers who are directly or indirectly involved in these killings. Thus, the
moral authority of the government over its law enforcement agencies has been greatly
diminished. The involved politicians will now have to enter into many compromises
with officers. Thus disciplinary control of law enforcement agencies will be even
more difficult after these incidents.
These are but a few consequences of allowing such extrajudicial killings to occur.
Anyone who cares for democracy and the rule of law should worry about this turn of
events. Perhaps many years of struggle for democracy are now being undermined in a
very subtle but brutal way. The anti-corruption drive, right to information law,
autopsy law and other achiements like the establishment of the National Human Rights
Commission have all been undermined in one stroke.
It is necessary to investigate this whole affair and to redress those who have been
wronged. Above all, law enforcement agencies should be cleansed of those who have
blood on their hands.
Why has the rule of law been made a victim of Thailand's anti-drug campaign?
Asian Human Rights Commission
Since February, when the government of Thailand opened the way for alleged drug
traffickers to be murdered with impunity, over 2000 persons have been killed. This
relentless carnage poses an enormous threat. Unless quickly averted, the consequences
of mass extrajudicial killings will be far deeper and more insidious than the damage
caused by the trade and use of drugs in Thailand.
Behind the worst atrocities in history lies the mentality that there exists a class
of persons who can be eradicated simply because they are deemed socially undesirable-
in this case, alleged drug dealers. Irrespective of what a person is said to have
done, if they and their kind are pursued without regard for due process, a deep
social crisis is sure to follow.
The Asian Human Rights Commission has consistently reported on cases in Asia where
tacit state approval of one human rights violation has led to an intractable cycle of
abuse. Extrajudicial killings have led to mass disappearances and torture. Censorship
has led to political opponents and human rights defenders being targeted as alleged
criminals. Undermining of the judiciary and independent bodies established to monitor
abuses has eventually rendered them irrelevant.
By endorsing murder, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has set his country on a path
with dire consequences. Some are already being felt. The Prime Minister has himself
attacked the National Human Rights Commission simply for attempting to fulfill its
mandate. One of the commissioners has been warned that he may face impeachment, and
has received death threats. The Defence Minister has implied that drug dealers are
paying members of the media to criticize the government, opening the door for
sanctions against journalists.
Why did the rule of law need to be undermined to rid Thailand of drugs? The Prime
Minister remains answerable both to this question and the consequences of his
actions. He must now introduce a number of quick remedial measures to stay the
disaster he has precipitated.
The Prime Minister must be unequivocal that offences in Thailand will be dealt with
according to established judicial norms. The killings must be stopped, and those
already facing charges must be permitted fair trials. The Prime Minister must also
guarantee the authority of the National Human Rights Commission, and the safety of
its members.
Finally, the Prime Minister must permit a thorough, independent, international
enquiry into the atrocities to date, under United Nations auspices. He has remarked
that he has nothing to fear from the United Nations and international scrutiny. If
this is so then he should be more than willing to oblige. He has said that he can
explain everything. And indeed he must do so.
Addressing extrajudicial killings of alleged drug dealers in Thailand
Asian Legal Resource Centre
After a profound crisis hits the law enforcement and administrative organs of a
country, it can be difficult to see a way forward. With the extrajudicial killing of
over 2000 people accused of dealing in drugs this year, Thailand has been affected by
such a crisis. Coming after a period that saw a growing commitment to human rights
and democratization, many will be struggling to understand what has happened. Certain
agencies and persons must now take it upon themselves to lead their society out of
this mess.
The National Human Rights Commission for one must address this crisis as if a matter
of its own survival. It must persist in investigating all complaints of killings and
other rights violations arising from the ¡®war on drugs¡¯, and
make public its findings in each and every case. It must consistently and
deliberately lobby through the media and every other available means for a full
accounting of these killings. It should also set a target to complete and publicize a
thorough report on the killings and related abuses, and present its findings to the
National Assembly. Among matters this report should consider is the adequate
compensating of all victims and their families. To do all this it must be able to
fulfill its mandate, which means that the Prime Minister and other government
officials must cease launching attacks against the Commission and its members. They
must also respect its powers and respond to its enquiries in keeping with section 32
of the National Human Rights Commission Act of 1999. Furthermore, the Commission must
be provided with adequate resources, as stipulated in section 75 of the
Constitution.
The Ministry of Justice also must vigorously pursue all cases of murder, and enforce
the law equally and without delay. It must respond to all complaints and in
particular ensure that in every possible case full and proper autopsies and forensic
examinations are conducted. Where bodies or evidence have been destroyed or
¡®lost¡¯, the police officers responsible must be held to
account. The Ministry should also consider providing better incentives to doctors to
undertake autopsies and site investigations, and establish the means to ensure that
they are not subjected to police intimidation.
Internationally, the United Nations and other groups too must take a much more
assertive role in dealing with these events. In particular, the Special Rapporteur of
the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial killings should approach the
Government of Thailand and raise these murders as a subject of special concern. The
Special Rapporteur must urge the government to grant an international team access to
investigate the killings thoroughly. The United Nations must also respond to attacks
on its credibility, and that of its representatives, by the Prime Minister and other
officials in the Government of Thailand. Furthermore, it should provide material
assistance to agencies genuinely committed to investigating these killings, and
likewise suspend partnerships with those that are failing to cooperate. Similarly,
international donor agencies should also as a matter of policy raise their concerns
regarding these events, and tie the provision of assistance for programmes in
Thailand to evidence of progress in investigations.
All of this requires the leadership and participation of concerned Thai citizens.
Lawyers, doctors, human rights advocates, victims and their relatives must be
prepared to come together and voice their concerns over what has happened. They must
exchange ideas on practical, locally devised solutions to the crisis. They must be
prepared to act in the face of government threats, and unchallenged assumptions that
the vast majority of Thai citizens have been swayed by the propaganda that
accompanied this campaign. Indeed, without alternative voices making themselves
heard, the public will continue to be held captive to this propaganda and subjected
to a climate of fear and intimidation from which only more bloodshed, deceit and
animosity can be expected to come.
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